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ABSTRACT
This thesis is based on the belief that Richard Casey played
a greater role than has been attributed to him in the
foundation of the wartime alliance between Australia and
the United States. Throughout his distinguished political
career, Casey lived in the shadow of the Prime Ministers
Robert Menzies and John Curtin. Casey was widely praised
by contemporaries and scholars for his tireless efforts as
Australia’s first ambassador to the United States in 194042, yet there is little public recognition of his role in laying
the foundation for the alliance between Australia and the
United States. Bridge and other academic historians have
rehabilitated Casey; this has not, however, flowed through
to

popular

culture

and

writers

of

popular

histories.

Instead, most accounts misleadingly credit Prime Minister
John Curtin with the fact that Australia successfully ‘looked
to America’ for its salvation in World War Two. It will be
argued here that one reason for the neglect of Casey is
that, while he is often credited as a superb publicist and
networker in Washington, he is not normally given much
credit in the American decision in December 1941 to turn
Australia into its Pacific base. It will be argued here that
there needs to be greater recognition of Casey as a
strategic thinker who, more than Curtin or any other
Australian, facilitated the transformation of Australia into a
key American ally.
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Introduction
Richard

Gardiner

Casey

distinguished Australian.
became,

in

turn,

a

was,

by

any

standard,

a

Trained as an engineer, he
decorated

soldier,

diplomat,

parliamentarian, member of both the British War Cabinet
and the Australian Cabinet and Australian War Cabinet,
company director, party chief, peer, Privy Councillor and
twice, vice-regal envoy. His efforts were usually attended
by success and encomium. For the most part, his abilities
were recognised by his peers. The Department of Foreign
Affairs in Canberra is today housed in a building named in
Casey’s honour. Australia’s Antarctic base also carries
Casey’s name. Yet, in the eyes of many of his fellow
countrymen, he was not, and is not, held in the high regard
that his accomplishments would suggest is warranted. His
devotion to his country, even his patriotism has been seen
as qualified by self-interest. Moreover, within the confines
of his political reference groups, his limitations robbed him
of the political reward that he most coveted – the prime
ministership.
Thus, the perception of Casey in Australian history accords
him a minor role.

Because of his failure to achieve any

kind of domestic political eminence, he has been relegated
to that large band of political identities who had the
misfortune to reach near the top, but never the top itself,
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of the political plum tree during the long period of what has
become known as ‘the Menzies years’.
This thesis is an attempt to conduct a closer examination of
Casey in one specific period in his career, 1940 to 1942,
when he represented Australia in Washington. This period
has been chosen because his responsibilities as Australian
Minister in Washington could be regarded as the most
important responsibilities he ever undertook. In the years
immediately leading up to the outbreak of the war in the
Pacific, the government and the people of Australia
realised, with increasing dismay, that the nation would be
virtually defenceless in the event of attack by the forces of
Japan, an attack long feared and expected.

With Britain

fighting for its very survival and unable to offer any kind of
military or naval aid and much of the Australian defence
forces engaged in the Middle East and the European
theatres, Australia increasingly perceived the United States
as the only power capable of bestowing assistance.
It is not an original observation to argue that the years
1940 to 1942 included the most significant events of the
twentieth century. The historian, Ian Kershaw, claimed that
1941

was

the

most

momentous

year

in

modern

history.1According to Kershaw: ‘That year, the most awful

1

Ian Kershaw. Fateful Choices. Ten Decisions That Changed The World. 19401941, (London: Penguin, 2007), p. xv.
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in history…took its shape largely from a number of fateful
choices made by the leaders of the world’s major powers.’
This was certainly true of Australia’s situation too. As Harry
Gelber described Casey’s mission to the United States:
‘never

before

and

never

since

has

any

Australian

Ambassador been called upon to serve in so vital a post at
such a critical turning point not only in Australian but world
history’.2
While ever the United States remained the focus of
Australia’s endeavours to enlist massive military aid in the
feared conflict with Japan, Casey’s role as Australia’s chief
representative

in

the

United

States

carried

grave

responsibilities. It was he who would argue the justification
for American participation in the defence of Australia, not
only with the Roosevelt Administration but with the
American people, who were deeply committed to an
isolationist stance, as the rest of the world erupted into
war.
When Casey first arrived in the United States, he received
the worst possible news from the American President.
Roosevelt confirmed to Casey that his Cabinet had decided
that assistance in the event of war breaking out in the
2

Harry Gelber,

‘Turning Points. Richard Casey and the Development of An

Australian Foreign Service’, Quadrant, April 2009, Vol. 53, pp 74-79, p. 79.
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Pacific could not be offered to Australia, which was so
distant from where the United States’ principal strategic
interests lay. Casey was quickly made aware that one
reason for the Roosevelt Administration’s view was that
public opinion would not allow any offers of help to
Australia. For the entirety of his term in the United States,
Casey strove to turn around public opinion, Administration
thinking and American naval and military strategy.
It would not be too blunt to claim that the American refusal
to come to the military aid of Britain in May-June 1940,
when that nation was seemingly threatened with invasion,
boded ill for Australia. The survival of Britain was far more
important

to

the

United

States

than

Australia,

yet

Washington was not prepared to give that aid. Australia,
obviously,

was

not

seen

as

being

worthy

of

more

sympathetic consideration. Casey’s mission therefore was
to convince the United States that Australia should be
looked upon not as a distant outpost of the British Empire,
but as a key element of its strategic thinking.
This study seeks to add to our understanding of the degree
to which Casey’s adroit lobbying took the concept of an
Australia-America alliance to the point where United States
strategic thinking perceived Australia as an integral part of
that thinking. Casey’s efforts were directed to the coming
together of Australia and the United States and the
creation of an alliance between the two nations, an alliance
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that preserved Australia in 1942. Casey’s efforts in 194042 were undertaken in the context of Australia’s very
survival being guaranteed only with American help. Casey’s
achievement was that, more than any other Australian, he
facilitated the movement of Australia from the periphery to
near the centre of the United States’ strategy in the Pacific
War.
Yet this is not the most common or popular view of Casey’s
achievements in the United States. Although there is a
general recognition of Casey’s active and successful efforts
in making Australia better known to influential figures in
the Administration and the American media, there is little
recognition linking Casey with the United States’ strategic
decision to use Australia as the base for the repulse to the
Japanese attack. In most academic studies, Casey is
accorded only a minor role, given that the Americans only
entered the war after the events at Pearl Harbor seeminlgly
gave them no other choice than to turn Australia into their
Pacific base. Popular representations and much of the
historiography of this period clearly perceives the Prime
Minister John Curtin as the catalyst in the Australian
defence strategy moving from its traditional reliance on
Britain to a new alliance with the United States. As the
historian
popularity:

James

Curran

explained

Curtin’s

enduring

11

In a land that has seen no civil war or engaged in no
act of military rebellion against the ‘mother country’ to
act as the baptismal font for a self-sustaining national
mythology, the Curtin story offers a tale rich in the
vital ingredients of nationalist drama and human
experience..3
Or to quote the journalist Allan Ramsey: ‘If anyone was
ever the political father of Australia’s security ties with
Washington, however much they were formalized by the
Menzies coalition government’s negotiation of ANZUS in
1951, it was without question, Labor’s John Curtin’.4
The conventional wisdom holds that Curtin’s initiative in
gaining American support at this very crucial time led to
the development of close and enduring ties with the United
States, ties that since 1941 have remained the foundation
of Australian defence policy, endorsed by both major
political parties. As one recent study has put it, ‘the alliance
with the United States remains the universally-supported
centrepiece of Australia’s foreign policies’.5The role of
Curtin in this hugely significant development in Australian
defence and foreign policy has become part history and
part folklore, made immeasurably easier to understand by
3

James Curran, Curtin’s Empire, (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

p. 5.
4

5

Alan Ramsey, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 October 2001.

Mark Beeson, ‘Australia, the United States and the Unassailable Alliance’, in
John Dumbrell and Alex Schafer (eds), America’s ‘Special Relationships (London:
Routledge, 2006), p. 76.
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the adoption of the simple tag, ‘Australia Looks to
America’. This was a key phrase in the statement, issued
by Curtin as a New Year’s Day message to a Melbourne
newspaper on 27 December 1941. As Lionel Fredman has
put it: ‘Curtin’s statement of 27 December, 1941, has
become a landmark in our history’.6 Or as former Prime
Minister Bob Hawke put it in a forward to a book entitled
John Curtin: Saviour of Australia, Curtin was ‘the greatest
of Australians’.7 This link between Curtin’s appeal, the
wartime alliance with the United States, the transformation
of Australia into an American bridgehead for the Pacific
War, and the formalising of the alliance in the ANZUS
treaty of 1951 appears well established.

‘Australia looks to America’ has come to convey a precise
meaning of where Australia stands in relation to the rest of
the world. Because Casey’s work was what might be
described as ‘behind-the-scenes’ diplomacy, his writings
left no such identifiable marker to compare with ‘Australia
Looks to America’. Writing in 1982, Carl Bridge noted that
Casey’s

mission

to

the

United

States

was

widely

understood to have produced little that was positive:

6

L.E Fredman, The United States Enters the Pacific, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson,
1969), p. 55.
7

R.J.Hawke, ‘Foreword’ in Norman E. Lee, John Curtin. Saviour of Australia,
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1983).
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Existing accounts are harsh in their assessments of the
effectiveness of Australia’s first Washington legation in
the two years from its establishment in March 1940 until
the fall of Singapore in February 1942.8
Over the years, Bridge and others have fought to correct
this impression of Casey as a failure, but, even today,
doubts

remain.

Certainly,

there

is

no

widepsread

recognition of Casey as the foundation stone of Australia’s
alliance with the United States. Bridge, in 2008, noted the
continuing neglect when he wrote that:
Few today realise that when Curtin issued his famous
“Australia looks to America” statement in December
1941 he was actually following the trail blazed and
prepared brilliantly by Casey over the previous two
years. It was then that the seeds of the future
Australia-United States alliance were planted.9
As Bridge is acknowledging here, the standard accounts of
the dramatic events of 1940-42 rarely if ever directly credit
Casey with an important role in the American decision to
turn Australia into its base in the South-West Pacific. Yet
there are good reasons for thinking that this was Casey’s
legacy.

8

Carl Bridge, ‘R G Casey, Australia’s First Washington Legation and the Origins of
the Pacific War, 1940-1942’, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, 1982,
Vol. 28, No 2. pp. 181-189,p. 181.

9

Carl Bridge ‘ The Other Blade of the Scissors’, in Baxter, Christopher and Andrew
Stewart, Diplomats At War, British and Commonwealth Diplomacy in
Wartime.(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) p. 148.
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It was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December
1941 that caused the United States to come to the aid of
Australia. In the weeks that followed Pearl Harbor, General
George Marshall and his staff came up with a new plan for
war against Japan which situated Australia as its principal
Pacific base for waging that war. The standard accounts of
how Australia became an American base make the point
that

the

decision

was

‘coldly

strategic’.10

With

the

Philippines under attack and likely to fall, Australia, which
had barely entered the consciousness of the United States
eighteen

months

earlier,

now

became

a

strategic

priority.11Perhaps General Douglas Macarthur summed it up
best when he told Curtin in June 1942 that the interest of
the United States in Australia was purely ‘from the
strategical aspect of the utility of Australia as a base from
which to attack and defeat the Japanese’.12 Implicit in that
was the cold, hard fact that emotional ties between the
United States and Australia had no bearing whatsoever.
Yet, what is striking about the American decision is how
quickly and easily it was made, and how effectively it was
implemented. An awareness of Australia and what it had to
10

See, for example, Anthony Burke, Fear of Security. Australia’s Invasion Anxiety
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 74.

11

Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965, (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 68.

12

Quoted in Peter Stanley, Invading Australia. Japan and the Battle for Australia,
1942 (Camberwell: Penguin, 2008), p. 168.
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offer the United States had obviously grown, thanks to the
efforts of Casey and others. Casey learned of this felicitous
turn of events from Harry Hopkins, and recorded the news
in his diary:
December 22, 1941 Winston Churchill and the Chiefs of
Staff
arrived
in
Washington...
Harry
Hopkins
telephoned and cheered me up a good deal by saying
that he thought I would be pleased at what was in train
so far as Australia was concerned.
I told him that I
was feeling a little “blue”, at which he said that I had
no reason to do so, as the representations that I
had made were bearing very promising fruit ( my
emphasis).13
Harry Hopkins, a former Secretary of Commerce, was
Roosevelt’s personal and unofficial representative to the
British government. His closeness to the President is
exemplified by the fact that he lived in the White House.
The implications of the Hopkins’ message are worth noting.
They convey the thoughts of a close Presidential adviser,
probably

the

closest

Presidential

adviser.

Hopkins’

comments clearly recognise the work and effort that Casey
had put into the campaign to make Australia front and
centre of the new American political and military strategy.
At one level, the decision to turn Australia into its Pacific
base was an obvious choice in the context of December

13

Casey Diaries, 22 December 1941. The Casey Diaries are held at the National
Library of Australia, Canberra, at MS6150, Vol 1, Box 24. In this thesis, I simply
cite “Casey Diaries” and the date of entry.
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1941. As a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the
Americans had few options and so decided to ‘look to
Australia’. A more accurate way of looking at the matter is
to view the United States as being gradually drawn towards
looking at Australia as a base. As Bridge has described this
evolution, the Roosevelt Administration was badly shaken
by the fall of France. In September 1940, Roosevelt and
Churchill signed the ‘Destroyers for Bases’ deal, which
provided no real military help to Britain but proved that the
‘biased neutrality’ of the United States favoured the Allies.
In early 1941, the secret military ABC1 talks in Washington
suggested that ‘Australia would be a principal Pacific base
and a significant supply provider for the global war effort’.14
On 1 December 1941, the United States finally made an
‘explicit guarantee to come to Britain’s and Australia’s aid
should

the

December

Japanese
1941,

attack

Roosevelt

Malaya’.15
signed

Finally
off

on
on

17
the

Marshall/Eisenhower plan to turn Australia into its Pacific
base. From that moment, the ‘saving’ of Australia was
more or less assured.
Casey’s achievement was to encourage this process of
American recognition of what Australia had to offer to the

14

Carl Bridge, ‘Poland to Pearl Harbour’ in Carl Bridge (ed), Munich to Vietnam.
Australia’s Relations with the United States since the 1930s, (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1991), pp. 45-47.
15

Bridge, “The Other Blade of the Scissors”, pp. 140-143.

17

United States. Roosevelt himself, after Pearl Harbor,
credited Casey with being in tune with his own thinking.
Casey quoted the President as saying that: ‘As I have
always realised and as you have said in your speeches
here, the South West Pacific is one unit’.16It will be argued
here that the story needs to be recast so that at the centre
of Casey’s achievements is the successful promotion of
Australia as the principal American base and bridgehead in
a war with Japan.
For

Casey

personally,

the

wartime

alliance

between

Australia and the United States represented a recognition
of the correctness and the effectiveness of his arguments
that he had first developed when arguing for American
assistance to Britain during the Battle of Britain in the
summer of 1940. Casey’s years in Washington therefore
represent a key area of study and examination. While the
ultimate decision by the American president to wage the
major response to Japan from Australia might have been
made on purely strategic grounds, there are
justifications

sound

for concluding that Casey prepared

the

American leaders, including the President, for an inevitable
involvement in the South Pacific. Clearly, the decision by
Washington was one which had profound effects on the
survival of Australia.

16

Casey Diaries, 17 December 1941.
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As for why Casey has not been acknowledged for what he
achieved, several factors are at work. Bridge and others
have pointed out that Casey is a convenient villain in a
nationalist myth. According to this myth, it was only after
conservative United Australia Party politicians, such as
Casey, left the stage that the Labor team of Prime Minister
Curtin and Minister for External Affairs ‘Doc’ Evatt carved
out a new independent path for Australia that genuinely
reflected

Australia’s

national

interests.17

Casey

as

a

consequence is more likely to be remembered as too
attached to the British Empire to have been of much use to
Australia.18
It can also be added that in the context of Australian
politics, Casey does not present as a dynamic, engaging
personality capable of turning around world events. Casey
never boasted publicly that he had played an important
role in the creation of the Alliance. Over time, Americans
came to realise the value of Australia to American strategic
interests. The remarks by Harry Hopkins, speaking on
behalf of the President and referred to earlier, have been
allowed to remain largely unknown.

17

18

Bridge, ‘Poland to Pearl Harbour’, pp. 38-39.

Christopher Waters, ‘Casey. Four Decades in the Making of Australian Foreign
Policy’, p. 381.
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Finally, Casey’s achievement in the United States is often
described

in

terms

of

his

remarkable

publicity

and

networking achievements. What is often forgotten was that
Casey was a true diplomatic ‘renaissance man’. With
experience of the academic, military, business and political
spheres, Casey was better placed than most career
diplomats

when

faced

with

the

task

of

convincing

Americans to come in on the side of the Allies in World War
Two. Casey was a superb salesperson of Australia in the
United States and a tireless ‘networker’, but he was also
capable

of

thinking

strategically

and

mastering

the

technical detail of Australia’s military needs. Australia was
indeed fortunate to have Casey as its representative in
Washington in 1940-42.
The thesis argues that Casey should be remembered as a
highly effective advocate of Australia’s national interests
because he, more than any other Australian politician or
diplomat, facilitated the changed perception of Australia in
the United States. Casey was successful because he
understood an important fact of political life, that national
interest - and not brotherly concern or the ‘civilisational
ties’ of the British speaking world - would stimulate
American interest in Australia.Where he saw his role, was
to endeavour to change the perception of what the United
States thought its national interests to be.

20

As Christopher Waters has put it, Casey was a realist in
international relations terms.19According to Michael Wesley,
Australian realism has three key elements. The first was
‘experientialism’ – meaning a consciousness of Australia’s
isolation and its security threats. Secondly, Australian
realists are skeptical about the stability of the international
system and are prone to see the world in terms of threats.
Thirdly, Australian realism favours pragmatic or ‘common
sense’ solutions to international problems. There is little
faith in multinational efforts to solve problems or keep the
peace. Instead, realists recommend that Australia look out
for

its

own

interests,

usually

through

bilateral

relationships.20 These views were a clearly identifiable part
of the conservative tradition of Australian politics and not
simply a product of Menzies’ political strategies in his fight
with the Labor Party.21
Casey is a prime example of this type of realism. Casey’s
experiences of diplomacy in the 1920s and 1930s led him
to the conclusion that national interest was what mattered
in

the

world. He

was deeply pessimistic

about the

enforceability of the Treaty of Versailles and sceptical about
19

Christopher Waters, ‘Casey. Four Decades in the Making of Australian Foreign
Policy’. p. 383.

20

Michael Wesley, ‘The Rich Tradition of Australian Realism’, Australian Journal of
Politics and History: Vol. 55, Number 3, 2009, pp. 324-334, p. 325.
21

David Lowe, ‘Brave New Liberal: Percy Spender’, The Australian Journal of Politics
and History, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2005, pp.389-399, pp. 390-91.
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the

League

of

Nations.22Casey

was

an

enthusiastic

‘appeaser’, long before the word took on its defeatist and
pejorative connotation of submission to naked power.
Casey, understandably, favoured negotiation over war.
Appeasement, for Casey, was the logical way to maintain
the peace for an Australia that had nothing to gain and
much to lose from a new world war.
It was this realism and pragmatism that underpinned
Casey’s approach when he arrived in the United States in
Fenruary 1940. Casey quickly came to the view that
interesting Americans in Australia’s defence on the basis of
a common civilisational bond was simply futile. He was
proved right on this score. As Bridge has put it:
When the United States came to Australia’s defence in
1941 and 1942 they did so not just to protect ‘kith and
kin’ or to reward an ally, but to protect a vital source of
human resources, food supplies and other materials for
the global war effort and to preserve a basis for the
reconquest of their territories in South-East Asia.23
Understanding this reality was one of Casey’s strengths
almost from the outset of his work in the United States.
Casey was immediately struck by the fact that isolationism
in the United States meant that there was virtually no
solidarity at all among what is today described as the
22

Waters, ‘Casey. Four Decades in the Making of Australian Foreign Policy’ in
Australian Journal of Politics and History. Vol 51, No 3, 2005, P 383.

23

Bridge, ‘Poland to Pearl Harbour’, pp. 50-51.

22

‘Anglosphere’. There was no way that the United States
was going to save Australia because of their shared
civilisational values. Casey had to sell Australia as a vital
American economic, political and military resource. This he
did brilliantly.
Casey’s barnstorming of the United States was done in two
separate stages. For the first six months, the thrust of his
efforts were directed to attempting to generate greater
American support for Britain in her hour of need. By the
end of 1940, when the threat of a German invasion of
Britain was over, Casey threw himself into the real purpose
of his appointment, that is greater recognition of the
significant role Australia could play in the event of
hostilities breaking out in the Pacific. This, after all, was
going to be a global war. Casey endeavoured to emphasise
the strategic value of American involvement in the Southwest Pacific, specifically the huge landmass of Australia.
Casey’s prioritising of Britain in the first phase would lead
to the unwarranted tag that Casey was, as one historian
has put it, just ‘another good boy scout for the Empire’.24
Yet this type of criticism is unjustified. For Casey, Britain
was the first line of defence for both Australia and the
United

States

and

its

defeat

would

be

a

military

catastrophe for both counties, indeed for the whole world.
24

Stephen Alomes, A Nation at Last. The Changing Character of Australian
Nationalism 1880-1988, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1988), p. 116.

23

Once the threat of a German invasion of Britain had been
deferred or, as quickly became evident, cancelled in the
northern autumn of 1940, Casey concentrated on getting
Australia included into American strategic planning for the
looming conflict in the Pacific. Casey mingled with key
Administration figures, tirelessly worked the press and
town halls, and, especially in the second half of 1941,
shared his view with key American military leaders,
gradually improving American appreciation of what it was
that Australia had to offer.
At this point, it is fair to ask, what if Casey had been
ineffectual? Would the Americans have come to the same
conclusion about Australia, given the turn of events?

No

doubt the US would have eventually seen that Australia
was a logical choice from which to fight. However, Casey’s
groundwork not only in the political sense, but in providing
details of harbours, airfields, geographical possibilities, his
own WWI experience assisting his assessments, meant that
the US decision to use Australia as a base could be made
quickly with no need for detailed enquiries. The speed with
which the decision could be implemented is demonstrated
by the arrival of the Pensacola convoy in Australia on 22
December 1941.25

25

Mauriec Matloff and Edwin snell, The War Department Strategic Planning for
Coalition Warfare 1941-42, (Washington, DC: War Department, 1953), pp. 72-73.

24

The task of discovering, examining and documenting
Casey’s actual impact on the development of American
strategic thinking has been an exhausting one, extending
over more years than the author cares to count. The
research has involved documentation from a variety of
secondary and primary sources in Australia, in Britain, and
an even greater number of primary sources in the United
States. It must be admitted that the secondary literature is
daunting and much the same is true of primary sources,
given that this was an era when powerful players kept
diaires, sent letters, and wrote long confidential reports
that are now available to the public.
Casey

is

already

the

subject

of

a

vast

academic

literature.26Casey’s harshest critics have been an academic,
David Day, who knew him not, and a colleague, Paul
Hasluck, who knew him well. Casey wisely intended to
make sure that his side of the story would be told by
keeping a diary. Menzies’ biographer A.W. Martin described

26

W.J. Hudson, Casey, (Sydney: Oxford University Press, 1986), Carl Bridge, ‘R G
Casey’s Contribution to Australian War Policy’, Journal of the Historical Society of
South Australia, Vol.9. 1981, pp. 80-90, Carl Bridge, ‘R.G. Casey, Australia’s First
Washington Legation and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1940-1942’, The Australian
Journal of Politics and History, 1982. Vol. 28. No. 2. pp. 181-189, Bridget GriffenFoley, ‘The Kangaroo is Coming Into Its Own: R G Casey, Earl Newsom and Public
Relations in the 1940s’, The Australian Journal of American Studies, Vol.23, No.2.
December, 2004, pp.1-20, Harry Gelber, ‘Turning Points. Richard Casey and the
Development of an Australian Foreign Service’, Quadrant, April, 2009, pp.74-79,
David Ellery, ‘Furphies a’plenty in Long ANZUS Alliance’, Canberra Times, 18
November, 2011, Michael Birgan, ‘Lord Casey: Britain’s Secret Agent’, The Bulletin
(Sydney) 20 November, 1984, pp. 60-62.

25

Casey as ‘Canberra’s most notorious diarist’. Martin tells of
Casey almost daily distributing to friends and colleagues his
versions of daily events. Menzies was apparently opposed
to the concept of diary-keeping and told the GovernorGeneral, Lord de Lisle, that he did not trust people who
kept diaries.27 Although Menzies instructed Casey to cease
his diary-keeping, Casey clearly ignored his Prime Minister.
Instead, he became more discriminating in choosing
readers of his daily thoughts. His diaries for the period
March 1940 to March 1942 have been minutely examined
and published as The Washington Diaries edited by Carl
Bridge.28The

unabridged

Casey

diaries,

used

for

the

research for this thesis, are available at the National
Library of Australia.29Casey’s diaries are testament to the
multiplicity of repeat meetings with officers and officials
holding senior positions in their respective fields, which
clearly show that Casey occupied an unusual, if not a
unique position of both importance and influence in the
Washington firmament.

Of course, with any diary, one

needs to question the audience for which it was intended.
As Casey’s will left his diaries to the National Library of
27
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Australia, he clearly meant them to be publicly available
after his death.

He knew they would be an addition to

archived official documents and so they add a personal
aspect to formal documents and provide an insight into the
commitment to official duties and participation in the ‘social
whirl’ and the manner in which Casey combined the two to
achieve his aims.
There were three Prime Ministers – Robert Menzies, Arthur
Fadden and John Curtin, and four Ministers for External
Affairs– Henry Gullett, John McEwan, Frederick Stewart and
Herbert Evatt - while Casey was in the United States.
Casey, of course, wrote cablegram reports and letters to
them all. Much of this correspondence is available through
the National Library and the National Archives.
Despite the high offices that Casey held in a singularly
successful life, his ability to mix easily with the powerful
and the influential and his propensity to gravitate towards
the centres of action, there has been only one full-length
biography, by W.J.Hudson, published in 1986.30 Hudson’s
work is an important source of biographical material about
Casey, but, by no means, the only source. Apart from
familiarity with the more commonplace documents and
personal writings, Hudson had the advantage of having
worked
30

on

the

W.J. Hudson, Casey. P. ix

publication

of

a

large

volume

of
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correspondence that flowed between Casey and Stanley
Melbourne Bruce, Australia’s eighth Prime Minister and
Casey’s principal supporter.31
Hudson recognised perhaps the major hazard confronting a
biographer: ‘If one invests some years of one’s own life in
the exploration and presentation of another’s, one tends to
justify the investment by exaggerating the qualities of the
subject’. Hudson, to his credit, achieved exemplary balance
in his account, noting Casey’s strengths and weaknesses.
According to Hudson, Casey sought to live ‘a highly
gregarious life and a very public life’. Yet, Hudson, after
years of researching the ‘millions of words’ that, as a
compulsive writer, Casey left behind, concluded he was
extremely careful in what he wrote.32 Carried through to his
personal

relationships,

this

characteristic

would

have

ensured a good fit into the higher echelons of government
in both London and Washington and an acceptance by the
diplomatic communities in both capitals.
Yet Casey’s discretion and modesty present a real difficulty
in assessing Casey’s achievements. In some ways, Hudson
concedes the frustrations of writing Casey’s biography in

31

W.J. Hudson and Jane North (eds.), My Dear P.M. R.G. Casey’s Letters to
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Hudson’s failure to reveal the complete man, because of
Casey’s refusal to ever reveal his innermost thoughts.
Although he left behind a massive amount of personal and
official records, some going back to childhood, there was
nothing intimate or confessional in any of his papers, his
personal relations with men and women were seldom
explored in any detail, and the daily reality of politics was
rarely described. Perhaps the lowly, almost invisible place
that Casey occupies vis-à-vis the Alliance lies in Casey’s
own inability to talk about himself, or create any written
record of his personal feelings, a characteristic that Hudson
found deeply frustrating.33
Since Hudson, it has been Bridge who has brought to life
Casey’s efforts as a diplomat and Australian representative
in Washington.34 Bridge described Casey’s achievement
thus:
As Australia’s envoy, Casey had two objectives: to gain
American support for the Allies’ war effort against
Germany; and to alert the Americans to the common
33
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danger from Japanese aggression in the Pacific. He set
about achieving these in three ways. First, he mounted
a public speaking and media campaign which
succeeded in putting Australia on the mental map for
millions of Americans. Secondly, he networked,
particularly among the Washington administative elite.
And thirdly, he made some timely, well-directed and
effective diplomatic inteventions.35
This thesis endorses this summary of Casey’s goals and
achievements, but argues that it is because Casey is not
given the credit he deserves for Australia’s transformation
into a wartime base of the United States that his public
reputation and recognition is not what it should be.
In terms of American sources, I have looked at State
Department archival records. Historians have not needed to
accept Casey’s own account of his role in Washington; all of
the important American decision makers of this period have
left behind observations about Casey. I have used the Adolf
Berle papers, especially Berle’s diary, which Bridge has
used but which are not often cited in the Australian
literature,

to

understand

Casey’s

thinking

and

influence.36According to the historian David Reynolds, Berle,
Assistant Secretary of State, ‘combined one of the sharpest
minds in the State Department with an obsessive hatred of
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Britain’.37 Winning over Berle was the type of challenge that
Casey relished. I was also able to consult other documents
not much cited in the Casey literature such as the blatantly
anti-British

‘Briefing

Notes’

Department

for

by

use

produced

President

by

the

Roosevelt,

State
when

preparing for the visit to Washington of Prime Minister
Menzies in May 1941. A number of official notes kept by
Dean Acheson, another Assistant Secretary of State, were
consulted. In neither the archives of the State Department,
nor the personal writings of Berle and other leading figures
in the Administration, is there any hint of Casey being
regarded as less than a diligent, worthy representative of
his country.
The author was able to interview only two people who
knew Casey personally, his daughter Jane and the former
Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser. I was also fortunate
enough to engage in correspondence with Hudson, Casey’s
biographer.
Out of this long search and study, it became impossible to
avoid the conclusion that Casey exercised an influence way
beyond that ascribed to him.

All the networking, the

speeches, the interviews, the meetings, the conferences,
the dinners, the arguments that took him from the Oval

37
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Office to the backwoods of small town America, his close
relationships with the opinion makers and decision makers,
with the editors and publishers of the major American
newspapers and periodicals, with the top echelons of both
the army and the navy, with the diplomats and politicians
and in particular, with the American President, bore fruit.
He was preaching the ‘gospel’ (his phrase) of the need for
a close relationship between Australia and the United
States. The relationship that exists today can be traced
back to Richard Casey in 1940-1941, albeit through a
tortuous journey with many vicissitudes.
Few aspects of Australian foreign policies or Australian
defence policies have been subject to the same forensic
examination as the American connection. It needs to be
emphasised that this thesis is not concerned with the place
of the Australia-United States alliance in contemporary
Australia. Rather, the present-day existence of the alliance
is acknowledged and recognised. It is the beginning of the
alliance and Casey’s place in that beginning that prompts
this study. Nor is it being asserted that the ANZUS alliance
of 1951 flowed naturally from the wartime alliance that was
in place after Pearl Harbor. The United States looked to
Australia as its wartime basis, but this was not in itself a
guarantee of continuing American interest in Australia.
After the war, the United States reviewed its commitments
in the context of the Cold War. Percy Spender, Casey’s
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predecessor as Minister for External Affairs, contributed to
the decision made by the Americans in 1951 to extend
their security network southwards from the Philippines to
Australia and New Zealand.38 Casey welcomed ANZUS, but
the focus here is Casey’s mission in 1940-42, which
revolved around engaging the United States in the defence
of the South-West Pacific.
Chapter One is an examination of the literature about
Casey. This chapter offers a brief account of Casey’s career
with a view to helping to understand why Casey has not
received the accolades that at least some historians believe
that he deserved. His career was one of both remarkable
achievement and nagging doubts about his capacity to
influence events. Judgments about Casey often carry the
suggestion that he was too ‘British’ to be an effective
representative of Australia, too ‘good’ a man to be
successful in politics, and that he was a politician of style
rather than substance. It will be argued here that many of
the alleged political weaknesses ascribed to Casey were
also his strengths during his period in Washington.
Chapter Two looks at the context of Casey’s Washington
appointment

by

describing

the

state

of

Australian

diplomacy before the sending of the first legation to

38
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Washington. In the 1930s, the senior members of the
Lyons’ and Menzies’ governments were for the most part
supporters of appeasement as the most likely way to
achieve a lasting peace.39It is argued that while Casey can
be criticised as an advocate of appeasement, his decades
of involvement in shaping Imperial foreign policy should be
viewed instead as excellent preparation for his taking up
the post in Washington. He saw the world of the great
powers, accurately, as driven solely by considerations of
power and self interest.
Chapter Three looks at what Casey was faced with when he
arrived in the United States. It is often assumed that the
Roosevelt administration was waiting its chance to involve
itself in the war against Nazi Germany and only the
November election of 1940 prevented earlier assistance to
the Allies. Yet the evidence suggests that much the reverse
was true. Casey found himself confronted with a vast array
of challenges, including Anglophobia, ignorance about
Britain and Australia, and an isolationist public. At his first
meeting with Roosevelt, the American president confirmed
that Australia was too far away to interest the American
public.

39

Christopher Waters, Australia and Appeasement. Imperial Foreign Policy and the
Origins of World War II, (London: I.B. Tauris and Company, 2012), p. 243.

34

Chapter Four looks at how Casey developed his strategy
during spring 1940, the Phoney War period. This was an
information-gathering period where Casey set down his
basic operating principles. It was also a period when Casey
established the contacts needed to influence events in
Washington. It was at this point that Casey showed one of
his greatest skillls – the careful use of information – to
advantage.
Chapter Five looks at the summer of 1940 and why saving
Britain became Casey’s focus in that summer. It was during
this period that Casey developed a much more accurate,
global picture of the war. Despite his tireless efforts to
involve the United States in the defence of Britain, his
gospel placed Australia at the centre of his strategic
message about American security concerns in the Pacific.
Chapter Six looks at the autumn and winter of 1940-41
when Casey was able to turn most of his attention to Pacific
affairs.

After

the

November

election,

there

was

an

expectation that Roosevelt would offer more wholehearted
support to both Britain and Australia. There was no firm
commitment from Roosevelt and Casey worked hard in
particular to make the United States pay attention to the
strategic keys to the south of the Philippines, that is,
Singapore and Australia.
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Chapter Seven looks at the Spring and Summer of 1941
especially the Menzies visit. By this time, the Americans
perceived Australia as important to its security needs in the
Pacific. The devil was in the detail, however, and Casey had
now to fight skilfully to convince American strategists that
the South-West Pacific was one unit and that concentrating
upon the defence of the Philippines at the expense of
Singapore and Australia was unwise.
Chapter Eight argues that the contribution of Casey to the
‘saving’ of Australia is best understood in the context of
comparing Casey’s efforts with Curtin’s ‘Look to America’
appeal. While Curtin’s appeal achieved virtually nothing
except some hostility in the United States, specifically with
the

President,

Casey

achieved

much

more

tangible

outcomes.
Chapter Nine looks at events after Pearl Harbor. They
confirmed that Casey was a superior strategist, at least by
Australian standards, with a remarkable mastery of the
technical and tactical detail that Australia needed if it were
to wage war against Japan.
Chapter

Ten

concludes

the

thesis,

summing

up

the

argument for crediting Casey with impressing upon the
Americans why it was in their interests to turn Australia
into their principal Pacific base.
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CHAPTER ONE: Casey and the Literature

In this chapter, Casey’s biography is considered in the
context of the vast literature about his achievements and
shortcomings. Casey’s stay in Washington represented only
two years of an extraordinarily rich political and diplomatic
career. Three main themes emerge from an examination of
this literature. The first theme might be described as
Casey’s personal attributes. He was often described as a
‘good man’ but an indifferent politician who lacked the
necessary toughness to influence events. The second
theme

is

Casey’s

allegedly

incompatible

loyalties

to

Australia and the British Empire. Thirdly, Casey’s wellknown ability to charm his audience has been interpreted
as

the

triumph

of

style

over

substance.

Casey

is

remembered as a ‘networker’ but not as a thinker,
strategist or policy maker.

It might be profitable first to outline Casey’s biography.
Hudson describes Casey as a child of his class and his time.
He was born in Brisbane in 1890 into a prosperous family,
one of ‘the landed families of Queensland, the Australian
robber barons of the nineteenth century’, according to the
historian, Manning Clark.40 As described by his daughter,
40
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Jane MacGowan, there is no denying that despite his being
a conservative politician, Casey formed friendships with
people on the other side of the political spectrum.41 His
grandfather, Cornelius was a medical practitioner who,
after

arriving

in

Australia

in

1833,

married

Loetitia

Gardiner, daughter of an Army captain. Their first son,
Richard Gardiner Casey senior, born in 1846, became a
successful businessman and a member of the Queensland
Parliament before losing most of his fortune through the
gambling activities of his partner. By diligent work, he later
recovered and with wise investments in the new Mount
Morgan Gold Mining Company and, later, Goldsbrough Mort
and Company, rebuilt both a fortune and a reputation. He
moved to Melbourne with his family in 1893, where his
growing prosperity enabled his two children, Richard junior
and his brother Dermot to step into what Hudson referred
to as a ‘comfortable bourgeois life’.42
Although

Richard

grandfather

and

could

number

maternal

a

father,

great-grandfather

maternal
as

past

members of the Queensland Parliament and a great-uncle
as a former Premier, Hudson claims that Richard and
Dermot would have found social and school life intolerable
had it been known that their mother’s great- grandfather

41
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had been sentenced to death at the Old Bailey for theft or
that one of her great-grandmothers was an unknown
convict woman. According to Hudson: ‘From the time that
he became aware of the world about him, Richard Casey
knew only material privilege. Emotionally, he was less
privileged’.43Writing of him at the beginning of his career,
Clark less kindly described him as ‘a young man of
promise, one of those men known to his friends as a man
of infinite desire and limited capacity’.44 It is not clear how
Clark formed this conclusion. It might well be that Casey’s
failure

to

meet

his

own

goal

of

becoming

Prime

Ministerjustified Clark’s judgment.
The Australian Who’s Who entries for Casey over a period
of some years are hopelessly confused with alternating
references to a B.A. and an M.A. The University of
Cambridge has advised that he gained B.A. in June 1913
and M.A. by proxy in November, 1918, as is the custom as
both Oxford and cambridge Universities.45 Casey was not an
academic star at Cambridge, but it is worth noting
Hudson’s observation that he engaged with American
students more successfully than with British students. His
writings show that their gregariousness appealed to him
43
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more than the reserve he found in the British-born
students.

Possibly,

Casey’s

favourable

introduction

to

Americans at Cambridge may have played some part, years
later, in his achieving such easy rapport during his
diplomatic appointment in Washington.
In World War One, Casey served as a Staff Officer at both
Gallipoli and the Western Front. Hudson makes the telling
point that although he spent the entire war years on staff
duty, he never commanded men.46

On the other hand,

Casey was an engineer, a technical training considered
useful by the military. He collected both a Military Cross
and a Distinguished Service Order. His status as a staff
officer did not provide him with any sort of immunity from
danger. He was frequently under fire at Gallipoli and was
with

General

William

Bridges

when

the

Australian

commander was picked off by a sniper, a shot that proved
fatal.
After demobilization in 1919,Casey served in the Army
Reserve, working part-time as an Intelligence officer in
Melbourne. Casey pursued various business interests after
the war and visited the United States in an unsuccessful bid
to convince Ford to use an Australian-designed motor
engine.

46

Casey’s

friendship

with

newly

elected

Prime

Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 13 Editor Bede Nairn. (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press) p. 382.
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Minister Stanley Bruce led to his appointment as Australian
Liaison Officer with the British Cabinet Office in 1924. He
was in effect, Bruce’s political agent, separate from the
High Commission. Although the High Commissioner kept
Bruce and the Australian government well informed of
decisions made in London, Bruce considered it necessary
for this information to be supplemented by a close observer
capable of discerning ‘developing problems before they
reached crisis and decision point’.

47

Casey thus became Australia’s first diplomat, garnering
information and gossip not only from Whitehall and
Westminster but from the various strata of London society.
Casey’s easy fit into that London society as well as his
ready acceptance by the mandarins of Whitehall enabled
him to offer an interpretation of whatever intelligence he
passed onto Bruce.

Moreover, his distinguished military

career led to his acceptance by Britain’s service chiefs.
Hudson is clearly impressed with Casey’s performance in
London, describing him as ‘Bruce’s eyes and ears at the
Imperial centre’, reporting to Bruce on everything from
British defence policy to club gossip.48 Edwards remarks
that when Casey was appointed to the London post in
1924, he was given an office in 2 Whitehall Gardens, the
47
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office of Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary and
probably the most influential and best-informed civil
servant in Britain. Far from resenting the presence of a
colonial outsider in his sanctum, Hankey eventually came
to regard Casey as his ‘confidential Australian assistant in
imperial policy-making, rather than as a prying foreign
diplomat’.49
Bruce himself described Casey in glowing terms, suggesting
that his role embraced not only reporting on matters but
influencing them:

‘From the time (that) Casey went to

London as my liaison officer until I ceased to be the High
Commissioner in 1945, Australia was invariably better
informed on international affairs, and had far more
influence on the U.K. government and its policy, than all
the rest of the Empire put together’.50 While in London,
Casey married Ethel Ryan, known as Maie, herself from a
well-connected family in Victoria and later remembered as
an author, artist, composer, aviator, and bon vivant. The
Caseys slottted easily into inter-war British high society.
With the defeat of Bruce in the 1929 Election, Casey had
no further purpose in remaining in London. He returned to
Australia and won election to the Federal Parliament as a
49

P.G. Edwards, ‘R.G.Menzies Appeals to the United States. May-June, 1940’,
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United Australia Party (UAP) candidate. Casey was in
Federal

Parliament

as

the

member

for

Corio

from

December 1931 to January 1940. Prime Minister Joseph
Lyons appointed Casey Assistant Treasurer in 1933 and
Treasurer in 1935. Under Menzies, Casey served in the
crucial role of Minister for Supply and Development in
1939.
Hudson claims that although he was a worker, what would
now be called a workaholic, Casey left no significant
monuments

as

treasurer.51The

problem,

according

to

Hudson, was that Casey was not a natural politician:
The 1930s had been for Casey years of remarkable
success.

Without any grounding in local government or

state government and without the basic political gifts of the
gab

and

a

thick

skin,

through

some

highly

placed

connections, he had entered Federal Parliament at his first
attempt, becoming a junior minister after less than two
years and a senior minister after less than four…placed to
enter the Privy Council and to challenge for the prime
ministership. In career terms they were successful years.
In terms of concrete accomplishment, the times, the
company and Casey’s own inability to wheel and deal made
the decade for him less memorable.52
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It was this apparent inability to ‘wheel and deal’ effectively
with his Cabinet colleagues that presents as an enduring
criticism of Casey throughout his career. Years later, Casey
himself virtually confirmed this judgment by admitting the
failure of his strenuous efforts as Treasurer to convince his
Cabinet colleagues to boost defence expenditure in the
years immediately before the outbreak of the Second World
War.53

Of Casey’s tenure in the Lyons Ministry, the

economic historian, Boris Schedvin wrote that ‘Casey was
energetic

but

uninspired

in

his

several

Treasury

capacities’.54 Casey can take some credit, however, for the
fact that, in the case of Australia, rearmament did finally
get under way in the last years of the decade so that ten
times more was spent on defence in 1938-39 than was the
case at the height of the Depression in 1932-33. Indeed,
the case has been made that Casey and other UAP
politicians did a great deal to help Australia save itself in
the Second World War by strongly developing its industy
and military technology.55
The suspicion that Casey, who had spent the best part of a
decade in London, had a dual allegiance to the Crown and
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to the Australian government was a constant refrain from
his critics.56In his examination of Anglo-Australian defence
relations during the inter-war years, J.M. McCarthy accuses
Casey of revealing Cabinet discussions to the British High
Commissioner, Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, in 1936, during the
negotiations about the construction of aircraft for the
R.A.A.F. Descriptions of Casey as ‘British’ or ‘English’ in
appearance and style abound in the literature. Gavin
Souter, quoting the U.S. Consul-General J.P. Moffatt,
creates a vivid word picture of Casey sounding and looking
like ‘an Englishman, perhaps a Guards’ officer in well-cut
mufti, rather aloof most of the time, but affable when he
chose to be…travelled widely in Europe and North America,
spoke good French and some German, and had the knack
of impressing people in high places’.57Fred Alexander noted
that ‘in dress, manner and personal appearance, he
possessed ‘many of the outward marks of an Englishman‘the Anthony Eden of Australia’.58Evatt’s close friend, Sam
Atyeo, described Casey as ‘the poor man’s Anthony
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Eden’.59Clark’s word picture of Casey follows the familiar
theme: ‘English, Melbourne Grammar and Cambridge,
while his manners were impeccable, his clothes straight
from Bond Street and his voice from the Old Country’.60
A Parliamentary colleague, James Killen, wrote of Caseyas
‘English in appearance, in manner, in dress, with a clipped
English style of speaking…’.61 In a review of Parliamentary
performers in 1950, Casey was said to have ‘a rapid, eager
stutter’ found more often in Britain than Australia.62
There was both an irony and a practical difficulty here
given that the man who had to explain Australia to the
Americans at the outset of World War Two looked and
sounded like a stereotypic English diplomat. Fred Daly, a
Labor Member of Parliament with a reputation as a
humorous participant in debates, tells how he ridiculed
Casey by asking him a prank question during Question
Time and Casey taking it seriously, suggesting either a
poor sense of humour or unfamiliarity with the sardonic
aspects of Australian humour.63Trevor Reese considered
59
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Casey’s

parliamentary

speeches

‘unimaginative

and

woefully tedious’.64

Given these attributes, it may well have been that Casey
slotted easily into a more formalised relationship with the
colleagues that he had found in London than the more
robust and casual relationships found in Australian male
groups. It is also possible that the very qualities that were
seen as detrimental to political success in Australia were
regarded highly in London and Washington. Indeed, more
than one observer concluded that Casey appeared more at
home when overseas than he did in Australia, a personal
characteristic occasionally applied to Menzies. T.B. Millar, a
former Director of the Australian Institute of International
Affairs, while judging that Casey was an excellent choice as
Australia’s first Minister to Washington, claims that he was
‘perhaps more at home in foreign fields than in his own’.65 A
similar belief is expressed by W.J. Hudson and Wendy Way:
‘Casey was wealthy, more at ease in London society’.66It
would be fair to say that his Labor opponents disliked
64
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Casey’s upper-class origins, imperial politics, and British
loyalties. Given Australia’s relative isolation from Europe
and North America at that time, it would be reasonable to
conclude that Casey’s upbringing, including a Cambridge
degree and a long sojourn in the British Foreign Office, had
prepared him not so much for the rough and tumble of the
Australian political milieu but rather for life in the upper
reaches of British society.
Having a dual allegience to Britain and Australia was
commonplace in inter-war Australia. Casey, as Waters has
put it, ‘was a firm believer that the English-speaking
peoples had a special role in world affairs’ and in the saving
of ‘Western civilisation’.67Casey in the 1930s was an
enthusiastic imperialist on both economic and defence
grounds, and as a strong supporter of the ‘one voice
theory‘ of imperial foreign affairs. Yet Casey emphasized
that Australia had very practical reasons for its close
relationship with Great Britain. In 1938, Casey summed up
his reasoning thus:

between Australia and Great Britain there is a
community of interest that probably does not exist with
equal force between any other two countries in the
world. On those very material grounds we are in a
unique degree dependent on the continued existence of
Great Britain, and that is why I say I am an Imperialist
67
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as well as an Australian.68
Thus, Casey emphasised the ‘material’ link to empire and
believed that the security of Australia and Britain were
closely linked. Given that the United States was in no mood
to offer protection to Australia and given the parlous state
of Australia’s military preparedness, Britain’s was the
logical, indeed, the only source of protection on offer. Like
most Australian leaders, Casey wanted to forge closer links
to Britain with a view to influencing British thinking. This
did not rule out a closer relationship between Australia and
the United States. Bringing the United States and the
British Empire closer together was a strong theme among
Australian politicians, as well as the British Prime Ministers,
Chamberlain and Churchill.69

Lyons’ sudden death in 1939 enabled Casey to stand for
the leadership of the United Australia Party (and Prime
Ministership) but he was easily beaten by Menzies. Hudson
claims that the leadership was denied Casey because he
was ‘far too modest and too inept in organizing support for
himself’.70 As Bridge has pointed out, Casey ran an abysmal
third after Menzies and the indefatiguable former Prime
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Minister, Billy Hughes, having made the dual mistakes of
first backing the candidature of Bruce and then courting the
Country Party.71Thereafter, Casey’s role was always focused
upon

the

international

arena,

though

Casey

himself

continued to harbour leadership ambitions in the decades
that followed.
Both Lyons and Menzies made use of Casey’s international
connections and diplomatic skills.Casey was an important
contributor to the Imperial Conference of 1937 which he
attended with Lyons, Hughes, Archdale Parkhill and Bruce,
High Commissioner in London since 1933. Casey in the
1930s, like Menzies, Gullett, Lyons, and the majority of
Australia’s political class, sat firmly in the appeasement
camp. Or, as David Lowe has put it,‘to divide Australians
into

‘appeasers’

and

‘anti-appeasers’

is

an

historic

nonsense, collapsing a broad range of positions, most of
them involving concessions or efforts to improve relations
between the major nations, into opposing camps’.72
Casey, as Bridge has put it, was one of the ‘ultra’
appeasers.73 The aim was to keep Australia out of a war
with Japan and to ensure that Britain did not become
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entangled in a war in continental Europe with the result
that it would be unable to assist in the security of Australia.
Australian political leadership on both sides of the left-right
divide recognised Australia’s vulnerability in the face of
German aggression, Japanese militarism, and the threat
posed by the arms race. After the beginning of the
European conflict, it was not difficult for Menzies to be won
over and to agree to a rapid expansion of Australia’s
diplomatic positions. Despite the prohibitive cost of a
legation with its own staff and premises, Australia would
now have a voice in Washington as insurance against the
ever-increasing danger of Japan embarking on a rampage
in the Pacific. In June 1939, the British Prime Minister,
Neville Chamberlain had promised Menzies:
in the event of war with Germany and Italy, should
Japan join in against us, it would still be His Majesty’s
government’s full intention to dispatch a fleet to
Singapore…it would be our intention to achieve three
main objects, (1) the prevention of any major
operation against Australia, New Zealand or India, (2)
to keep open our sea communications, (3) to prevent
the fall of Singapore.74
Menzies

gave

every

indication

that

already

he

was

convinced that Britain could not sustain war with Germany
and simultaneously send vast resources to defend British
interests in the Pacific and Asian regions. This showed no
74
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great perspicacity. Britain’s long period of running down
defence preparations during the 1920s and 30s inevitably
raised doubts about her ability to cope with major conflicts
in two parts of the globe. Even Bruce was privately
doubtful that Britain would or even could live up to its
commitments.75
Menzies sent Casey to London late in 1939 to evaluate
assurances from Britain about the Far East; the 6th Division
of the Australian Imperial Force was about to be sent to
Britain to help in the war against Nazi Germany. Casey
reported that he found the assurances of the British
government about Singapore satisfactory. Casey had his
doubts about how much of the British assurances should be
believed, but on balance accepted the view that the main
enemy for Britain and Australia in 1939 was Nazi Germany.
In reality, unless Australia could interest the United States
more in the South-West Pacific, the Australian government
had little choice other than to hope that Britain would live
up to its promises.76 Menzies and his cabinet made the
decision to send the 6th Division on the basis of Casey’s
recommendations.77Bridge explained Casey’s logic in the
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following terms: ‘regardless of all else, the Pacific defence
situation depended upon the survival of Britain and her
fleet. Thus by defending Britain, the Australian 6th Division
would be indirectly defending Australia’.78
While Casey was in London, Menzies appointed him as
Minister heading the Australian legation in Washington.
Casey was not Menzies first choice, but he was the obvious
appointment. As Waters has put it, Casey was ‘Australia’s
first diplomat of significance in the 1920s and a wellconnected senior minister in the 1930s’.79 Casey was
certainly

better

versed

than

most

in

United

States

government affairs. In July 1937, Casey, as Australian
Treasurer, visited Washington and spoke to Secretary of
State Cordell Hull and other high-ranking American officials
about the contentious Empire-United States trade relations.
By that time, Britain was viewing favourably the signing of
a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States, a
development that owed as much to Britain’s desire for
closer ties to the United States as it did to easing up trade
restrictions. However, this would involve Australia losing
much of its advantages under the Imperial preference
scheme and abandoning high protective tariffs. Casey’s
talks achieved little. He was able to give the Americans an
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assurance

that

the

Australian

government

would

be

prepared to make concessions, but only on the condition
that the United States government indicated beforehand
the extent of its concessions. This was the stumbling point.
From the American viewpoint, Casey’s offer was an
advance in negotiations but in effect, it achieved nothing.
His

talks

with

Department,however,

leading
had

figures
left

a

in
very

the

State

favourable

impression. According to Moffat, the American ConsulGeneral in Australia, the Washington officials believed
‘Casey the smartest of the lot…a future P.M’.80
Yet the context of Casey’s appointment to the United
States revealed personal qualities in Menzies that would
eventually contribute to his downfall in 1941 and cast a
shadow over Casey’s suitability for the job of leading the
Australian legation in Washington. Despite knowing of
Casey’s reluctance to terminate his political career in
Australia for the diplomatic posting to the United States,
Menzies advised the Dominions Secretary in London,
Anthony Eden, that Casey would be going to Washington.
This was before Casey had definitely accepted the post.81
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Casey, from London, told Menzies that he (Casey) could
render more valuable service in Australia, but that he
would go if that was what Menzies wanted.82 At this time,
Casey confided in Bruce that the reason he wanted to
remain in Australian politics rather than take up the
Washington

appointment

was

to

be

available

should

Menzies cease being Prime Minister, a distinct possibility at
that time.83 Casey’s response to Menzies’ request may be
seen as loyalty to his leader, especially in the increasingly
fraught times or alternatively as reluctance to press his
own interests. His language in the reply to Menzies carries
some significance: ‘With the knowledge I have acquired
here (in London) I feel that I could be of some assistance
to you in the serious times that lie ahead…my judgment is
that I could render more valuable service in Australia (than
in the United States)’. He was thus arguing, perhaps to
himself, that taking over from Menzies would be of far
greater service to Australia than accepting the Washington
post.

Yet,

he

seemed

incapable

of

asserting

that

argument.84
In a cablegram to Bruce in London asking him to visit
Washington ‘to negotiate with the American administration
82
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for establishment of reciprocal Legations and to inaugurate
our own’, Menzies let slip his doubts about Casey: ‘I have
had some reservations about Casey, but on the whole I
think that a man of political experience is essential at
Washington, and he appears to be the most suitable of
those available’.85 No matter how it is read, this was hardly
a ringing endorsement of Casey.
In taking up the post of Australian Minister to the United
States, Casey was breaking new ground. Australia had
never had An independent diplomatic presence in the
United States. Given the fact that Casey was not Menzies’
first choice, it could be seen as almost serendipity that
Casey

was

appointed

to

be

Australia’s

first

senior

diplomatic appointment. Certainly the appointment was
fortuitous given Australia’s lack ofexperience in foreign
relations; Casey was, by Australian standards, a veteran of
international diplomacy.As Cecil Edwards has put it, before
the outbreak of the Pacific conflict, Australian foreign policy
was ‘being formulated largely by the triangular traffic of
cables between Bruce in London, Casey in Washington and
Menzies in Canberra’.86 On the other hand, the United
States certainly represented a major personal challenge for
Casey. After the years spent in London, working with
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British mandarins at the centre of the Empire, would Casey
be able to assert an Australian role in international
diplomacy?
The verdicts are mixed. For his supporters, Casey’s
appointment to the Washington post enabled him to
exercise the diplomatic and public relations skills that he
had

exercised

so

effectively

in

London.

For

the

representative of a small nation, entirely without influence,
Casey, after assuming the post on 6 March, 1940, quickly
gained frequent access to President Roosevelt, himself
renowned

as

a politician

of engaging

charm.

Casey

cultivated Administration officials and the service chiefs. As
the Australian Dictionary of Biography put it: ‘Although he
was now 50, boyish charm and courteous deference
opened doors to him, and he was a keen convert to the
American craft of public relations’.87

Indeed, he engaged

the services of a public relations consultant and showed
remarkable energy in promoting his mission. While not a
typical day, Casey’s account of his movements for 3
December 1940 illustrates his energy in undertaking what
he saw as his responsibilities, his diary noting simply: ‘Saw
the

Secretary

of

State,

Dinner

at

Legation,

Justice

Frankfurter, Joseph Alsop (Columnist) Admiral Stark (Chief
of Naval Operations) John Foster and Danish Minister. Left

87
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on midnight train to Hartford Connecticut’.On this occasion,
Casey was to remain in Hartford for just one day, meeting
persons of influence, especially newspaper and university
people, inspecting munitions factories and addressing
meetings before flying onto Boston and then New York in a
similar routine.88
The American press certainly approved of Casey. The New
York

Times,

commenting

on

his

appointment

to

Washington, reported that ‘Australia has given her best in
sending us Richard G. Casey’.89 Hudson makes the point
that Casey had a rare talent for charming important
people, evident in both his London and Washington years:
His natural shyness and boyishness now a little at odds
with his age (when he arrived in the United States he was
nearly fifty) made for a socially powerful combination.
President Roosevelt liked him and took him up, and when
Maie (Casey) arrived in Washington, the President’s wife,
Eleanor, had the Caseys to tea at the White House. He
melted the austere heart of Cordell Hull, also a shy man.
He wisely took the precaution of courting Harry Hopkins,
Roosevelt’s closest and most privileged adviser …and paid
close attention to the President’s man at the State
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Department Adolf Berle…Cabinet members, Supreme Court
justices and servicemen.90
According to Millar, Casey became ‘a trusted, informal
intermediary’.91

Millar also argues that so far as anyone

could do it, he put Australia on the map in America.92Alan
Watt, who took over from Keith Officer, an Australian
diplomat in the Washington legation, noted that, ‘it is clear
that Roosevelt had a high opinion of Casey’, and recounted
a number of incidents when Roosevelt and the Roosevelt
Administration employed Casey on delicate diplomatic tasks
that were apparently beyond the capabilities of their own
people.

93

An example of Casey’s high standing became apparent
when United States Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter, avowedly pro-Allied and a personal
acquaintance of Casey, requested Casey to give to
Churchill a personal message before he met Harry
Hopkins, who was about to spend some time in
London with the Prime Minister. The Justice was
anxious that Churchill express to Hopkins his great
admiration for the American president, to match
Hopkins’ admiration which bordered on worship. It
says a great deal about the relationship that
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Frankfurter selected Casey as the one most suitable to
carry the message.94

Maie Casey is worth special mention at this point. Although
Maie Casey remained in the background of Richard Casey
for most of her life, in the words of the writer, Kay
Saunders,

she

was

a

bohemian,

adventurous

and

unconventional at one level but deeply status conscious,
snobbish and demanding on another. Saunders describes
the marriage as close but puzzling. Saunders claimed that
she moved in the highest international circles, ‘a confidante
of Gandhi, Churchill, Noel Coward, Dame Judith Anderson
and Eleanor Roosevelt’.95 The inclusion of the name of the
President’s wife in Maie Casey’s circle may have gone some
way towards Casey’s apparent ease of entry into the Oval
Office and his attempts to establish an influential presence
in the White House. Eleanor Roosevelt’s winning personality
and

the

active

role

she

played

in

the

Roosevelt

administration is well documented. Maie Casey was a
talented artist who furnished her Washington abode with
her private art collection brought from Australia and
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enchanted Washington with an exhibition of Australian
settler and Aboriginal art.
Edwards

views

Casey

as

having

successfully

worked

towards a better understanding between Britain and the
United States. One of Evatt’s biogpraphers, Kylie Tennant,
takes a similar view: ‘Casey’s extraordinary charm had
brought him such success in Washington that the British
Embassy had been only too glad to follow his advice’.96 A
like judgment by Watt throws some light on Casey’s actual
activities in America: ‘Casey was an excellent host, with a
flair for starting a conversation and inducing men of
different outlook and views to carry it on’.

Further, Watt

writes of Casey that:
His university and official experience in England and his
understanding of the English temperament and outlook
made it possible for him to explain Englishmen to
Americans and Americans to Englishmen, and often to
bring together on social occasions representatives of the
two countries whose direct contacts had been formal
rather than close.97
Paul Hasluck, usually numbered among Casey’s critics, had
no reservations about Casey’s Washington appointment:
‘Early in 1940, the appointment of Casey as first Australian
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Minister to the U.S. had robbed the government of an
experienced, energetic and tactful minister who could push
ahead with a job and still be pleasant about it’.98 Bridge
claims that Casey’s contribution to Australian war policy
was ‘fundamental’: Casey ‘served with great distinction,
especially in the dark and difficult days before Pearl
Harbor’.99Tennant

refers

Washington,

the

‘in

to

Casey

handsome

being

tradition

popular
of

in

old-time

diplomacy’.100 Taking a slightly different slant, Hudson has
claimed that Casey personified to Americans ‘the Hollywood
notion of a handsome Britisher enlivened by New World
zest’.101 Hudson also notedthat senior British services
personnel ‘liked the cut of his jib’.102
On the other hand, it should be noted that Casey worked
hard at achieving his preferred self-image. Hudson goes so
far as to claim that this meant that Casey used ‘a mask’
when his views differed from those of the person to whom
he was speaking.103 Hudson may be referencing an earlier
book by Percy Spender, who knew Casey for over thirty
98
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years and wrote of him: ‘In many ways, his demeanour
appeared to mask the inner man, and the mask and the
man, it may happen, become in the end, indistinguishable
one from the other; the mask indeed can become the man
behind’.104 Spender suspected that, despite his confident
image, Casey, at heart, was a somewhat shy man and ‘this
may account for the mask which I think was always with
him’.
An alternative explanation is that Casey had learned from
his diplomatic experience that masks were a necessary part
of the job. Indeed, Casey’s Washington diary is full of bitter
and sarcastic comments about influential Americans and
the American people more generally, but no hint of these
heartfelt views were allowed to contaminate Casey’s gospel
of goodwill to the United States from Australia.Casey
certainly made no secret of his admiration for British
stoicism in the face of the Nazi onslaught, telling his diary
on 27 June 1940 that ‘The British race is the finest race in
the world’.105 The contrast was with the Americans and their
complete failure to live up to their duty to ‘come in’ and
join Britain’s fight against the dictators.

In one of his

darker moments, Casey speculated on the reason for the
American failure to help Britain in 1940:
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May it not possibly be that there is the same sort of
feeling between U.S.A. and Britain as there is between
Japan and China? – ie the one having drawn its
civilization from the other – hating to acknowldedge it
– having a sense of inferiority from it?106
Casey met Roosevelt one-on-one on no fewer than eleven
occasions.107 Although he is on record noting the difficulties
in arranging to see Roosevelt, his relations with the
President became closer over time.108Before Pearl Harbor at
least,

these

Presidential

conversations

tested

Casey’s

patience, though he usually described their outcome as
useful.Casey described an interview with Roosevelt as
being something of a monologue: ‘It is not easy to get an
opportunity to express oneself and you have to hop in
while he’s pausing for breath’.109Hudson confided to this
author that ‘in my judgment, Casey had so recommended
himself at every level in Washington, including the White
House, that there was nothing inherently improbable in
Roosevelt having confided in him’.110
Even so, the critics have tended to disparage even Casey’s
seemingly easy access of Roosevelt. David Day has noted
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that Casey mostly accompanied Lord Lothian, the British
Ambassador, when he visited the White House. For Day,
Casey did on occasions make Australia’s voice heard but he
was more likely to be perceived as a British cipher.111It is
certainly true that the British Embassy in Washington, was
soon drawing attention to Casey’s skills in the area of
disseminating its message.112 Just about every source noted
that Casey worked closely with Lothian, who had the
principal

responsibility

for

arguing

Britain’s

case

in

Washington. Casey was himself so good at arguing the
British case that some American press assumed that Casey
would replace Lothian when the latter unexpectedly died in
December 1940.113 All of this makes Casey an easy target
for those who prefer to see Casey as a British ‘agent’
pushing the ‘Empire’ line.

The diplomat Malcolm Booker summed up the charge
against Casey: ‘Throughout his stay in Washington, Casey
invariably deferred to the British Ambassador, as is
indicated in his own writings’. While conceding that Casey
and his wife occupied an influential position in Washington,
Booker claims that he used that influential position not so
much to promote a specifically Australian point of view as
111
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to act as a broker between the British and the Americans.114
Booker claimed that, as a senior cabinet minister in the
Menzies Cabinet, Casey showed surprising humility in
accepting the secondary rank of ‘minister plenipotentiary’.
This was a rank below ambassaor, making it clear that
Britain was the senior partner in the Imperial allliance.
Booker makes the point that the terms of his Washington
appointment placed him in a position of inferiority to all the
important

diplomatic

representatives

in

the

capital.

According to Booker: ‘In particular, it symbolized to the
rank-conscious Americans, Australia’s readiness to accept a
role subordinate to the British’. Booker asserts that this
relationship was doubtless confirmed by the Note which the
British Ambassador delivered to the State Department
declaring that the Casey appointment was not to be
regarded as denoting ‘any departure from the diplomatic
unity of the Empire’.115

In the words of the historian,

L.E.Fredman: ‘The fiction of the diplomatic unity of the
Empire was still maintained even in announcing this first
appointment’.116
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Stephen Alomes is even less kind, portraying Casey as an
‘imperial boy scout’ and ‘another good boy scout for the
Empire’.117According to Alomes, Casey was ‘more British
than the British’.118 A similar conclusion can be drawn from
Roger Bell’s account of Casey’s years in Washington.
Conceding that the Australian minister developed close
associations

with

Roosevelt’s

personal

adviser,

Harry

Hopkins and with Secretary of State Hull and close but
unofficial contacts with Generals Marshall and Arnold and
Admiral King, Bell claims that these were inappropriate and
insufficient to meet the

needs

of intimate war-time

collaboration.119While acknowledging that Casey is entitled
to some of the credit for a changed American attitude to
Australia’s defence needs in 1942, Reese claims that ‘Casey
had

a

high

opinion

Washington’.120According

to

of

his

Alomes,

own

work

Casey was

in

‘more

concerned with bringing the United States into the war (as
Britain wanted) than with avoiding a Pacific war (as
Australia wanted)’.121
Writing of the withholding from the Australian government
of the policy adopted by Churchill and Roosevelt to ‘Beat
117
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Hitler First’ in 1941, Day describes the violent reaction by
Evatt upon learning of the existence of this policy when
visiting London in May, 1942.

Day speculates who was

responsible for concealing the ‘Beat Hitler First’ decision
from Evatt and the Australians up to that time and lays the
blame primarily with Churchill, ‘connived at by Roosevelt’
and ‘aided and abetted by Australia’s representatives in
Washington and London who did a grave disservice to their
duty when they became involved in this campaign and
withheld vital information from their political masters. Of
those representatives, Day is unsparing in his criticism: ‘As
former or present conservative MPs, Page, Bruce and Casey
proved ill-suited to serve the needs of a more nationalistic
Labor government’.122
The centrality of Curtin’s ‘Look to America’ has led to the
popular view that politicians of that era could be divided
into ‘Australia first’ and ‘Britain first’ camps. Yet the charge
that Casey withheld information about the ‘Beat Hitler First’
policy from the Australian government does not hold up, as
Bridge has shown. The Australian War cabinet saw the
report of the ABC1 talks of January-March 1941, which
decided the ‘Hitler first’ issue.123As Curran has pointed out,
there was
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importance of Britain to Australia’s survival.124Up until Pearl
Harbor, it was not only Casey and his fellow UAP members
who prioritised the need to win the war in Europe. Upon
becoming Prime Minister in October 1941, Curtin did not
change

Australia’s

military

strategy

or

question

the

commitment of troops to Britain. As late as November
1941, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, Curtin agreed to
reinforcing the AIF in the Middle East.125 In other words, it
was not just conservatives, but Labor politicians too who
saw the good sense from Australia’s perspective in ‘saving
Britain’.
Joseph Maiolo writes of a noticeable change of mood in
Washington in the last months of 1941. Hull had become
convinced that further negotiations with Japan were futile.
Frank Knox, Political Head of the Navy, and Henry Stimson,
Political Head of the Army, both former Republicans in the
Hoover regime, were firmly of the view that hostilities with
Japan were inevitable.

Knox had been Republican Vice

President nominee in the Presidential race of 1936.
Stimson had been Secretary of State in the Hoover
Administration. It is significant that two experienced men
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from the conservative side of politics came to these
conclusions about Japan.126
The advent of a Labor government in Australia in October,
1941 initially gave Casey no reason to consider his future,
after he was refused permission to return to Australia for
consultation.127 Curtin, the new Prime Minister wanted him
to remain at his post in the United States.128Casey’s
relations with the new Minister for External Affairs,Evatt,
however, were not amicable and Casey ultimately accepted
the offer of the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to
become Britain’s Minister of State in the Middle East, based
in Cairo. Casey accepted this appointment despite knowing
of

Curtin’s

strong

preference

for

him

to

remain

in

Washington.129
Few events in his long career attracted as much criticism
from both his political opponents and, in the long term,
writers and historians, as his acceptance of the Cairo
appointment.130

Curtin wanted Casey to remain as the
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Australian representative in the United States and his
decision

to

accept

Churchill’s

offer

has

been

often

portrayed as a snub to Australia in its hour of need.
Curiously, some observers who were not impressed with
his efforts during the two years he spent in the United
States were critical of his leaving. The intensity of the
debate about the posting to the Middle East may be gauged
by Churchill’s response to Curtin’s objections:
Both principal Ministers I have consulted and Chiefs of
Staff are agreed in wanting Casey for this most
important post which requires military experience and
knowledge of public affairs both ministerial and
diplomatic. I had a whole evening in the train with
Casey when I was in America and learned from him
that he was very anxious for a change.131
Churchill went on to suggest that Curtin appoint Menzies to
replace Casey in Washington, a suggestion that fell on deaf
ears.
This was at a time when the war situation created
unbearable tensions, pushing tempers to a knife edge. For
instance, on virtually his last day in Washington, Casey
noted:
Splenetic reaction from Mr. Curtin and from the
Melbourne Herald about my accepting Mr. Churchill’s
proposal. Mr. Curtin is hard pressed —and in respect of
him, I believe I have happened, by bad chance, to come
131
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between the hammer of his and the anvil of Mr.
Churchill.132
The sometimes acrimonious exchanges between Curtin and
Churchill over the latter’s offer to Casey of a senior
Ministerial position in the Middle East in 1942 reveal a
duality in Casey’s personal relationships. Hudson observes
that Casey never forgave Curtin for objecting to and
attempting to stop him leaving Washington for the Cairo
appointment. His unforgivedness extended to refusing
invitations in later years to write about Curtin. Yet Hudson
also sees a
allowed

his

redeeming quality in Casey in that he never
personal

animosity

to

affect

his

official

responsibilities. According to Hudson, Casey ‘went out of
his way’ to sell Curtin and Evatt in high places.133
So far as the Cairo appointment was concerned, Hudson’s
observations suggest that Casey should have realised that
he was not qualified for the job, which according to
Hudson, ‘was awesome in its scope and complexity’.
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Casey’s difficulties in the Middle East would do great harm
to his reputation.The post was so complex that it is
doubtful if any one person, no matter how experienced,
could have juggled, successfully, the many competing
interests that formed the area of every day responsibilities.
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On 8 March 1942 the American jurist, Felix Frankfurter, by
now a close friend of Casey, was moved to commit to his
diary:
My sum total impression was that poor Dick Casey never
in his life gave a thought to the position of the Jew in the
world in general, or to Zionism in particular, that he
suddenly is confronted with problems for which he has no
background… Casey not only knows nothing of the
Balfour Declaration and of Palestine since then, but he
doesn’t even know that there is such a history or that
people like me know it. 135
Casey’s difficulties in his new, Middle East role emanated
principally from the British Foreign Office, whose officials
regarded the Australian as an ignorant outsider who had
usurped the Resident Foreign Office representative there.
Yet it was not the case that Casey left the Middle East
without accolades.

When Lebanon declared war on the

Axis powers in February, 1945, and became a foundation
member of the new United Nations, Casey would have been
entitled to appreciate the comment of a London newspaper
that ‘the refreshing frankness of Mr R.G. Casey had a good
deal

to

do

with

the

agreement’.136

The

British

Representative in Beirut, Louis Spears reported to London
that Casey had turned out ‘to be a real rock’.
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event, Casey’s efforts apparently satisfied Churchill, who,
the following year, offered him the governorship of Bengal.
Despite his stellar career, Casey’s reputation as a politician
mostly revolved around the perception that he was a ‘good
man’ well-liked by his colleagues and acquaintances but
somehow superficial and lacking in political substance. As
Hudson has put it, ‘All his life, he tried to be a good man
(and) like all men, Casey could be inconsistent and foolish;
he could be vain and self-seeking; in some intimate
relationships he could be inept; especially as he aged, he
could show lack of proportion in estimates of his own
importance’.138
As evidence that Casey was ‘a good man’, Anne Henderson
has described how, upon the death of Lyons in April 1939,
Casey gave substantial on-going financial support to Enid
Lyons and her large family, most of whom were dependent.
Federal Cabinet, immediately after Lyons’ death, chose
Casey with his ‘dignity and tact’, as the appropriate person
to ask the widow, Enid, where she wanted the late prime
minister to be interred.139 Hasluck, whose career was similar
to Casey’s to an astonishing degree, wrote of him, ‘Dick
Casey presented himself well. I am not sure how much of
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this was studied and contrived and how much was due to
natural grace…either by early training or by nature, he
found it congenial to be on parade and met people easily
and without shyness’.140 Bridge identifies Casey’s gifts as
being a good listener, a loyal assistant, well-travelled and
read, and an officer and a gentleman in the old sense of
those words.141
The notion that Casey was ‘a good man’ is also taken up by
Alan Renouf, former Australian diplomat, in his book
dealing with the foreign policy of Evatt.

Commenting on

Casey’s advising President Roosevelt of the impending visit
to Washington of the new Australian Foreign Affairs
Minister, Casey wrote that Evatt was ‘an intense admirer of
the United States’.

Renouf called this comment ‘weighty

testimony as Casey was politically opposed to Evatt.
Moreover, Evatt, after becoming Foreign Affairs Minister in
late 1941, left Casey in no doubt of his animosity towards
him. However Casey was always a fair man’.
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Indeed,

Evatt’s attitude to Casey, according to one memoir, may
have been based on Evatt’s distrust of those members of
‘the ruling class who were imbued with a sense of social
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superiority’, including Menzies, Bruce and Casey. Yet the
same memoir claims that, over the years, Evatt’s opinion
mellowed. Casey, as Foreign Minister, as a matter of
courtesy, gave Evatt advance notice of what he planned to
say in a foreign affairs debate in parliament.143
Similar attestations of Casey’s generosity of spirit appear in
the entry of Garry Woodward and Joan Beaumont in an
anthology of Paul Hasluck’s achievements. As they put it:
‘The observation of the forms did not stand in the way of
Casey taking a deep and often generous interest in his
senior officers’ personal circumstances’.

144

For Hudson,

Casey was something of a virtuous anachronism.

He

describes Casey as ‘a moral man…an oddly innocent
man…an honourable man’, but with notions of honour
belonging in the early twentieth century rather than later.145
Hudson notes in Casey what he describes as ‘an Edwardian
paradigm of secular gentlemanliness’.146
Yet Casey’s popularity could be interpreted as a flaw. The
United States’s Consul-General to Australia in late 1941,
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Nelson T. Johnson, recorded a conversation with Evatt at a
social gathering at Johnson’s home shortly after the
formation of the Curtin government, during which Casey
became the topic of conversation. Evatt had expressed the
view that Casey was a poor representative of Australia.
Johnson noted that his polite remark to the effect that
Casey appeared to have a good reputation and to have
made a very wide circle of acquaintances in the United
States brought a heated retort from Evatt: ‘The trouble
with Casey is that he tries to be so popular.

All this

popularity business is nonsense. What Australia needs in
Washington is an unpopular man. It is the unpopular man
who gets things (done) because he does not have to worry
about what people think of him’.

It must be added that

147

while Evatt was regarded in both London and Washington
with reservations, bordering on hostility, Casey enjoyed
genuine respect and widespread co-operation in both
centres.148
Clearly, Casey in Washington was employing what later
became known as ‘soft power’, that is, winning hearts and
minds by building a favourable opinion about, in this case,
Australia. To the contemporary mindset, this proposition
147
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seems blindingly obvious. But in 1930s Australia, a nation
that hitherto had had no foreign relations and no foreign
service, international diplomacy, especially in regard to the
United States, represented something new. If Casey’s style
did, in fact, add to his substance, it also made his
substance

more

Washington.

He

acceptable,
was

not

certainly
a

in

Europe

quintessential

and

Australian

politician, a shortcoming that inhibited his career in
Australia. Viewed in a positive light, Casey’s style gave him
easier entrée into senior levels in Washington and London,
where his substance would be heard and noted and
perhaps heeded.
Casey’s

personal

characteristics

were

subjected

to

examination by a colleague, who had the opportunity to
observe him in a different context to Evatt. Watt, First
Secretary at the Australian Legation in Washington during
Casey’s appointment there, described him as ‘a man who
learned more by personal contact and conversation than by
reading

documents

and

reflecting

deeply

upon

their

contents’.149 This practice of employing personal contact in
preference

to

studying

and

responding

to

the

documentation, arguably at least, encouraged a more
effective and possibly more rapid exchange of views.
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The conclusion that can be drawn is that Casey was good
with people or that he possessed what today might be
described as emotional intelligence. The historian M H Ellis
made the observation, not entirely valid, that Casey had
talked, at some time with nearly every man of note or fame
in the world in the preceding fifty years. Moreover, Ellis
argued that ‘no man in Australia, few in the Britishspeaking world, have had such a variety of experiences and
been

associated

with

so

many

and

so

various

an

assortment of offices and personalities…he was accessible…
he was always working, always had his facts at his
fingertips’.150 Implicit in Casey’s practice was a belief that
such exchange of views may well lead to a speedier
resolution or agreement, rather than the more conventional
exchange of diplomatic notes, possibly over an extended
period. This is not to assert that oral negotiations ‘over the
negotiating table’ invariably lead to a quicker resolution of
the

matter.

negotiating
qualities

of

Actual
parties,

personal

however,

personality,

body

contact

brings

between

into

language,

play

the

those

manner,

a

readiness to at least understand and recognise the other’s
position.
Casey relied heavily on ‘the personal touch’ in all his
dealings, whether they be with his colleagues or in his
150
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diplomatic duties. He clearly felt the need to discuss and
explore all aspects of an issue before reaching the point of
conclusion where a policy position could be taken.Casey
claimed to be at his best when he had a colleague with
whom he was comfortable testing out ideas. This was the
case during his first year in Washington when he worked
hand-in-glove with Lord Lothian, the British ambassador.
As Casey put it:
My mind works best when I have some individual with
whom I can argue out a problem- someone against
whom one can fling one’s arguments- and they come
back at you- and vice versa. This is the way Lothian and
I worked.151
Waters cites the example of how, when Casey was later
Minister for External Affairs, he was at a loss as to how to
proceed with a review of its organisaiton. His friend, Lester
Mike Pearson, the Canadian Minister for External Affairs,
was the type of person who could act as a sounding board
to enable Casey to develop new policies. ‘If only Mike and I
could get alone somewhere and think it through’, a solution
could

be

found’.

departmental

Casey

officers were

explained
adequate

that

his

senior

at this sort of

discussion but that they were so pressed with day-to-day
problems that they had no time for basic thinking. Casey
admitted that he was no good ‘at battling this sort of thing’
through by himself and that he had to have somebody with
151
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whom he could bat the ball back and forth. Lest too much
might be made of one dinner-table conversation, Waters
makes the point that studying Casey’s ‘voluminous diaries’
reveals little evidence of foreign policy being worked out on
paper or through memoranda or departmental submissions.
Rather, ‘it is the private meeting, the personal exchange
and the lunch or dinner conversation where Casey was at
his best’.152
On the other hand, Casey was not often described as a
deep thinker or significant driver of policy. Edwards, in his
examination of the making of Australian foreign policy,
concluded that Casey was not a major Australian policymaker while in Washington. According to Edwards, Casey
was ‘charming, tactful and quick witted, but not a profound
or original thinker on great issues.

It could be said that

throughout his career, he was more of a diplomat than a
politician in the sense that he ably executed the policies
devised by others’.153
If accurate, Casey’s alleged lack of substance in the area of
policy development constitutes a serious impediment to
leadership. But it is perhaps less of an impediment for a
152

Christopher Waters. ‘Cold War Liberals: Richard Casey and the Department of
External Affairs, 1951-60’ in
Beaumont, Waters, Lowe and Woodard (eds)
Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats, (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2003),
p. 93.

153

P.G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats. The Making of Australian Foreign
Policy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 127.

81

diplomat

undertaking

representative

duties.

Casey

seemingly recognised his failing in this area, even if he was
unable to overcome it. In a different context, Millar claimed
that Casey lacked

the intellectual skill

to out-argue

Menzies. Given that Menzies has often been described as
one of the best orators to grace the Australian political
spectrum, Casey’s inferiority does not necessarily denote a
significant failing.154 Yet, this inferior status of Casey vis-àvis his leader had all kinds of negative consequences.
Waters suggests that to be an effective Minister for
External Affairs in Australia requires either a close and
intimate working relationship with the Prime Minister, such
as Evatt had with Chifley, or the stature and energy to take
the initiatives without prime ministerial approval, such as
Spender did in committing Australian land forces to the
Korean war without Menzies’ prior approval.155

Yet, by all

accounts, the relationship between Menzies and Casey was
anything but close.
Here too, the evidence is far from conclusive when it comes
to Casey’s understanding of world events. Casey, for
example, warned Menzies against involvement in the illfated Suez Crisis of 1956. He was also an early advocate of
Australia forging closer relationships with non-Communist
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Asia in the 1950s, relations that he fostered as Minister.
These are examples of Casey as a perceptive and proactive
thinker

when

it

came

to

Australia’s

foreign

policy

requirements. Casey was a key player in the Menzies
years, but was not a stereotypic conservative nostalgic for
empire.
Casey, as we have noted, was viewed as sophisticated,
British and engaging. His ‘people skills’ that came naturally
to him and which he employed to the full in the varied
assignments of his long working life created a lasting
impression.The criticism that he was effectively a British
agent in Washington does not stand up to any sort of
scrutiny. Yet, Casey is not considered a heavyweight when
it came to strategic thinking or planning. The suggestion
contained in much of the literature is that Casey was a
follower – a good ‘lieutenant’ as Hudson has put it – rather
than a leader who can influence events. As we shall see,
the achievements of Casey’s Washington mission require a
modification to this picture of Casey as an amiable executor
of orders given by others.
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CHAPTER TWO: Casey, Australian Diplomacy and the
American Challenge

Because the alliance between the United States and
Australia, formalised through ANZUS in 1951, is the
bedrock of Australia’s post-war foreign policy, it is often
forgotten that there was nothing obvious or natural about
this alliance before Pearl Harbor. Casey’s task in the United
States has to be situated in the context of the triangular
Australia-Britain-United States relationship before the war.
What each nation perceived as its ‘national interest’ was
more often a source of conflict than agreement prior to
Pearl Harbor.
It is a cliche of international affairs that the concept of the
‘national interest’ is one that is common to all nations.
Perhaps

the

best

definition

came

from

the

British

statesman, Viscount Palmerston: ‘We have no eternal allies
and we have no eternal enemies. Our interests are eternal,
and those interests it is our duty to follow’.156

Winston

Churchill famously remarked that Britain does not have
friends or allies, it only has interests; the French President
Charles de Gaulle noted that nations have no feelings, only
interests. The Australian academic Gary Smith defined
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national interests in basic terms as ‘survival’.157 For less
powerful states like Australia, the implications of the great
powers’ prioritising of the national interest are alarming. In
the words of David Day, national interest constituted:
… one of the realities of international relations that
nevertheless seems to demand constant repetition for
it to be appreciated. It is this, that in the final analysis
great states will act only to protect their perceived
interests regardless of treaties and understandings with
lesser states.158
Casey understood the concept of the national interest; his
practice of international politics placed him firmly in the
‘realist camp’. Michael Wesley has defined ‘Australian
realism’

in

international

relations

in

terms

of

three

characteristics – experientialism, systemic pessimism and
pragmatism. As we shall see, these three characteristics
clearly

apply

to

Casey’s

approach

to

international

diplomacy.
Experientalism, according to Wesley ‘has fostered an
intensive

focus

on

the

particularities

of

Australia’s

international position — size, isolation, wealth, population,
culture — and how these factors can help understand the
ways in which Australia relates to the world beyond its
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shores’.159Australia has always participated in, but also
viewed skeptically, multilateral organisations such as the
League of Nations or the United Nations. Instead, the
tradition of Australian realism is to look for pragmatic
solutions to the existential threats facing Australia.
The

crisis

unexpected.

facing
From

Australia
the

in

first

1941-1942

settlement

in

was

not

the

late

eighteenth century, there has existed in Australia a sense
of isolation from ‘home’, meaning Great Britain, that was
keenly felt. As Wesley has put it:
Since European colonisation, Australia has always been
a rich, isolated, status quo state. This has fostered a
particular attitude towards the outside world, and
imbued Australians’ thinking about the world and their
place in it with a distinctive character. It is only natural
that a country’s physical location and basic perceptions
of itself and its surrounds will be the most profound
shaper of how its thinkers perceive international
relations.160
Although Britain’s navy was the most powerful in the world,
there remained the fear engendered by the isolation of the
Australian colonies, and later the Federation, that Britain’s
seemingly unchallenged naval authority could not provide
all the protection needed.

Moreover, the colonies were

dismayed by the application of British diplomacy to
problems in the Western Pacific even before Federation.
159
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The colony of Queensland, perceiving itself to be the
closest to the ‘problem’ areas northwards and fearful of
foreign occupation of New Guinea, in 1883 annexed the
Territory of Papua.

The repudiation of the annexation by

the British government and the German annexation of the
north east of New Guinea heightened anxiety throughout
the Australian colonies.
In the two hundred and twenty-five plus years since the
commencement

of

European

settlement,

Australians

perceived several nations as constituting a serious threat to
their security: France, Russia, Germany, China and Japan.
The nearest neighbour, the Netherlands East Indies, was
not considered in the same hostile terms because it was a
colony of a friendly European power. These considerations
lead to an understanding of why there has always existed
in Australia a need, perceived but not always actual, for
allies capable of rescuing Australia from conquest by a
hostile Europan or Asian power. Robert Menzies graphically
expressed this need in a phrase that has entered the canon
of Australian core beliefs: ‘No country in the world more
than ours needs great and powerful friends’.161
Critics of this view argue that the perception of an everpresent threat is based upon an incorrect reading of the
policy and posture of the ‘other’ nation, or else driven by
161
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political imperatives. Smith, Cox and Burchill suggest that
Australia’s cultural insecurity explains its attitude towards
the prospect of external military threats. Recognising that
Australia has never been invaded, they make the point that
Australia has no traditional adversaries.162
While the question arises as to what extent its secruity
fears were products of Australian cultural isolation and
insularity

-

a

settler-colonial

outlook

projected

into

fantasies about potential military threats – a sense of
vulnerabiity

to

external

contamination became

attack

enduring

and

fears

themes

of

racial

of Australian

history. These notions spawned an array of beliefs and
initiatives, ranging from local defence forces, including
individual navies in some colonies. However, more astute
minds believed that the new nation should set about
establishing friendly international relations outside the
ambit of the empire. There were notions and ideas
emerging that questioned the conventional wisdom of
leaving the matter of ‘international relations’ to London.
Australia took more than thirty years to develop its voice in
international

affairs.

Shortly

Department of External Affairs
responsibilities

revolved

after

Federation,

was created,

principally

around

the

but its

Australia’s

relations with Britain and the Pacific islands and it was
162
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eventually abolished in 1916, its functions distributed
around other departments. As Hudson has pointed out,
‘external affairs’ did not mean then what it means now. In
1901, ‘external affairs’ simply referred to the imperial
connection with London, not to connections with the world
at large or even with the rest of the Empire. The ‘external’
relations of the embryonic Department of External Affairs
was restricted to the Colonial Office in London.163
Deakin, the second Prime Minister, recognised that the
national interest of the fledgling nation of Australia would
be served by the adoption of a more proactive role in
international affairs. Deakin, who had become Prime
Minster and Minister for External Affairs in September
1903, set a standard of independence in international
relations, specifically with the United States, that did not
accord with the wishes of the British government. One of
his early clashes with London over this issue occurred in
1907, while he was attending an Imperial Conference in
London. Deakin proposed the creation of a permanent
Imperial secretariat to give the self-governing colonies of
the Empire an effective voice in foreign policy, defence and
economic

co-operation.

The

British

government,

not

surprisingly, was opposed to conceding any responsibilities
for foreign relations to the dominions, no matter what their
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constitutions may or may not have said, but all lacking an
ingredient that it, Britain, alone possessed, that is, the
hundreds of years of experience in international relations
that resided in Whitehall. Yet, Deakin was acting within the
words, if not the spirit, of the Constitution and the reality
that the Australian Constitution is a statute of the British
Parliament, emphasised its arguing strength. Section 51,
provides for the Commonwealth Parliament ‘…to make laws
for

the

peace,

order

and

good

government

Commonwealth with respect to…(xxix) External

of

the

Affairs’.

While the formal alliance between Britain and Japan that
began in 1902 did little to reassure Australians that their
island home in the South-West Pacific had been made more
secure, British politicans and military leaders saw the
Anglo-Japanese naval alliance as a plus for the security of
Australia. The alternative, from Britain’s perspective, was
for Australia to pay more for its own defence. When Earl
Kitchener produced his Memorandum on Australian Defence
in 1910, he predicted the possibility of British naval forces
being fully engaged in European waters and not being able
to come to the aid of Australia in its moment of need.
Kitchener saw the solution in compulsory military service
and a more concentrated Australian defence posture. The
British Foreign Secretary, clearly repudiating the Australian
hostility to the treaty, noted in January 1911 that ‘the
logical consequence of denouncing the Anglo-Japanese
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alliance would be that Australia and New Zealand would
undertake the burden of naval supremacy in the China Sea.
This, they are neither willing nor able to do’.164
In 1907, Prime Minister Deakin’s interpretation of the new
Commonwealth’s responsibility took the novel form of
inviting a visit by a significant American naval fleet then
making its way around the world, a journey conceived by
President Theodore Roosevelt to emphasise that the United
States was indeed a power to be reckoned with. Ignoring
what London would dictate as correct protocol, Deakin
issued the invitation to the United States Consul-General in
Melbourne, the State Department in Washington and the
American Ambassador in London, without first approaching
the British Foreign Office or the Governor-General, Lord
Northcote.165 This was not an oversight, nor was it a
deliberate snub on Deakin’s part, but rather a clever
diplomatic ploy. He reasoned, probably correctly, that both
the Governor-General and the Colonial Office in London
would reject any request made through the normal
channels.

By initially issuing invitations direct to various

arms of the American administration, Deakin placed Britain
in a position where a refusal became impossible, especially
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after it was made public that the American Secretary of
State had accepted the invitation, at a time, when the
whole matter was a subject of furious debate in London.
Deakin’s delight upon learning of the American acceptance
of his invitations was captured by a journalist, who claimed
that he was ‘trembling with excitement’, when he made the
announcement.

He wrote that Deakin saw the visit as

recognition by ‘the other Great White Power of the Pacific’
that Britain, the United States and Australia would be
united ‘to withstand yellow aggression’.166
The Great White Fleet, as it became known, received a
tumultuous welcome at its Australian ports of call, Sydney,
Melbourne and Albany, the reasons being obliquely spelt
out by Deakin in his address of welcome, when he referred
to ‘that unnatural treaty, the Anglo-Japanese treaty’ as
opposed to the similar cultural heritage and traditions
shared by Australia and the United States.167

Deakin was

acknowledging both the hostility of many Australians to the
Anglo-Japanese Agreement and a widespread desire for
closer links with the United States, which was perceived as
closer to Australia in outlook, institutions and life-style,
more forward-looking than Britain and being more relevant
to Australia’s security as a Pacific nation. In an editorial,
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The Age (Melbourne), while advocating the creation of an
Australian navy, took comfort from America, ‘our friend and
ally, navally dominant in the Pacific’.168
Yet, it is possible to make too much of the visit to Australia
of the ‘Great White Fleet’. In her oft-quoted article written
in 1970, the historian Ruth Megaw claims that the visit was
the first public opportunity which Australia had had of
demonstrating her reaction to a permanent American
presence in the Pacific. She claims, moreover, that the visit
cast its shadow to a future American-Australian alliance
which was not to eventuate until World War Two, but which
was already present in a formless, embryonic fashion in
many Australian minds in the early twentieth century.169
This, surely, is hindsight.

It is true that public comment

arising from the visit of the Great White Fleet emphasised
the kinship with America based upon similarity of race,
language, institutions and what might be termed the
dynamics of a new nation. Australia was seen as a replica
of the United States a hundred years earlier. It is true that
Japan engendered a certain amount of fear, especially after
her defeat of the Russian navy in 1905.

Yet, if hopes of a

mutual Pacific defence alliance between Australia and the
United States arose from the visit, they would have been
168
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laid to rest during the twenty long years of strict American
isolationism following World War One. It must be admitted
that the perception of the United States as a ‘saviour’ of
Australia, should Japan embark on an expansion of her
interests in the Pacific, was a popular one. Sadly, such
views were often based on excessive optimism rather than
an understanding of the real state of American politics.
Australian interest in more independent foreign relations
diminished in the governments that followed Deakin’s three
ministries. The call by the then Opposition Leader, Andrew
Fisher, in 1914 that Australia would aid Britain to ‘her last
man and her last shilling’ reflected a patriotic fervour
shown by many, but by no means, all Australians.170
Michael McKernan suggests that 28 October 1916 could be
Australia’s Independence Day when the Australian people
voted against conscription, refusing to give the government
of Billy Hughes the power “to compel young Australian men
to go to war on the other side of the world.”171 He claims
that it is significant that “so many embraced their
responsibility” and turned out to vote when it was not
compulsory to do so, rejecting Fisher’s ‘last man and last
shilling’ call. Real politics meant that farms, factories,
170
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offices, banks and schools all needed to manned.172 Thus
we see ordinary Australians demonstrating independence
and exercising an effect on foreign affairs. Although the
impetus for an independent foreign policy was submerged
during the Great War, it re-emerged immediately after.
The British Dominions obtained direct representation at the
Versailles

Peace

Conference

in

1919

and

Dominion

ministers signed the Peace treaty on behalf of their
respective governments. The Treaty was later ratified by
these

same

Dominion

governments.

Moreover,

the

Dominions became full members of the League of Nations.
Australia’s voice at the peace talks, due largely to the
efforts of the Nationalist Prime Minister WM Hughes, was
more influential than its relative size dictated, to the extent
that Hughes argued with the American President, Woodrow
Wilson, and played a small role in the writing of the
League’s Charter. Ironically, Hughes sided with Wilson in
defeating an attempt by Japan to include, in the Covenant
of the League, a declaration of racial equality. Hughes had
perceived this as a threat to the White Australia policy,
about which he was, in the words of Poynter, ‘almost
fanatical’.173 Yet Hughes, like Deakin, was able to show that
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a small power like Australia could influence international
decision making even if the decisions made after World
War One created ever more formidable dangers in the
Pacific.
Hughes believed that the former German colonies and
protectorates in the Pacific were potential bases for an
attack on Australia and persuaded the League to grant
Australia a mandate over what was previously the German
protectorate of New Guinea, enabling it to be joined with
the existing Australian Territory of Papua.174The Pacific
came under discussion again at the Washington Conference
in 1921, when three treaties were signed, the Naval Treaty
being the one most relevant to Australia’s security. The
terms of this Treaty provided for Britain, the United States,
Japan, France and Italy to limit their naval strengths to
specified ratios, that had the effect of the major powers
reducing their tonnage of warships by about 40%. The
Treaty

also

forbade

the

building

of

any new

naval

fortifications on the new Pacific mandates. While the ratios
indicated that the Japanese navy would always remain
smaller than either the British or American fleets, in fact,
Japan emerged in a stronger position because her sphere
of interest was limited to the Pacific, whereas Britain had
responsibilities to guard an Empire that spanned the world.
174
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Britain’s navy had to be spread thinly, while Japan could
enjoy concentrating hers in just one, albeit large, ocean.
Similarly, the United States needed to maintain fleets in
the Pacific and the Atlantic. Thus Japan could become
virtually dominant in the Pacific, a development that fed
Australian disquiet.
The Anglo-Japanese alliance was not renewed at the
Washington conference and instead Britain decided that its
strategy for protecting its interests east of Suez was the
building of a naval base at Singapore. In theory, a British
fleet could be sent to Singapore in time to check any act of
aggression on the part of Japan before Australia was
endangered. The justification for Britain’s building and
maintaining the Singapore base was the crucial need for
the south-east Asia region to keep Britain supplied with
vital materials, such as rubber and oil. Singapore was also
the key to Britain’s plans for defending Malaya, Australasia
and India from Japanese aggression.
The Singapore strategy has been criticised as inherently
flawed because the British navy was not strong enough to
fight a multi-ocean war and because fleets of battleships
were becoming less important, as the naval stalemate of
World War One showed and the rise of air power
confirmed. On the other hand, defenders of the Singapore
strategy have pointed out that fleets remained crucial, that
naval tactics had improved since the Battle of Jutland, and
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that there was no real alternative to British sea power in
terms of defending Australia. As Christopher Bell has put it:
During the 1920s Britain possessed a comfortable
margin of naval superiority over its rivals, and it might
have maintained a large fleet in the Far East and still
dominated European waters. This possibility was only
undermined by the emergence of a triple threat from
Germany, Italy, and Japan in the mid-1930s, and it was
only precluded by the fall of France in 1940. These
events were exceptional, and unpredictable.175
Casey, a cautious supporter of the Singapore strategy,
would have to face up to these very ‘exceptional, and
unpredictable’ events in June 1940.
Bruce, a vastly different Prime Minister to Hughes, initially
did not wish Australia to have an independent foreign
policy but he later modified that position and propounded
the view that the Dominions should have a greater
influence in the development of the foreign policy of the
Empire. A flaw in this argument is that the British Empire
was made up of such scattered, disparate nation-states
that it was almost impossible to conceive of a foreign policy
that would be acceptable to them all.

Casey, writing in

1938, perceived the difficulty: ‘The basic problem is how
the immediate and direct interests of the various parts of
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the Commonwealth are to be reconciled in practice with
Imperial solidarity in the field of foreign affairs’.
The

Balfour

autonomous

Declaration
direction

of
of

1926

176

strengthened

Australia

vis-à-vis

the
the

Commonwealth. The members of the Commonwealth were
to be regarded as equal in status and, in no way,
subordinate to one another in their domestic or external
affairs, although united by their common allegiance to the
crown. The Statute of Westminster, passed by the British
Parliament in 1931, gave legal form to the Balfour
Declaration

and

resolutions

passed

by

the

Imperial

Conference of 1930, and conferred on the Dominions (that
is, members of the Commonwealth), full powers to make
laws, which applied beyond their boundaries. Although
Australia did not adopt the Statute of Westminster until
1942, there were no reasons why Australia could not have
been more innovative in establishing relations outside the
Commonwealth. A proper interpretation of the relevant
clause in the Constitution finally came in 1936, when two
justices of the High Court, Evatt and McTiernan, held that
the Federal government was utterly free to deal with
foreign states.177

176

R.G. Casey, ‘Australia’s Voice in Imperial Affairs’, in W.G.K. Duncan (ed.),
Australia’s Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1938), pp. 48-49.

177

Hugo Wolfsohn, ‘The Evolution of Australia in World Affairs’, Australian Outlook,
March, 1953.

99

Writing about the 1920s and 30s, P.D. Phillips argued that
‘Australia certainly was content to do without a foreign
policy of its own’.178 Yet Bruce attempted to create a small
Australian foreign service with its own ambassadors.
Rejecting his earlier arguments, Bruce brought Allan
Leeper, an Australian-born officer of the British Foreign
Office, to Australia to advise on the organization of the
External Affairs Office that had been re-established in the
Prime

Minister’s

Department.

It

was

Leeper

who

recommended the creation of the Liaison Officer post in
London, to be occupied by Casey (1924-1931).179Casey
proved to be a valuable source of information to the
Australian Cabinet, information that otherwise may have
remained hidden from local eyes. Before Casey, the
Colonial Office was the main source, and, according to
Hudson, delivered all material by sea-mail.180

However,

cables would have arrived expeditiously.
There were myriad possibilities of conflict between Australia
and Britain, separated as they were by half the globe.
Britain was vitally concerned with Europe, both from a
trading

point

considerations.

of

view

as

much

as

by

security

Australia, on the other hand, saw its
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interests, especially its security interests, totally in the
Pacific region. Nevertheless, Bruce persisted with the
notion that Britain should consult Australia in formulating
foreign policy.
Edwards makes the point that between 3 March 1927 and
23 September 1935, the Federal Labor caucus did not pass
a single resolution on foreign policy.181The last of Australia’s
‘commissioners’ in Washington, Herbert Brookes, in 1929,
aware that both the onset of the world-wide Depression
with

the

concomitant

expenditure

and

the

need

for

installation

reduced
of

a

government
new

Labor

government in 1929 made his position less than tenable,
saved Prime Minister James Scullin embarrassment by
resigning the following year.182 In other words, the structure
that Bruce had created in the External Affairs Department
withered after his departure and had to await the arrival of
a new government led by Joseph Lyons and his United
Australia Party for some kind of revival. Bruce would play a
part in this revival when Lyons appointed him High
Commissioner to Britain in 1933, a post he retained until
1945.
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The uneasy relationship of Australia with Britain that had
characterised the nineteen twenties persisted into the
nineteen thirties. The basis of it lay in the two different
ways in which Japan was perceived, Australia believing
Japan to be a threat, Britain believing that Japan could
bring a measure of stability to Pacific affairs.

There was

certainly an element of wishful thinking on London’s part
with Britain reluctant to commit naval forces to the Pacific
and nominating Japan as a proxy. Casey was one of many
Australian leaders who breathed a sigh of relief when Japan
turned north to invade Manchuria in 1931; Casey wanted
Japan to have a ‘free hand’ in Manchuria to lessen its
appetite for a southward invasion. There is an irony here in
that

one

of

the

constant

refrains

Casey

heard

in

Washington in 1940-42 from the likes of Secretary of War,
Henry Stimson and Under Secretary of State, Sumner
welles, was that British and Australian appeasement sowed
the seeds of Japanese empire building in China. Casey was
usually quick to respond that the Americans shared the
blame for offering no guarantee of support for firmer
British action.
Appeasing Japan and Germany became a staple of the
Lyons’ government and of Casey’s engagement with
international politics.183In the first of several of his forays
183
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into foreign relations, Lyons appointed a Minister for
External Affairs, J.G. Latham, the first time since 1916 that
the portfolio was not held by the Prime Minister. In 1934,
Latham led a mission to Tokyo hoping to lessen tensions
and

achieve

some

kind

of

understanding

with

an

increasingly aggressive Japan. Although he expressed
sympathy

for

Japan

in

its

dispute

with

China over

Manchuria, Latham declined a Japanese offer to exchange
diplomatic representatives, claiming that Australia was not
yet ready to establish its own foreign service. However, on
Latham’s recommendation, a trade commissioner was
appointed to Tokyo.184 The mission to Tokyo achieved little
beyond laying on Lyons the mantle of belonging to the
‘appeasement camp’, an appellation that later assumed a
distinctly pejorative connotation, one which appeared to
ignore the widespread desire to do whatever was necessary
to avoid another major war.
Reflecting somewhat forlorn hopes that the United States
would become a security blanket for Australia in the event
of Japanese aggression, Lyons was favourably inclined to
the establishment of some kind of diplomatic presence in
Washington. Moffat, the Consul-General to Australia, drew
Lyons’ attention to the practical difficulties in Australia
needing to communicate with Washington by going through
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London.

Moffat also had difficulties in understanding

Australia’s reluctance to sever its close, or what he
perceived as subservient, ties with Britain.185Lyons went
only some of the way in acting on Moffat’s suggested
creation of a legation in Washington, electing instead to
appoint, in 1936, an Australian Counsellor to the British
Embassy in Washington, an appointment floated by Bruce
four years previously. Lyons agreed to London’s insistence
that the officer appointed be ‘subject to the authority of the
British

Ambassador,

communications

who

sent

has
to

the

right

the

to

see

all

Commonwealth

Government’.186
Lyons, in London in 1937 for the Imperial Conference,
raised the idea of a Pacific Pact binding nations committed
to

promoting

regional

understanding

and

peaceful

settlement of disputes, a suggestion that drew little
support. Lyons envisaged a pact embracing all the Pacific
nations, including the United States and Japan plus those
European powers with an interest in the Pacific, Britain,
France, the Netherlands and Portugal. In mounting his
argument

to

the

conference,

Lyons

referred

to

a

conversation with President Roosevelt in July, 1935, during
which the American president had expressed his readiness
185
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to enter into an agreement with Japan or with any other
country to secure the preservation of peace.187 At this time,
1935, relations between Japan and the United Sates were
deteriorating rapidly and it is likely that Roosevelt’s reply, if
quoted correctly, simply reflected a non-specific desire for
an easing of tensions between the two nations without any
intention of Lyons’ suggestion being acted upon. Certainly,
no documentation could be found to substantiate Lyons’
claim.
In rejecting Lyons’ plea for a Pacific Pact, the British
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, claimed that it would
simply repeat what was already in the Kellogg Pact of
1928. It was at the Imperial Conference that Casey, who
was there as a member of the Australian delegation,
emerged as a strong advocate of greater Dominion
participation in the formulation of British foreign policy and,
according to Waters, emerged as spokesperson for the
‘radical’ appeasers.188 Casey’s contribution could well be
seen as an attempt to demonstrate that the Dominions
could contribute to the formulation of what might be
termed ‘Commonwealth Foreign Policy’, an aim already
identified as part of the thinking of Lyons’ predecessor,

187

There is no record of this conversation in the Prime Minister’s Department files,
or with the Lyons papers held in the National Australian Archives. The only known
reference is contained in Dame Enid Lyons, So We Take Comfort, pp. 241-243.

188

Waters, Australia and Appeasement, p. 146.

105

Bruce. This was also the conference where the Australian
delegation learnt that it would take between 53 and 70
days for a British fleet to make the journey from European
waters to Singapore, a revelation that added to the woes of
the Australians.189
Casey’s

appetite

for

appeasement

was

certainly

as

wholehearted as anybody’s in the late 1930s. His aim was
to ensure that Britain was not once more entangled in a
continental war and therefore unable to defend Australia if
required. After the German reoccupation of the Rhineland
in 1936, Casey welcomed the speedy dismantling of the
shackles imposed upon Germany at Versailles.190 Casey
argued that rather than defend Czechoslovakia against the
German menace, ‘it would be very much fairer to the
smaller countries, and particularly those in Central and
Eastern Europe’ if they were told the truth of the
inevitability

of

a

Greater

Reich.191Strategically,

Casey

wanted Britain to do everything possible to woo Mussolini
away from Hitler and therefore reestablish Italy as a British
and not a German ally.192 This was hugely important in
terms of the balance of naval forces in the Mediterranean,
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and, therefore, Britain’s capacity to offer credible deterence
to Japan in the Far East. Waters

makes the point that

there was general recognition that the terms imposed upon
Germany after 1918 were too harsh and that it would be
only a matter of time before Germany commenced a rebuilding program to restore her powerful position in
Europe.193

The appeasement policies followed by British

Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, most of the British
Cabinet, and virtually the whole of the Australian ministry
were natural consequences of that recognition. There was
certainly no offer of help from the United States during the
1930s.

Casey,

understood

all

of

these

international

currents as well as, and probably better than, any other
Australian politician.
Among the Australians, it was only Billy Hughes, Minister
for External Affairs and a contributor to the Versailles
Treaty, who argued for tougher action to stop German
expansion. Even Hitler’s brazen takeover of the remainder
of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 did not put an end to a
faith in appeasement in Australia, with Menzies, for
example, arguing strongly that Poland was not worth going
to war over. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that
they failed to realise that Hitler would renounce his
assurances and become the evil force that would dominate
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Europe for six years. Yet there are good reasons for
thinking that appeasement in the 1930s was a sensible,
perhaps the only approach, short of war, that could have
been taken.
Hughes was not the only one wishing to take firmer stand.
A notable ‘anti-appeaser’ was Percy Spender. In 1937, he
won, on ALP preferences, the seat of Warringah over the
incumbant,

Archdale

Parkhill,

Minister

for

Defence,

campaigning on the lack of preparedness for Australia’s
defence.194

As a newly elected member, Spender did not

have an immediate effect on government views.

Rather,

time did that.
The final Cabinet decision to establish Australian Legations
in Tokyo and Washington was taken in March, 1939. Lyons
sought endorsement from London but, before he could
make

a

public

announcement,

he

was

dead.

The

government parties spent the next eighteen days in
acrimonious debate over the leadership, Menzies emerging
as the eventual winner of a coalition government riven
deeply by bitter and deep-seated differences.
public

announcement

after

becoming

In his first

Prime

Minister,

Menzies announced the establishment of the Washington
and Tokyo posts, appointments that, in the past, he had
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opposed. The fact that the appointments were a Cabinet
decision left him little choice. Menzies sentCasey to
Washington, Latham to Tokyo, William Glasgow to Ottawa,
and Frederic Eggleston to Chungking. Another of Menzies’
acts was to move Hughes from the External Affairs
portfolio, replacing him with Henry Gullett.
American isolationism meant that there was little American
sympathy for Britain and even less for its erstwhile imperial
outposts. The British Ambassador Lothian told Foreign
Minister Halifax in November 1939, that ‘there was not I
think, any particularly strong feeling in the U.S. for
Australia and New Zealand’.195Australian representation in
Washington was an obvious and urgent need. Megaw
argued that the exchange of ministers between Australia
and

the

United

States

was

not

driven

by

policy

considerations but rather brought about by fears of
Japan.196

Certainly, the proposal came at a propitious

time. The worsening international situation raised the
traditional Australian fears about the need for acquiring
supportive allies.
Casey’s actual appointment to the United States was
announced publicly by Menzies on 8 January, 1940. The
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exchange of diplomats was not consummated for another
six

months

when

Clarence

C.

Gauss

presented

his

credentials as United States Minister to the GovernorGeneral in July. According to Menzies, ‘the American
Minister to be diplomatically accredited to Australia, the
first such appointment, will become for all Australians the
living

embodiment

of

a

gesture

of

friendship

and

recognition by the United States’. True as this expression
may have been, it simultaneously expressed the intense
ambition of the Australian government for the United
States to occupy a central role in Australian security.
In

his

justification

for

establishing

the

office

and

exchanging diplomatic ministers with the United States,
Menzies stated that he expected Australia ‘to play an
effective part in the development and strengthening of
peaceful contacts between all Pacific Powers’. In answer to
the obvious question, why the United States but not Japan,
or rather why not the United States and Japan, Menzies
was

unequivocal:

‘I

say…quite

frankly

that

Australia

attaches importance to have (sic) the friendship of the
United States and is prepared to do much to improve it’.
The question of diplomatic representation with Japan, he
said, was ‘under immediate consideration’. Menzies was so
anxious to make an appointment to Tokyo that he had
asked Bruce, in London, to seek the King’s approval to do

110

so.197

Even before reaching Buckingham Palace, the plan

was nipped in the bud by R.A. Butler, Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Because of the high
levels of tension between Japan and the United Kingdom,
especially what Butler called ‘economic warfare’ and supply
of raw materials to Japan, the appointment of an Australian
representative in Tokyo could be seen as evidence that
Australia was dissatisfied with Britain’s handling of the
situation or even a ‘break in Empire diplomatic and
economic fronts’.198
In a message sent to the Australian Counsellor at the
British Embassy in Washington on 8 January 1940 for
release to the American media,

Menzies lavished praise

upon Casey:
Not only a distinguished representative of his own
country uncommonly well qualified to fill the
distinguished office…one of the most influential members
of the Australian government…the highest qualities of
capacity, energy and patriotism.
As for Casey’s mission, Menzies emphasised the common
civilisational bonds of the two countries:
we have the same general ideas of government; we
attach the same supreme importance to the liberty of the
individual: we have in common the conviction that the
197
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proper object of all governments is to forward the
happiness of ordinary men and women, and not merely
of a chosen few. And we are better able to exchange our
ideas and to forward our ideals by joint effort because we
speak the same language and share the same
literature.199
Menzies,

whose

oratorical

and

literary

skills

were

recognised equally by his political enemies as much as by
his ardent supporters, did not normally descend into such
flowery language. At times, there seems to have been a
note of desperation in the message.
Reflecting

the

growing

concern

at

the

deteriorating

international situation, Menzies ended his announcement
by

defining

diplomacy

in

terms

appropriate

to

that

situation: ‘The business of diplomacy is not a mere
business of dexterity in negotiation. Its real purpose is to
remove misunderstandings, not to create them.

Its real

justification is peace’.200 Behind the fine words, the tasks
confronting Casey were formidable. Essentially, Casey and
Menzies were relying on Roosevelt to bring the United
States into a closer orbit of opposition to the German war
machine.
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The

question

confronting

Casey

in

the

Washington

appointment was not whether to seek greater American aid
for Britain, or to concentrate on involving the United States
in Pacific and South-east Asian security affairs, specifically
those affecting Australia. Clearly there was a need to do
both.The survival of Britain had as its corollary the survival
of British naval, military and air forces and the possibility
that, eventually, Britain might be in a stronger position
should Australia become involved in hostilities with Japan.
There was the risk that Casey would be seen as pushing
the ‘Empire line’, that is seeking access to American
resources, men, materiel and money in order to preserve
the British Empire, a fear aired constantly in the United
States following the end of the First World War. Casey had
to

convince

a

sceptical

American

government

and

population that the national security of the United States
did not allow them the comfort and luxury of standing on
the sidelines.
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CHAPTER THREE: - Roosevelt: The Washing of the
Hands
In taking up his appointment, Casey hit the ground
running. The New York Times wrote that ‘Richard Casey,
Australia’s first Minister to the United States, said today
that Australians, partly with the aid of American supples,
were making a gigantic effort to help Great Britain in the
war’. According to this account:
Mr. Casey who arrived here last night (my
emphasis), said that Australia through manufacture
and purchase, was gathering together 2,500 training
planes with which to build up a corps of tens of
thousands of aviators.201
Casey’s first report to his Minister, Henry Gullett, dated 9
March 1940, advised that although he had been confined to
bed for a week with influenza, he had presented his
credentials to the President, called on Secretary of State
Hull and begun the ‘long and wearisome business of
formally

calling

colleagues’.

on

each

Recognising

of

the

my

(sixty)

important

role

diplomatic
of

Trade

Commissioners, Casey visited the Office of the Australian
Trade Commissioner (Mr Macgregor) during his early three
day visit to New York. This

first report signalled the

manner

was

in

which

Casey

responsibilities:
201
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approach

his
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I have of course, seen a good deal of Lord Lothian, the
British Ambassador, and the senior members of his
staff---as well as the senior members of the State
Department and a selection of other people of
consequence in this capital…I have spent three days in
New York…lunched with Messrs. Morgan Stanley and
Company, with the publisher and senior staff of “The
New York Times”, and with the President and senior
officers of the Radio Corporation of America…have
made contact with J.P.Morgan and Company and with
the Anglo-French Purchasing Mission—as well as a
number of influential private individuals in New York
with whom I was previously acquainted. I have what I
think I may describe as a good reception by the press
in this country.
In the same report, Casey set out what could be described
as operating guidelines:
the Australian Legation was established solely for good
relations between the two countries.
it will studiously avoid being regarded as a war
propagandist.
he (Casey) will emphasise the similarity in outlook and
bearing of the American and the Australian peoples.
he will emphasise the complete independence of
Australia in all matters, domestic and external, whilst
at the same time stress the voluntary and willing co-
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operation of Australia as a loyal member of the British
Commonwealth.202
Casey

reported

to

Gullett

that

public

opinion

was

bewildered about the war. Casey had quickly become
aware

of

widespread

Anglophobia.

The

view

was

widespread that Britain had cynically let down the Czechs,
Poles and Finns. His interpretation at one point struck a
note

of

gallows

humour:

‘If

we

(Britain

and

the

Commonwealth) are winning, the Americans will sit back
and be sceptical and – irritating and know-all - but if we’re
losing, they’ll become worried but much more helpful’.203
A short time later, Casey noted to McEwen, who replaced
Gullett as Minister for External Affairs, resentment against
the war in general because of a discerned attack on
American exports. The British blockade restricted American
exports to much of Europe, while Britain’s need to increase
defence spending reduced her purchases of consumer and
similar manufactured goods from the United States. This
view was compounded by what Casey observed as a
forgetfulness about the reasons for the war:
When a war has been waged for six months, neutrals
tend to forget its real origin and causes. They see it, in
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this instance being waged largely with economic
weapons and numbers of people are drawing the
conclusion that, for this reason, it had an economic
origin. The Allies and Germany are, in reality, fighting
for markets---what has America to do with this sort of
struggle, except to protect their own export trade?204
Indeed, solving an economic issue was Casey’s first major
task. Casey may have believed that his major role in the
United States revolved around such security considerations
of Britain and Australia arising from a mutual fear of Japan,
but awaiting his arrival in Washington was a referral from
High Commissioner Bruce seeking Casey’s assistance over
the ‘thorny subject’ of wool.205 It is proposed to examine
this in some detail, because, firstly, it was Casey’s initial
major challenge in the United States and secondly and
more importantly, it illuminates the extent of Casey’s
prowess in achieving a satisfactory result in a clash of
interests between Britain, the United States and Australia.
Casey had a unique opportunity to understand Japanese
intentions

in

the

years

leading

to

1942.

The

two

ambassadors that represented Great Britain during the
time of Casey’s posting in Washington (Lothian and Halifax)
both gave him full access to all their incoming and outgoing
messages, including Sir Robert Craigie’s reports from
Tokyo.

In addition, Casey’s close relationship with S M
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Bruce,

the

Australian

High

Commissioner

in London,

enabled Casey to pick up the general policies of Whitehall
and Downing Street. Because of his long spell in London in
the 1920’s Casey was always regarded as an unofficial
member of the UK Foreign Office. He received intelligence
of the greatest value. So, it is not surprising that he was
asked to be involved in the ‘thorny subject’ of wool.
Conflict had arisen between Britain, Australia and the
United States over the question of wool sales to Japan.
Australia wanted to sell as much wool as possible to Japan,
then still a neutral. The Ministry of Economic Warfare, in
London, fearful that Japan was passing on Australian wool
to Germany, wanted restrictions placed on these Australian
sales. Britain’s deep interest in the matter was perhaps
exemplified by the existence of a Committee for Sale of
Empire Wool Abroad, under the chairmanship of Lord
Essendon. One such restriction was limiting contracts to
‘very small quantities and …extremely short periods’.
Specifically, supplies should be limited to a month by
month arrangement. The Menzies cabinet, under pressure
from Country Party members, considered such restrictions
to be unreasonable. The Australian view was that Japan’s
need for wool was too great for any to be on-sold to
Germany. More importantly, any restrictions or conditions
placed on Australian sales to Japan could jeopardise the
whole marketing relationship.
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As explained by now Dominions Secretary Anthony Eden in
a long cable to the U.K. High Commissioner in Australia,
Britain was anxious to avoid creating difficulties with the
United States in the area of withholding exports to
Germany.206

London, at that time, was negotiating with

Washington in drawing up a schedule of these vital
commodities. The American position was strongly opposed
to allowing any exports of wool to Japan. Britain believed
that despite the cost to Australia, it would support the
American position to deprive Japan of Australian wool, in
the expectation that the Americans would support British
proposals to halt vital exports to Germany.207 While this
two-way arrangement clearly served the interests of both
Britain and the United States in preventing exports to both
Germany and Japan, it was an arrangement thrashed out in
the context of Britain’s long-term plan to foster good
relations with the Roosevelt Administration. Australia’s
trading interests would have been seen in London as
206
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largely irrelevant when placed beside Britain’s perception of
the threat posed by revanchism in Germany.
Bruce told Menzies that he would instruct Casey ‘to put his
back into getting results’ while telling Casey: ‘the matter is
now to a great extent, in your hands’.208 It was clear that
Bruce had high hopes of Casey presenting a strong case to
Washington for Australia to continue to sell wool to Japan,
with as few restrictions as possible. Casey’s diary shows
that over three days at the end of March, he met Hull, and
two influential advisors, Stanley Hornbeck and Adolf Berle.
He

also

conducted

discussions

with

the

American

representative of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare,
who

was

familiar

Administration’s

with

thinking.

the

current

Arising

out

state
of

of
all

the
these

negotiations, Casey, on 25 March 1940, was able to inform
Menzies that the State Department had agreed that wool
could be sold to Japan on a three-monthly basis, rather
than a monthly basis, provided it was not sold on credit.209
Casey’s assurance to Menzies certainly indicated a more
flexible approach by Washington. Casey’s well known
reluctance to speak of his own achievements prevents a
complete understanding of how this flexible approach came
about. It may be inferred, however, that Casey was, in
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some

way

instrumental

in

obtaining

a

compromise

agreement from Britain and the United States on a matter
of equal and joint importance to both countries. The fact
remains that Bruce and Menzies, on the basis of Casey’s
apparent early success, may have felt justified in the
choice of Casey for the Washington appointment.
This early foray into American politics also shed light on
Casey’s realism that was on display throughout his time in
the United States. Some of his countrymen saw the world
rather more naively. In January, 1940, Dr Ian Clunies Ross,
Australian member of the International Wool Secretariat in
London, compiled a report, emphasising the importance of
the relationship of Australia ‘to the United States’. Clunies
Ross saw Australia’s security problems in the Pacific and
‘the possibility of establishing a better understanding of
Britain

and

her

problems

in

the

U.S.

through

the

interpretation of those problems by Australia’. However, his
reasoning that followed those arguments were themselves
woolly. Clunies Ross saw in the United States ‘a latent fund
of interest in and sympathy for Australian social ideals and
character’. Accusing ‘Australian opinion of the United States
and its people as too often influenced by ignorance… and
the fact that Australians are the heirs to that attitude of
condescention and superiority too frequently shown by the
English’, he yet concluded that Americans felt sympathy for
and appreciation of Australia and her people. He described
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this attitude to Australia as ‘remarkable’ in view of the little
conscious

effort

that

development.210Bruce,

had
in

been

put

London,

into

its

enthusiastically

dispatched the report and its wishful thinking to Menzies
and to Casey, who at that time was crossing the Pacific.
Casey

was

under

no

such

illusions

about

American

sympathy for Australia.Indeed, this early triumph was
completely overshadowed by confirmation from Roosevelt
to

Casey

of

where

Australia

stood

in

American

perceptions.In what can be described only as the ultimate
bad news, Casey’s reports during his first weeks in
Washington contained the first clear indication of where the
American government stood in relation to any threat to
Australia. Perhaps aware of the dolorous import of the
message, Casey buried it in a prolix account of his
discussion

with

the

President

when

presenting

his

credentials. Roosevelt had described how some years
earlier he had asked his Cabinet what the attitude of the
United States would be in a variety of situations, an attack
on Canada, an attack on a South American nation and
lastly an attack on Australia and New Zealand. The opinion
of the Cabinet was in favour of coming to the aid of Canada
and those South American countries that were either in or
above the northern part of the Continent, such as Panama,
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Mexico or Guatemala, but less likely if the attack involved
one

of the more distant South

Australia

and

New

Zealand

American Republics.

however,

warranted

no

American response. The Roosevelt Cabinet believed that
the element of distance denoted a declining interest on the
part of the United States, to such an extent that that it was
impossible to make any public reference to those countries,
Australia and New Zealand, either directly or indirectly.211
This was a confirmation, if one was needed, of Roosevelt’s
doleful message given to Bruce nine months earlier and
recorded by him on 4 May 1939, but apparently not passed
on to Menzies or, for that matter, to Casey. In this memo,
Bruce described how he had raised with the President the
degree of anxiety he had found in Australia, not only in the
government but among the people about the future actions
of Japan in the Pacific region. Bruce reported to the
President that he was constantly asked about the attitude
of the United States towards any southward moves by
Japan. Roosevelt simply repeated the account of the
Cabinet decision that, in the words of the U.S. Attorney
general, Australia was ‘a hell of a way off’.212
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Roosevelt’s comments to Bruce in this same interview
throw further light upon this phenomenon. The President
recounted how in initially announcing that the United
States would respond to any attack on Canada, public
opinion had immediately expressed shock, but that after
some thought, they had concluded that it was the right
decision and had accepted it. However, the President
believed that the American people would not take the same
supportive view to a similar statement regarding Australia.
On this basis therefore, American intervention should
Australia be attacked was out of the question. Bruce
summarised his discussion with Roosevelt in the following
terms: ‘Nothing said

to me constituted

any binding

undertaking as to what the United States action would be
in the event of developments in the Pacific…’.213
It remains unclear why Bruce did not pass on this message
to Menzies. Equally unclear is why Bruce, who was always
close to Casey, appears not to have warned him upon
learning of Casey’s elevation to the Washington post.
Casey, upon meeting the President for the first time as
Minister Plenipotentiary, ideally should not have been in the
position where he was ignorant of White House thinking on
the very matter for which he had been appointed.
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In some respects, the admission that the President gave
Casey was more definite, with less room for change than
the President’s advice to Bruce, nine months earlier. In
explanatory comments, Roosevelt conceded to Bruce that
the United States would be ‘vitally concerned’ should Japan
make any move that would ‘take her south of the Equator’.
This was clearly not a commitment, but at least, it signified
that the United States might reconsider her future actions
in the Pacific region if Japan indicated any aggressive
intentions.214 Roosevelt’s talk to Casey included no such
promises. It was, according to Casey, unequivocal in its
determination for the United States not to get involved in
aiding Australia.
The significance of Roosevelt’s unequivocal ‘washing of the
hands’ message to Casey lies in its timing, presenting it to
Casey at the very beginning of his engagement with the
United States. No matter what hopes Australia may have
held for American aid should the need arise, the President
wanted to make it quite clear that the present view of the
Administration

eliminated

the

possibility.

However,

recognising the despair that his advice would create in
Canberra, the President gave an assurance that he would
create an opportunity for Casey to discuss the matter with
him further.
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For the remainder of his term in the United States, this
worrying message of American indifference to Australia
could well have haunted Casey, as he attempted to turn
around

public

opinion,

Administration

thinking

and

American naval and military strategy. As stated in the
introduction to this thesis, Casey was not given to
introspection

or

rather,

to

disclosing

his

innermost

thoughts, but it is not difficult to imagine that the full
import of Roosevelt’s message must have weighed heavily
upon him. Yet, so far as can be traced, he never referred to
it again in either official communications to Australia or in
personal

correspondence,

beyond

recognising

the

overwhelming strength of isolationism in the U S Congress
and

the

Roosevelt

Administration.

Perhaps,

in

psychological terms, he either repressed the message or
alternatively, simply did not admit this clear indication of
Administration thinking into his own thinking process,
because it represented the very thing he had been
commissioned to change. To accept it would be an
admission not so much of defeat but of a pursuit of a
hopeless cause.
It is generally recognised that Casey would have faced
enormous difficulties in working in Washington. Years later,
Keith Waller, Ambassador to the United States during the
Johnson years, described one aspect of these difficulties:
‘Australia has always been at a disadvantage in the United
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States in having no constituency. There is a Polish vote, a
Scandinavian vote, a Jewish vote, an Irish vote, but no
single constituency which is in any way, dependent on the
votes of an Australia-oriented section of the community’.215
For most Americans, Australia was all but invisible.
Casey

understood

correctly

that

it

was

the

State

Department where much of the hostility towards Britain
and ignorance about Australia was generated. In his initial
meetings with Berle and Hornbeck, respectively, Assistant
Secretary of State and Far Eastern Adviser to the Secretary
of State, it was confirmed to Casey that American
reluctance to become involved in any sort of conflict was
not necessarily the considered opinion of either the
President or the Administration but rather a reflection of
public opinion. Hornbeck made the point that in the United
States, more than any other country, public opinion made
itself felt on government policy, and that it was practically
impossible for a President or his Administration to ‘put
over’

a

policy

disapproved.

of

which

a

majority

of

the

people

President Wilson, he said, found that out.

This was no doubt a reference to Wilson’s

unsuccessful

attempt to bring the United States into the League of
Nations. President Roosevelt gave more lead to the people
than any president for many years, but even he had to
215
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frame

and

adjust

his

policy

to

enable

him

to

get

Congressional approval. Casey quoted Hornbeck’s graphic
description of Roosevelt’s gamesmanship: ‘He often flew
kites and if he found that he couldn’t steer north, he
altered his course to north-east’.216 In an earlier letter to
McEwen, Casey recognised Roosevelt’s need to dissemble:
The President …until the Presidential election in
November…will have to repeat ad nauseam that he is
determined to ‘keep this country out of a European war’
in terms that will carry the requisite amount of conviction
and at the same time allow him adequate freedom of
action.217
Casey was thus able to conclude that in the scope and
range of his responsibilities, influencing American public
opinion would be no less important than influencing the
policy makers.
The United States’ refusal to join the League of Nations and
Australian resentment at high American duties on the
import of Australian wool contributed to a perception of the
United States as a less than friendly power and in one
sense, a rival. Nor was the relationship between the United
States and the British Empire as a whole much stronger.
The depth of the chasm between these two Englishspeaking nations is perhaps illustrated by a remark
216
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attributed to Churchill in 1927 that war between the two
countries was not ‘unthinkable’.218 Kershaw argues that the
isolationism that had taken hold in the United States at the
end of the First World War became still further engrained
during Roosevelt’s first term. He has noted that:
The impact of (that) involvement on American society
had been profound. Fifty thousand American soldiers had
lost their lives in a conflict which, to many, had not been
their country’s concern…most Americans felt that this
must on no account, ever be allowed to happen again.219

Many of the politicians referred to as isolationists often
preferred the term ‘non-interventionists’ as signifying, for
instance, a desire for the United States to object to
Japanese aggression and atrocities by instituting boycotts
of Japanese products. Far from being a simple withdrawal
from international discussions and negotiations, the noninterventionists saw themselves as active participants, not
interfering in the affairs of other nations but, at the same
time, steering the United States on a particular path that
would result in a more peaceful world.
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‘We are not isolationist’, claimed Roosevelt, ‘except insofar
as we attempt to isolate ourselves completely from war’.220
The original Neutrality Act, signed by the President in
August 1935 arose largely from an attempt by the
Administration to assist Abyssinia after Italy’s invasion, a
proposal that aroused much hostility in the Congress. This
first

Act

provided

for

an

embargo

on

the

sale

of

armaments, but not including oil, to all belligerents in any
war between, or among, two or more foreign states.
Frequent amendments to the Act meant that there were
virtually five Acts between 1935 and 1937. It would be
correct to conclude that the strengthening of the Neutrality
Acts in April 1937 marked the zenith of the isolationist
doctrine in the United States. Secretary of State Hull later
described the 1920s as a ‘crucial period’, when ‘the country
had gone wildly in favour of isolation, nationalism and
peace at any price’.

In the 1930s nothing had changed:

‘…the isolationist sentiment was so overwhelming that
there was almost total opposition to any armaments
building,

however

necessary

in

the

light

of

world

conditions’.221In the 1930s, the United States experimented
with the use of diplomatic and economic sanctions to
discourage military aggression, and with legislation to keep
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the United States out of European and Asiatic wars.222Hull
resumed his efforts further, ‘to advance the economic and
peace proposals’ he had long been advocating: ‘Economic
recovery and military disarmament seemed to me the two
most vital and outstanding factors for peace and business
recovery’.223
The

later

amendments

inhibitedattempts

to

assist

to

the
the

Neutrality

Allies.

Act

Roosevelt’s

proclamation of 5 September 1939 imposed an embargo on
the exports of arms to all belligerent nations and led
Menzies to protest to the President. Menzies stressed the
difficulties Australia would face in obtaining ‘vital supplies’,
including civil aircraft for training purposes, while, at the
same time, no corresponding disability would be inflicted
‘upon our enemy’.224 Roosevelt’s reply dumped the whole
blame on the Congress. As the President put it:
Earlier this year I endeavoured to bring about the repeal
of
the
embargo
provisions
of
our
neutrality
legislation…Congress finally decided to postpone the
consideration of this matter in spite of the considered
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recommendations of the Secretary of State and my own
efforts.225
Charmley has noted that:
Historians are still divided about Roosevelt’s real
intentions between 1939 and 1941. The orthodox
interpretation has a President whose heart was in the
right place, that is, anti-Hitler, but who, through
(according to taste) fear of Congress, or a recognition
of political realities had to proceed cautiously.226
On the other hand, Heinrichs noted, ‘Franklin Roosevelt,
who entirely lacked an isolationist mentality, worried about
the drift of world affairs, but not to the point of sacrificing
his domestic objectives’.227Burns considered the President
‘beguiled by public opinion’.228

According to Burns, the

President ‘floated helplessly on a floodtide of isolationism’
and, as a consequence, was ‘as a foreign policy maker,
during his first term, more pussy-footing politician than
political leader’.229As Rock has put it:
abundantly

demonstrated

by

‘It has been

American

diplomatic

historians that the isolationist element in Congress was
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both large and vocal and that Roosevelt, the consummate
politician, was ultra sensitive to its bellowing’.230According
to Lowenthal, Roosevelt was torn between his ‘instinctive
caution and fear of isolationist sentiment, and his desire to
act as a leader of the democracies’.231
As a consequence, Roosevelt was largely reactive and
forced into a series of tactical manoeuvres as those under
him applied pressure for more or less support for those
countries resisting the aggresssion of Germany, Italy, and
Japan.

Nonetheless,

President

would

Casey

educate

was

the

optimistic

American

that

people,

the
‘that

isolationism is not necessarily the best policy in their own
interests’.232Casey’s judgment of the political situation as it
affected Britain’s and Australia’s interests led him to
sympathise with Roosevelt:

‘It is a tragedy that the

Presidential and Congressional elections happen to be this
year.

It is not the President’s fault that America is not

doing more’.233
Casey’s description of his first impression of Roosevelt
bordered on the rapturous. As Casey described the
President to McEwen:
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The President is a most remarkable man. Crippled and
almost completely immobile, he has a personality,
character and intelligence of a remarkably high-order.
It is impossible to enter his presence without being
conscious of being with a great man.234
Conjecturing on the likelihood of Roosevelt seeking a third
term,

Casey

suggested

that

the

German

leadership

believed that if anyone could ‘get America into the War
against them, then Roosevelt can’. Roosevelt, he argued,
was Germany’s great potential enemy.

Accordingly, he

believed that Germany was unlikely to commence a great
assault on Britain before the Democratic Party Convention
in mid-July, lest such an assault create a wave of sympathy
in the United States for the Allies, converting into a certain
nomination of Roosevelt. Such an outcome, in Casey’s
thinking, ‘would be a great blow to Germany’.235 In this
prediction of Hitler’s war plans, he proved to be wide of the
mark, but Casey’s assessment of Roosevelt’s importance to
the Allied cause was sound.
There

was,

for

Casey,

no

alternative

to

Roosevelt.

Republican presidential candidates had no appeal as far as
Australia was concerned: ‘They are not very inspiring. I
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have met them all’.236

Offering an outsider’s view of the

Presidential Elections, Casey was scathing:
Most of those who have Presidential designs throw their
hats into their ring, (or their diapers as Secretary for the
Interior Ickes said of young Mr Dewey), months before
the Convention and undertake highly organised nationwide speech-making tours, accompanied by ‘build-ups’ in
the Press by wireless and on films.
It is a little
discouraging, after reading some of the Sunday
newspapers and illustrated weeklies, to meet some of the
candidates privately. The strength of character, he-man
qualities and high statesmanship that one is led to expect
from the press build-ups are frequently quite difficult to
discern.237
Casey reported that all the possible Republican candidates
for

President

had

expressed

themselves

publicly

for

Isolationism, varying only in degree. While Robert Taft
would ultimately prove himself ‘sound from our point of
view’,

Casey

reported

that

Governor

Dewey

held

a

‘particularly cheap and nasty Isolationist line’. It is ironic
therefore that the Republican who eventually lined up
against Roosevelt in November, Wendell Willkie, lost
support among Isolationists because he was perceived as
too pro-Allies. Casey became a great supporter of Wilkie
after the election and wanted him to fly the American flag
in a tour of Australia and Singapore.
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With all the Republican contenders firmly committed to
non-intervention in the European conflict, Roosevelt was
certainly Britain’s best hope. Roosevelt could have thus
been excused for reasoning that, on this basis, it was
imperative that the United States, under his current
Administration,

did

nothing

to

suggest

that

it

was

considering an active role in the European conflict and thus
face possible defeat. This optimistic view gradually became
unsustainable for Casey, who was increasingly alarmed by
American inaction as the threat to Britain grew.
After receiving Roosevelt’s baleful report at their first
meeting, Casey would have better understood an American
policy

that

deliberately

excluded

consideration of material support.

Australia

from

In this respect, he

would have been mirroring the views of Chamberlain, who,
not long before, had expressed the view that if Britain ‘got
into trouble’, she could expect no help from the United
States.

Indeed, ‘it is always best and safest to count on

nothing from the Americans but words’.238
Nonetheless, Casey had reached the prescient conclusion
as early as April 1940 that an ‘incident’ in which American
national honour were affronted ‘might well set fire to public
opinion and lead to an early and active participation in the
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war’.239 It is unlikely that Casey envisaged the scope of the
‘incident’ that would engulf the United States at Pearl
Harbor, but Casey clearly wanted to ensure that the
greatest possible advantage could be taken from any
unexpected

event.

Casey,

aware

that

conflict

would

certainly break out in the Pacific, knew that the United
States would be reluctant to participate, leaving Australia
doomed

with

Britain

unwilling to help.

unable,

and

the

United

States

Casey had to pin his hopes on an

‘incident’ that would make it impossible for the Americans
to ignore the need to become involved. Casey’s task
therefore would be to help the Americans develop a new
sense of the usefulness, even the vital importance, of
Australia. This was a political task and not something that
could be left to naval and military attaches. Casey would
have to take the initiative.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Spring 1940: From Phoney War to
the Fall of France
Upon arriving in the United States, Casey was presented
with an interesting array of challenges in his quest to both
bring Australia to American notice and to influence public
opinion about Britain’s urgent need for greater American
support. One consolation for Casey was that, from the
outset of his American post, hewas welcomed by the
American administration, a welcome taken up by the
American media. The New York Times reported that
‘Australia has given her best in sending us Richard G.
In an earlier report, the same journal had

Casey’.240
emphasised

the

‘increasing

importance

of

Australian-

American commercial and other relations’, without any
reference

to

common

defence

or

strategic

considerations.241Elsewhere, the issue of common security
interests did receive attention. The Washington Post in a
lengthy

editorial

announcement

in

welcoming
Washington

the
and

simultaneous

Canberra

of

the

establishment of diplomatic relations between the two
nations did discuss the defence interests of both:
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Because of the war and the continuing crisis in the Far
East, questions of mutual concern to the U.S. and the
Australian Commonwealth have greatly increased in
number and importance…The importance which the
Canberra government attaches to the newly created post
of Minister to Washington is seen in the appointment of a
high official, Richard G. Casey…242
These different American perceptions of Casey’s role
pointed to the central issue for Australia – how to translate
‘questions of mutual concern’ into some form of American
commitment to the Allied cause.
Casey arrived in Washington during the period known as
the Phoney War.

Re-entering the rarefied world of

diplomacy at a much higher level than his previous London
role, Casey confronted a world beset with conflicts and
threats of conflicts. The first battalions of the Australian
Sixth Division set sail for the Middle East and arrived in
Suez in February, thus beginning the flow of the Australian
Army to the other side of the world.In the period between
his arrival in March and the invasion of France in May,
Casey

worked

tirelessly.

He

needed

to

improve

his

understanding of the American political scene, to work out
who his friends and enemies were in diplomatic circles in
Washington,

assess

American

military

capacity,

and

advocate for stronger ties between the United States,
Britain and Australia.
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Early in his mission, Casey had discerned where the
centres of influence lay. Obviously, the Oval Office of the
White

House

was

central

to

United

States

policy

formulation but the decisions and directions that flowed out
of the Oval Office had emanated from a vast array of
sources that flowed into it. Tracking these inflows and
exercising his own influence upon them thus became the
focus of Casey’s attentions.
Hudson identifies the challenge confronting Casey as
‘achieving personal acceptance by powerful men’.243 Yet
because of Casey’s reputation for an inability to win over
Cabinet colleagues and his seeming inability to garner
support within his own party, there must have been doubts
about whether he would be capable of either achieving
personal acceptance or of influencing American attitudes.
Yet Hudson offers an interesting interpretation of how he
was perceived in the United States. The very characteristics
that had been detrimental to his successful progress in the
Australian political milieu, that is, a sense of urgency that
he was unable to communicate to colleagues in the context
of what Hudson describes as ‘the laconic phlegm of
Australian society’ and a frustration with the more routine,
conventional political ethos, were seen in the United
States, not as nervous tautness but rather as ‘attractive
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liveliness’.244 Hudson also makes the point that by adopting
means and methods peculiar to the American environment,
that is, courtship of the press, personal propaganda and
cultivation of contacts, Casey easily blended in with his
American hosts.
In one of his early messages to the minister, after arriving
in Washington, Casey described Adolf Berle ‘as a man of
considerable influence’, and ‘in growing and introspective,
very intelligent and stubborn, very critical of the English’.
On the other hand, Casey believed him capable of being
‘nursed along so far as we are concerned’.245 This would be
no easy task. According to Reynolds, Berle ‘believed that
America

had

the

strength,

particularly

economic,

to

determine the peace and also the moral right, unlike the
British, whose foreign policy seemed to him, not only inept
but consistently self-interested’.246 In a letter to Canberra,
Casey sketched a brief background:
He is the third man in the State Department, being
inferior in status only to Cordell Hull (Secretary of State)
and Sumner Welles (Under Secretary of State)…his
appointment is political a nominee of the President…not a
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career man…a man of pronounced ability
recognised force in the State Department.247

and

a

Berle was, in fact, a member of the ‘Brains Trust’, a group
of six men whom Roosevelt had gathered together, mainly
from academia, before his election in 1932.

In the inner

circles of the Roosevelt White House, there were two
classifications of those around the President, informal
perhaps but brutally valid, ‘B.C.’ and the others.

‘B.C.’

meant those who had joined the Roosevelt camp before the
Democratic Party Convention in Chicago selected Roosevelt
as the Presidential candidate, hence ‘Before Chicago’.
Their

numbers

were

small

and

generally

comprised

Roosevelt’s personal staff. Their loyalty to FDR was
unquestionable. Perhaps the most important was Louis
Howe, who teamed up with Roosevelt in the 1920s and
who

has

been

described

as

his

‘closest

working

associate’.248 But seeemingly just as close and vital was
Harry Hopkins, who has also been described as ‘Roosevelt’s
closest adviser’.249 Casey early recognised the influential
place occupied by Hopkins in the Roosevelt ‘family’.
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Hopkins

was

to

become

an

important

contact

in

Washington for Casey.
The second group, those who had joined the Roosevelt
bandwagon after the nomination, included the Brains Trust.
They had a philosophical commitment to Roosevelt, a belief
in Roosevelt’s ability to provide national leadership. Also
present was an expectation to actively participate in that
leadership, an expectation that might be ambition or simply
an altruistic desire to serve the nation at a time of crisis.
The Brains Trust occupied senior influential positions,
served as speech-writers and gave Roosevelt a ‘broad
education in economics’.250
Berle, who had been professor of corporate law at
Columbia

Law

School,

Professor

Raymond

Moley

of

Columbia University, Professor Rexford G. Tugwell of
Columbia University, William C. Bullitt, a former diplomat
who had been Roosevelt’s ‘observer’ in Europe and two
men from the world of finance, James P.Warburg and
Charles W. Taussig made up this inner group.251 Although
the Brains Trust was said to have been disbanded once
Roosevelt won the 1932 election, its members continued to
wield a powerful and pervasive influence.
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complexity and volume of events, both domestically and
internationally were beyond the grasp and understanding of
any one person.
President

surround

It was essential therefore that the
himself

with

informed,

committed

advisers, upon whom he could rely.
The decision-making process that operated in the Roosevelt
White House has been the subject of much examination
and speculation. As one commentator has put it: ‘Those
who knew Roosevelt best, agreed that he was a man
infinitely complex and almost incomprehensible’.252 Or, as
Reynolds has put it, Roosevelt was prone to ‘casual
administrative methods’.253 It seems that Roosevelt took
advice from as many sources as possible, but the eventual
decision may frequently have been the initial one grounded
in his own conclusions. However, even if they were
sometimes sounding boards, Roosevelt’s inner circle had
the advantage of personal contact with the President.
Although only Assistant Secretary of State, Berle appears
to have had more access to the President than Hull. In
identifying the powerful position that Berle occupied in the
Roosevelt Administration and then targeting Berle, Casey
set himself a formidable, but logical goal. At their very first
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meeting, it was clear that Berle regarded Casey as simply
an antipodean representative of Whitehall, a judgment
Casey did everything possible to demolish.

The plan to

modify the isolationist and anti-British views of Berle were
of paramount importance from Casey’s perspective.
There are two aspects of Casey’s determination to establish
some sort of relationship with Berle. Firstly, Casey’s early
identification of Berle as a target for ‘nursing’ recognised
Berle’s closeness to Roosevelt. In a work devoted to the
family life of the Roosevelts, one author describes how
Berle, in correspondence to Roosevelt during the prePresidency years, always began his letters with the
salutation, ‘Hail Caesar’.254 This practice persisted after
Inauguration, suggesting a respectful intimacy between the
two men. Berle was given wide latitude in the day-to-day
working of the White House, because of the special
relationship he had with the President. His position as
Assistant Secretary of State did not require him to report to
the Secretary of State. Rather he reported directly to the
President,

apparently

causing

Roosevelt

some

embarrassment: ‘Get hold of Berle and tell him to be darn
careful in what he writes me because the Staff see his
letters and they are highly indiscreet’, wrote Roosevelt to
an aide. Lest he offend Berle, Roosevelt then added to the
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memo, ‘tell him a little later on I want him to come down
and lunch with me’.255
A study of his diaries that recorded his innermost musings
on a wide range of topics reveals that Berle, in his various
conversations with foreign diplomats, unsurprisingly, was
not revealing Administration secrets. That is, Berle’s
messages

to

those

outside

the

White

House

were

frequently at marked variance with the views he was
committing to his diary. The diaries therefore constitute a
far more reliable guide to understanding and interpreting
the Roosevelt Administration. For Berle, Casey was an ideal
source of intelligence. Berle was able to take back to the
Oval Office Casey’s thinking, which of course represented
not only a strictly Australian view but, Whitehall’s, also.
Clearly, it suited Casey’s purposes for Berle to see the
Australian as a valuable source of information.
An examination of Berle’s diary shows that Berle was in
fact torn between his Anglophobia and the stark realisation
of the fact that a Europe of the dictators was an ever worse
prospect for the United States.

In other words, Berle

represented a large section of American opinion in that he
was anti-German, anti-Russian, and anti-British. Berle had
already reached some conclusions about the participation
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of the United States in the conflict as early as the first few
months of the European war. His diary entry for late
November 1939 includes: ‘The British and French might
well be worn out and in that case, we shall have to enter
the war’. Berle also believed that, were Germany and the
Soviet Union to combine to become dominant, ‘we should
have to become a militarist nation’.256 Berle’s apparent
indifference to the immediate crisis confronting Britain was
qualified. On 5 December, 1939, he wrote, with his
pleasure undisguised:
The change in public opinion here has been
remarkable. The Russian invasion of Finland seems to
have stopped everyone in their tracks… the pacifists of
last month are urging all kinds of measures against
Russia. Plainly the neutrality of this country is not as
solid as it was a week ago.257
Berle often expressed unhappiness that the United States
might have ‘to defend the British Empire’.258 Indeed, the
suspicion that Britain was attempting to engage American
participation in defending the Empire was a constant theme
in Administration discussion. As referred to elsewhere in
this thesis, a widely held view in the United States, not just
restricted to the isolationists or non-interventionists, was
256
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that the American involvement in the First World War had
been costly in men and materiel with no discernible
advantage to the United States beyond sharing the burden
of

assisting

in

the

preservation

of

Britain’s

colonial

interests. Casey took it upon himself to unburden Berle and
others of such fallacies.
When Casey arrived in the United States, the domestic
situation had improved dramatically, but the international
situation was deteriorating rapdily. Casey does not describe
his reaction when, at their first meeting, Berle asked him if
Australia had considered what it would do in the future if
Britain were beaten or even if, as a result of the war,
Britain were unable to extend ‘adequate defence’ to
Australia.259 Berle emphasised that the question came not
from official sources but he was simply interested for his
own information. Clearly, the defeat and occupation of
Britain by Germany was seen by Roosevelt’s advisers as a
possibility. The terms of the question, not ‘what would
Australia do’ but rather ‘if Australia had considered what it
would do’ in such circumstances carried an implication of
Australian unpreparedness.
Casey’s raison d’etre in Washington revolved around those
very eventualities, but at that point, probably for tactical
reasons, he was reluctant to lay open his awareness of the
259
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peril that Australia would face. He replied that Australia had
hardly dared to consider such possibilities. Moreover,
Australia had such close and important links with Britain, in
trade, finance and defence that he had no right to
anticipate that any other country would provide the
essential

background

and

connections

that

Britain

provided. He did concede, ‘speaking frankly’, that some in
Australia hoped that should the nation find itself in that
situation, ‘the United States would not be indifferent to a
threatened change in the status quo in the Pacific’. Such a
development, Casey emphasised, ‘was only a hope…
dependent on the state of public opinion in America at that
time’. This exchange with Berle preceded the revealing
interview with the President, when Casey learnt that the
Roosevelt

Administration

had

already

considered

the

possibility of Australia coming under threat of invasion and
had decided that no American assistance would be granted.
Berle gave no assurances and, in fact, did not refer to the
Cabinet decision as conveyed to him by the President,
simply limiting his comments to a general agreement of the
reliance of government on public opinion.

He told Casey

that, in any event, he did not believe that Japan’s deep
involvement in China allowed her to contemplate any
‘southward adventure’. Finally, the Far Eastern policy of the
United States was the most considered and developed of all
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their regional policies.260Berle’s question to Casey revolving
around the possibility of Britain being defeated or so
engaged in the European conflict as to be unable to assist
Australia, hinted at discussions about the break-up of the
British Empire under way in the Administration.
Despite the senior position he held in the White House
firmament, Berle held dogmatic views that failed to reflect
an understanding of the history of important issues. Casey
was

quickly

made

aware

of

a

residual,

historical

antagonism towards Britain that had its beginnings in the
American Revolution and the war of 1812-1815. According
to Berle, the British burned the White House in 1812 for no
reason except spite.

Berle also referred to unpaid war

debts although he did concede to Casey that ‘it was sheer
ignorance to believe that you could demand payment of
war debts and at the same time, steeply raise American
customs tariffs against all foreign goods.

The two were

mutually antagonistic’.261 Casey often noted how hard it was
to change the American perception that the British Empire
was by definition a bad thing. As Casey noted to his diary:
‘The British Empire, in the minds of many Americans, was
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‘the British Vampire’.262 Casey was left in no doubt that
Berle was one of those Americans who held such views.
Berle’s understanding of the factors that ended the Great
War in 1918 betrayed the Administration’s determination
not to commit forces to a European war. As the Battle of
Britain raged, Berle reflected upon the end of the last war
in which the United States fought alongside Britain:
The World War really ended because the many races and
groups in Europe rose up and threw off their German and
Austrian masters. If this war comes to an end, it will be
by somewhat the same process; I doubt if we are going
to put several million men on the European plain to
reconquer the continent; I doubt if the British can do so;
I doubt if the blockade, galling as it will be, can
accomplish anything really effective; the ultimate
reconquest will be psychological and political.263
Yet, the world situation as it existed in 1940, where there
was a real possibility that Germany would achieve a status
of overwhelming power vis-à-vis the rest of the world, was
way beyond the situation in 1917-1918. These predictions,
based as they were on dubious foundations, proved wide of
the mark. Internal revolts certainly occurred in both Russia
and Germany, but these were, at best, simultaneous with
the breakdown of fighting. On the other hand, Berle’s
emphasis on internal revolts reflected American and British
262
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strategic thinking. Even in 1941, there was no real thought
of a large American landing in Europe. The plan was a
blockade,

support

for

internal

revolts

and

bombing.

Roosevelt hoped to avoid formal American entry into the
war.264
Casey believed that American reluctance to become more
involved in Britain’s plight could not be modified while the
Administration’s senior figures, exercising much influence,
such as Berle, remained indifferent, even hostile. Berle’s
constant references to the United States being embroiled in
a war to save ‘the British Empire’ infuriated Casey because
it ignored the fact that the British Empire was not a series
of undeveloped nations that were exploited simply to add
to Britain’s wealth but included Canada, Australia, South
Africa and New Zealand that contributed significantly to the
world’s food supply and equally to the world’s energy
resources. Nonetheless, Casey was surely correct when he
noted that ‘it will be of good value for me to see as much of
him as possible’ and that towards that end, ‘I have of set
purpose created opportunities of meeting him’.

Berle’s

response showed signs of friendship, ‘although he is by
temperament, rather without warmth in his personal
relations’.
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Casey seems to have enjoyed his jousting with Berle, but
needed patience given that Berle was fond of rehashing old
arguments. If Berle could be ‘turned’ or 'nursed’, there was
no outward sign of a changed outlook. Hornbeck may have
seemed the more appropriate contact for Casey, but it was
a key decision on Casey’s part to concentrate on Berle who
was personally close to the President.265 No doubt, this
facilitated Casey’s access to the Oval Office. Berle himself
would never acknowledge any departure from his long-held
positions. While the British accused the United States of
failing to stand up for a dying democratic world, Americans
often expressed dismay at British cynicism. In June, 1941,
as Barbarossa was about to be unleashed, Berle was still
denouncing British cynicism and naked self-interest:
The British meanwhile, are not showing even the
remotest signs of statesmanship. In a conversation with
Welles, the other day, Halifax proposed trying to
“appease” Russia by recognizing her seizures of the three
Baltic republics, intimating that he did not care very
much for the Baltic peoples… had a less high opinion of
them than he did of the Finns. Considering that the
British were largely instrumental in setting up the Baltic
republics at the close of the last war, this is a reversion
to the old Foreign Office practice which specialised in
polite dishonour when it served their interests.266
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On an outing with Berle and his wife in July 1941, Berle
told Casey that the United States was ‘anti-German’ but
not ‘pro-British’. Among the sins cited by Berle were the
‘orgy of slanging of the United States’ undertaken by
British politicians such as Churchill and Chamberlain on the
‘Uncle Shylock theme’ after World War One. According to
Berle, it was the British who cynically made friends or
enemies of Russians or Finns depending upon their self
interest and nothing more. These were the arguing
positions that Casey encountered and grappled with in his
frequent dealings with Berle.
Yet it must be acknowledged that Casey’s encounters with
Berle brought Casey into Berle’s network. The complex but
blossoming relationship between Casey and Berle was in
evidence as the Phoney War came to an end. On the
evening of 11 May, Casey reported on ‘a long talk’ with
Berle that day, discussing whether the German invasion of
the Netherlands and Belgium, which had begun the
previous day, would bring the United States closer to
joining the war. That this was a matter of high policy
suggests that Casey could have only considered that Berle
was senior enough and influential enough to have a
significant input into White House thinking.267 It was just as
significant that Berle was prepared to discuss such a vital
matter with a junior diplomat. There was exhibited in this
267
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exchange a clear indication of Casey’s growing stature in
Washington.
Roosevelt and British Foreign Minister Halifax met the same
evening after the Casey/Berle talks, when the President
told the Ambassador that he had reason to believe that,
following the German invasion of the Netherlands, Japan
was contemplating intervention in the Netherlands East
Indies. The President refused to reveal his source but
Casey learnt of the President’s remarks immediately.268
Casey could only have been overjoyed at the President’s
advice, representing as it did an acknowledgment of
Japan’s serious intentions in the Pacific, an argument that
was crucial to Casey’s ‘mission’ to seek greater American
interest in the Pacific region. Casey’s activities as disclosed
in his diaries at this time reveal an almost obsessive
pursuit of his responsibilities in representing Australia and
a certainty that Japan would initiate some kind of hostilities
in the Asia/Pacific region. Casey hoped that Berle would
relay his concerns to the President.
Casey and Berle traded information and barbs not only
over history and wartime strategy, but the shape of the
post-war world. Berle’s specialisation was planning a postwar world where Britain had given up its empire and the
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United States played the leading role in the peace.269 Casey
became a part of that conversation. Berle came to perceive
Casey as influential, perhaps excessively so. The American
thought it best to keep Casey in his embrace rather than at
arm’s length. Casey subsequently became a sounding
board for Berle and a participant in the discussions about
the post-war world. For instance, Berle in November 1940
recorded in his diary:
a little dinner at home for the Argentine head of the
Central Bank, Prebisch, a brilliant man of under 40;
Felipe Espil, the Argentine Ambassador; Dick Casey,
the Australian Minister; Ronald Ransom; and myself.
This was exclusively a party to leave reality behind…we
planned and re-planned a new world’.270 (My
emphasis.)

Berle came to value Casey’s counsel, and perhaps his
company. After the dinner with the Argentinian banker and
ambassador, Casey was moved to note…’the main interest
lay in the fact that Berle had invited the Australian Minister
to come in on such a discussion’.271
The relationship that Casey had built with Berle gave
Australia a voice in American planning that they would not
otherwise have had. In June 1941, Berle asked Roosevelt
269
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for permission to begin tentative outlines of the post-war
order and the President agreed, emphasising that such a
study must not be revealed outside the Oval Office.272 Berle
included Casey in the study. That Berle sought Casey’s
presence on what the President insisted was a confidential
study illustrates Berle’s opinion of Casey. If the purpose of
the study were to ensure that the United States did not
make the same mistakes as Berle believed it did in 1919,
the

presence

of

Casey,

a

representative

of

the

Commonwealth, became even more significant.
Casey cultivated and prized his easy access to Berle and his
colleagues at the State Department, Dean Acheson and
Stanley Hornbeck, each an Assistant Secretary of State.
Hornbeck, like Berle, proved a useful source of information
and comment. On 27 March 1940, Casey described
Hornbeck to McEwen as ‘a man of consequence and
authority’.273 From Hornbeck, Casey soon learned the depth
of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. According
to Casey, Hornbeck claimed that:
The Japanese believe that they were the salt of the
earth, and their mission on earth was to spread
Japanese culture, commerce, and authority. All
Japanese parties and sections believed this. There
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were, in this respect,
everyone believed it.274

no

‘moderates’

in

Japan,

Hornbeck in June 1940 vented to Casey his gloomy
conviction that Japanese governments had had a policy
since 1894 of adhering to an agreement only for so long as
it suited them and, according to Hornbeck, Japan had
broken every agreement that it had entered into.275 Casey
found this snippet interesting, if not necessarily correct.
Casey, like most Australians, was anxious to avoid war with
Japan, to buy her off with concessions if possible, or
encourage her to advance in a direction away from the
equator.

Americans

like

Hornbeck

were

opposed

to

appeasing Japan and saw the Chinese as doing the work of
sapping Japanese strength.
Casey’s relationship with Hornbeck may not have been as
close as his relationship with Berle, but it appears to have
been conducted in a franker manner. Casey recounted a
long discussion he had had with Hornbeck on the evening
of 25 June in which both ‘got a little heated’, culminating in
Casey telling the American that in relation to Roosevelt’s
refusal to take a more belligerent stance against the Axis
powers

while

still

continuing

to

encourage

the

Commonwealth, ‘someone else does the exhorting and we
do the fighting’. Casey continued that the Commonwealth,
274
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in supplying military aid to China, was running the risks of
war with Japan, whereas the United States by doing no
more than stationing a fleet in the Pacific was taking no
risks whatever. Casey noted that, despite the heated
words, they nonetheless parted friends.276
With Dean Acheson, the hawkish third Assistant Secretary,
Casey

enjoyed

a

far

more

informal,

even

personal

relationship. Acheson was much more likely than Berle to
sympathise with the British cause. Acheson’s scope of
responsibilities in the State Department did not include any
of the areas which Casey perceived as being relevant to his
own responsibilities. Yet, the two became quite close in a
friendship conducted in Washington but not what might be
described as ‘official Washington’. By May 1941, Acheson’s
friendship with Caseyhad reached the point of Acheson
coaching Casey in how to use the new Lend-Lease program
potentially to effect a new trade treaty while American
‘vested interests’, usually in ‘full cry’, were distracted by
the war.277The Casey diaries reveal that their contacts
became more frequent after Pearl Harbor. Perhaps the
degree of their friendship and mutual trust may be gauged
by the fact that when Casey was posted to Cairo in early
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1942, the Achesons offered to mind the two Casey children
and did so for several months.278
It is possible to reach a completely contrary interpretation
of Casey’s apparent success in the United States vis-à-vis
his singular lack of success in Australia. Put simply, it may
well have been that Casey relied more on style than
substance, a cliché expression that nonetheless remains a
viable explanation. Yet, it must also be recognised that the
sophisticated, battle-scarred politicians surrounding, indeed
inhabiting, the White House (especially the ‘Before Chicago’
crowd) and the upper levels of the Administration were
able to discern the difference between style and substance.
After only a few months in Washington, Casey considered
himself

sufficiently

accepted

within

the

Roosevelt

Administration to hold frequent, unscheduled talks with
senior people such as Hornbeck and Berle. Indeed, a
cursory examination of Casey’s diaries and cablegrams
reveals

striking

evidence

of

Casey’s

extraordinary

sociability: multiple lunches, formal dinners, parties where
he met and conversed with Vice President Harry Wallace,
Hull, Welles, Berle, Hornbrook, Henry Morgenthau and
Navy Secretary Frank Knox. These were not fleeting
encounters but discussions, usually pre-arranged and not
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infrequently, conducted over a dinner table. Casey was an
extremely busy man, at the hight of his powers and his
days so full that it is quite conceivable, likely even, that not
all of his discussions were recorded in the diaries. It was
not

unusual

for

Casey

to

spend

an

active

day

in

Washington, talking to a variety of people whom he would
consider as worth talking to, hold a dinner party at the
Legation attended by those who might be regarded as
persons of influence and then board a plane or train for a
visit to some city, to begin a round of meetings and talks
early the next day.
Casey appears to have made few records of his (no doubt,
frequent) telephone conversations or casual, unscheduled
encounters with people who came within the orbit of his
activities, confirming the fact that his diaries do not
constitute a complete picture. Nonetheless, his diaries
suggest astonishing energy and successful networking with
his principal American targets. Casey’s indefatigable pursuit
of contacts, mentors and persons occupying positions of
power as instanced by his ready acceptance into Whitehall
and the British Cabinet Office and his entry as Head of
Mission, although a lesser diplomat in the context of
wartime Washington, being from a small nation, into the
highest levels of the Roosevelt Administration, including
the Oval Office, so quickly after arriving in Washington, all
point to the fact that Casey was capable of not only
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creating his own luck but was able to discern exactly where
he could put such good fortune to the most effective use.
Diplomacy was the world that Casey knew best. Yet, he
rapidly became aware that the United States would never
embark on a major policy shift unless it had the support of
the American people. It thus fell to Casey to tell the
American people where their interests lay, a task normally
outside the responsibility of a foreign diplomat. It is a
matter of record that Casey was able to judge just how far
he could go on this delicate course. Disputing a proposal
made by Clunies Ross that American public opinion could
be formed by using the same techniques employed to sell
‘a commodity’, Casey emphasised that while changing a
physical or a buying habit may be achievable, ‘it is quite
different and much more difficult to set out to change an
attitude of mind’. Casey saw a grave risk that the American
people ‘are all too apt to place (such material) in the
category of propaganda’. He claimed that a great suspicion
of propaganda, in any of its forms, existed in the United
States at that time, a suspicion strengthened by a widelyspread and deeply felt fear of being dragged into another
European war.
It is possible to discern Casey’s ability to use and exploit
the media by referring to a letter he wrote to Prime
Minister Bruce in December 1924, shortly after taking up
his position as Bruce’s representative in Whitehall:
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I think that if you at any time wanted to get anything in
the Australian press by cable from here—it would be
very simple for you to cable me in cipher what news you
wished expressed and for me to have the cable agencies
quietly inspired, preferably through a third party.279
This demonstrates that even at that stage of his career, he
had developed a technique to achieve press coverage that
was close to manipulation. Casey further honed his skills in
manipulating the media as he began his mission in
Washington. Casey embarked upon a carefully thought out
program to exploit the American media, press, radio and
newsreels. As Casey described his task:
I believe that all references to Australia in the American
press are to the good. I want to see them get used to
seeing the name “Australia” in their papers---and to
foster the picture of a young and virile nation composed
of a people like themselves, developing a land the size of
their own, and at the same time, defending their freedom
and independence against the forces of aggression.280
Casey understood the importance of not lecturing the
Americans but rather of giving the American media
something of interest to report:

‘It will be one of my

objectives to ensure that as many references to Australia
as possible appear in the daily press…. since I have been in
this country, there have been widespread press references

279
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to my appointment and to the new Legation, together with
photographs

and

good

reports of my speeches

and

movements’.281
Casey planned to bring Australia to the notice of the
American people in a non-threatening way, avoiding ‘the
taint and taunt of propaganda’.282 He engaged a public
relations adviser, Earle Newsom, whom he found useful
and helpful. Casey could not disguise the fact that he was
Australia’s official representative in the United States and
that Australia was Britain’s ally in the war against Nazi
Germany.283
However, guided by Newsom who knew how far he could
press his ideas, Casey managed the legal minefield and
avoided transgressing US sensitivities about foreigners
pushing their own point of view or illegal war propaganda.
However, when he perceived the Australian Department of
Information, headed by Keith Murdoch, stepping over the
fine line in August 1940 with a plan to spend US$300,000
281
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on advertising, Casey consulted the State Department and
the plan was dropped.284 Casey set himself the task to steer
a middle course, speaking freely about the Australian war
effort and the reasons that Australia was in the war, ‘whilst
studiously avoiding any suggestions as to what Americans
should do about the war’.285
In his first few months in Washington, he addressed a large
number

of

newspaper

executives

and

journalists

in

Washington, a gathering of the Economic and Social
Institute

Labor

Camp,

the

National

Foreign

Trade

Convention in San Francisco (audience eleven hundred),
the Overseas Press Club in Washington, a Businessmen’s
Lunch in San Francisco and a further evening address for
twelve hundred executives, the Commonwealth Club in
Washington, the New York Herald Tribune Forum in New
York, the Washington Torch Club, the University of Utah,
the Twentieth Century Club in Hartford, Connecticut, the
Harvard Chapter of American Students Defence League in
Harvard, the East Asiatic Society at Harvard Club in
Washington, Meeting of Law, Banking and Business Men in
Miami. His record of radio talks and interviews, beginning
in April 1940, is equally impressive. Indicating an intensive
284
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study of the reactions of the American press to his
activities, he reported to McEwen: ‘No less than 1400
inches of single- column press references have appeared in
the principal newspapers of America…apart from Australian
news cabled from Australia, that is, it represents press
references to Australia that would not have appeared had
the Legation not been created’. Casey told McEwen that
this press publicity had resulted in his being ‘the target’ for
a wide range of correspondents (sic) ‘mainly serious and
worthwhile communications on a variety of subjects, both
seeking and giving information’.286 Casey opined that ‘the
success of our endeavours here will be measured by the
increased references that we can get in the American daily
and periodical press…’.
As the Allied position deteriorated rapidly in June 1940,
Casey was torn, but decided that the lesser risk was to
take decisive action. Casey was acutely aware that any
overt attempt to win American support for, let alone
participation in the European conflict, was anathema. To
take on these powerful shapers of opinion was to court
disaster:

One’s mind has to accept the fact that the reality that
has to be faced is American public opinion. I believe that
no one other than Americans can say or do anything that
286
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is going appreciably to speed things up—and an
incautious word or even what might be interpreted as
going an inch too far might get wide and devastating
publicity.287
Despite Casey’s own reservations about the danger of
speaking out, a few days later in New York City he
addressed a wide selection of organizations. These included
No.1 Wall Street, the Union League Club, the Dutch Treat
Club (a private charity body made up of prominent Wall
Street figures), India House, making ‘a total of about 400
leaders of thought in New York’.

Privately, he met and

talked to Willard Chenery, editor of Colliers Magazine,
Henry Mertz, editor of The New York Times,

J.M James,

Managing Editor of The New York Times and Jacob
Sulzberger, publisher of The New York Times, Colonel
Patterson, owner of The New York Daily News, the highest
circulation tabloid, and Lowell Thomas, journalist, explorer
and film maker. On the same visit Casey also had a long
talk

with

Dorothy

Thompson,

commentator

and

journalist.288
An examination of the speeches he made reveals that he
had developed various themes which he repeated in
different parts of the country. For instance, one which he
delivered frequently was to explain why Australia was at
287
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war

when

explanation

it
of

was

not

threatened.

Australia’s

This

membership

involved

of

the

an

British

Commonwealth, a desirable end in itself, as it corrected
some of the misunderstandings around Australia’s status.
Australia was no longer a British colony.
Casey discerned ‘a curious dualism’ in the United States the regard and respect which thinking Americans hold for
Britain,

tempered

inferiority
dichotomy

by

complex’.289
of

views

jealousy and
He

soon

among

something

detected
the

major

a

of

an

similar

American

newspapers, with the Chicago Tribune, The Daily News
(New York) and The Times-Herald (Washington) invariably
adopting what he termed ‘an anti-British’ view.290 Casey’s
tactic was to flood the press with information about
Australia, making himself the subject of the story if
necessary. Casey, helped by Newsom, over time become
something of a celebrity. Evidence for this is that a speech
he gave at the California Institute of Technology in June
1941 received attention from newspapers on the East
Coast.
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Casey showed increasing assertiveness and a heightened
appreciation of how polling created public opinion in a
conversation over lunch with Dr George Gallup, founder of
the American Institute of Public Opinion and virtual creator
of public opinion polls. Casey persuaded Gallup not to
proceed with conducting an opinion survey. The subject
was to be Americans’ attitude to a statement by Hull,
following the invasion of The Netherlands, that Dutch
colonies in the south-west Pacific must not be allowed to
fall into Nazi hands. In a report to his minister, describing
the events, Casey considered that it would be dangerous to
risk getting an unfavourable reply to such a question from
public opinion in the United States at that time.
Australia did not have public opinion polling in the 1930s,
but Casey was quick to work out that opinion polls did not
just measure opinion, but ‘created’ it.292 Casey was sceptical
at first but acknowledged that most Americans believed in
opinion polls because, despite their small samples, they
were proving very accurate in predicting the actual results
of elections. At one level, this was something of a relief.
Casey, hoping for a Roosevelt win, recognised that, by
running for a third term, Roosevelt was taking a risk. He
was comforted by the fact that a Gallup Poll, released on
14 April 1940 showed Roosevelt on a 53% approval and
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possible Republican candidate, Senator Vandenberg on
42%.293 At another level, the results were sobering; more
than 90% of Americans wanted the United States to stay
out of the war.
Roosevelt’s recognition of the opinion poll as a key factor in
determining what the American public wanted and didn’t
want, impressed Menzies, who perceived that characteristic
as a positive, politically. According to Menzies, Roosevelt
was, in effect, ‘a master politician, judging public opinion
accurately, never getting too far ahead of it, never
impatient’.294 Casey, however, with his long experience of
the British and Australian systems of government found the
reluctance of the Roosevelt Administration to get too far
ahead of public opinion a departure from what he believed
to be effective leadership. Unlike Menzies, Casey was not
impressed with the purely political skills exercised by the
President.
Casey would often reflect upon the enormous influence of
public opinion on American decision makers, indeed a
greater influence than existed in other democracies. All
politicians were able to use the media, print and radio, and
talk to established American pressure groups, farmers,
manufacturers, newspaper publishers and editors, radio
293
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executives and broadcaster. Casey needed an edge over
his rivals and found it in his ability to fly his own aircraft to
meet his audiences. This both facilitated his activities and
made him into something of a celebrity, which in turn,
enhanced his standing and reputation in a nation that loved
celebrities. It is necessary to note that Casey was a
wealthy man and the costs of entertaining these important
Americans could not have been met from the salary and
allowances that came with the appointment as Minister.
There was not a great deal about the American political
system that earned praise from Casey in 1940. Casey
noted that the President has ‘full information’ but achieves
very little because he has ‘practically no power over the
Congress’.

To

make

matters

worse,

‘representative

government doesn’t exist in this country’; instead, ‘Leader
writers and columnists largely shape public opinion—
admirable

people,

no

doubt

but

without

public

responsibility’.295 Casey was no more pleased that, in the
United States, newspaper publishers, who were usually the
proprietors, set the political stance of their papers.
Casey recorded that he had had lunch with Henry Luce, the
founder and publisher of Time magazine and Furnas,
publisher of the Saturday Evening Post on 25 June, itself
evidence of his networking skills. Luce was so deeply
295
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entrenched in the philosophy of the Republican Party that
nothing that Roosevelt did or said could be viewed
favourably. As one commentator put it: Luce’s fealty to
Republicanism came a close third after God and country
and indeed, all three were related to in the continuum of
his ideals’.296
Casey may have heard unreliable rumours from Luce and
others in the Republican camp. Indeed, Casey recorded an
early impression of Harry Hopkins a day after meeting with
Luce when he noted, at the height of the Battle of Britain,
that Hopkins was ’(contrary to the usually unreliable
Republican tittle-tattle) very much on our side and willing
and eager to discuss practicable means of overcoming the
defeatism and pessimism that is sweeping over the USA as
to

Britain’s

chances’.297

Yet

Casey,

unsurprisingly,

nominated Luce ‘as a force to be reckoned with’. In one of
his discussions with Casey, Luce shared his opinion that in
any partnership with the United Kingdom, it was the United
States, the future world leader, that would be the senior
partner.298
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During the Battle of Britain, Casey knew that he had to
tread carefully, lest he draw the ire of more hostile
columnists:
I have given a lot of thought to what I can usefully say
publicly since I have been in this country. I have
consulted selected Americans who are well disposed and
have political sense. There is a great deal that I can
say—and I have been saying it in public speeches and in
my N.B.C. broadcast. There is however, a limit beyond
which one must not go. An inch over the limit and one
runs the risk of being ‘written down’ by some ill-disposed
columnist with a big following. I can tell them the point
of view of Australia about the war and what we believe is
behind the war - but I must be extremely careful not to
lay myself open to the charge that I am telling the
American people publicly what to do and advocating
intervention in the war.299
Casey then listed the bodies he had spoken to in the terms
just described. The list was impressive: National Press
Club, Washington;

University Club, New York; Economic

Club New York; English Speaking Union, Washington;
Overseas

Writers,

Washington;

International

Chicago; Women’s Press Club, Washington;

House,
American

Society International Law, Washington; English Speaking
Union, Chicago; Daughters of British Empire, Chicago:
English Speaking Union, Milwaukee; National Broadcasting
Company

299

Broadcast.
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However,

as

events

in

Europe
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worsened, Casey noted, ‘…the limits to what I can say have
progressively advanced’.300
To maintain the positive image of Australia, Casey found it
necessary to wear the public ‘mask’ that Hudson and
Spender referred to. Casey’s private descriptions of the
American publicoften reflected his utter disdain as well as
his own prejudices. As Casey put it, ‘The Irish question is
not dead.
who

hate

There are large numbers of Irish in America,
Britain…’301Two

senior

American

cardinals,

O’Connell and Dougherty, strongly opposed the United
States’ entry into World War One.302Casey drew attention to
a report compiled by the British Library of Information in
New York about the political inclinations of Roman Catholics
in the United States.

The report concluded that, while

strongly anti-Nazi, American Catholics continued to be
strongly Isolationist.

Casey’s belief in the importance of

this finding is contained in the following comments to the
Minister:
There is no doubt, of course, of the importance of turning
Catholic opinion, which is very influential in this country,
in the right direction… the suggestion has been made to
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me that the Australian bishops, many of whom are of
Irish origin, might be induced to address an appeal to the
hierarchy of the United States asserting as vigorously as
possible, the view that the Allies are defending
everything which makes the continued practice of religion
possible and that every religious authority should rally in
their support.
Casey believed that Catholic isolationism was so strong as
to be almost anti-Allies, thus leading him to justify his
suggestion by emphasising very strongly the wide-spread
failure in Catholic circles in the United States to appreciate
the true character of the present struggle. Casey was
forthright to the point of proposing how the Catholic
bishops should publicise their statement.303
Yet if the Irish came in for harsh stereotyping from Casey,
this was nothing compared to the scene that Casey claimed
confronted him in Florida the following winter:
Miami beach succeeds in representing in concentrated
form almost all the things that I most dislike. It is highly
artificial … and the human element most revolting large
numbers of rich and offensive Jews –and generally fat,
unhealthy and unintelligent people who overdress and
sit about and eat and drink and gamble, stay up half the
night… ostentation, silly gossip, physical and mental
sloth- vulgar and senseless display of wealth…304
The problem was not just the Catholics and Jews, but
vested interests everywhere, especially the businessmen,
303
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in the United States that were working against an American
commitment to the war.305 Above all there were the
isolationist politicians, ‘small minded, provincial, without
any conception of the issues involved or their implications
for the future of mankind’.306
The wildcard affecting both the European and Pacific
theatres of any future war was the Soviet Union. Aware of
the pivotal role that the Soviet Union held in the balance of
global

power,

Casey

made

contact

with

Konstantin

Umansky, the Soviet Ambassador, although he had learnt
that

the

Ambassador

was

a

‘notoriously

unreliable’

person.307 However, Casey duly reported to Canberra that
the Russian had assured him that the Soviet Union did not
propose to intervene any further in the war and that her
attack on Finland in the Winter War of November 1939March 1940 was based on the strategic need to defend
Leningrad. Situated only a few miles from the eastern end
of the Gulf of Finland, Leningrad, according to the
Ambassador, was in an impossible defensive position.
Negotiations with Finland had broken down and thus
invasion was the only remaining course of action. At that
time, the Soviet attack on Finland was regarded by Britain
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(and Australia) as aggression of a kind similar to the
German invasion of Poland. Despite assurances given by
the Soviet Ambassador that his country ‘did not propose to
intervene any further in this war, with which Russia was
not further concerned’, Casey remained suspicious of actual
Soviet intentions.308 Ideally, Stalin would be drawn into a
war against Japan, unlikely though this prospect appeared.
The Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland
offered some prospect of stirring interest in the European
war at least in certain parts of the United States. As Casey
noted to his diary, there were ‘the large number of
Scandinavians in the Middle West influencing the historic
Middle West tendency to isolationism’.309 Casey was aware
that the fate of Finland and the threat to Norway, Sweden
and Denmark was causing both rage and fear. Early in his
mission, Casey undertook a speaking tour of the Mid-West
including Chicago, Madison, Milwaukee and Minneapolis.
The importance of public opinion there was made clear to
Casey when the worsening situation developing in Europe
caused him to reconsider his plans. As he put it to his
diary: ‘My inclination was to abandon most if not all the
visits but I am now told authoritatively that this would
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cause some resentment …’.310 Among those he consulted,
Berle and British consular officials, who both recommended
that he proceed, the principal reason given - again
illustrating the extent of Casey’s being perceived as an
effective spokesman for Allied interests - was that ‘no-one
from our side had been in the northern Middle West for a
long time’ and it was thought necessary to ‘show the
flag’.311
That the Mid West was the isolationist heartland was not
accidental. A substantial segment of Wisconsin’s population
was descended from German migrants, while other Middle
West states such as Minnesota had similar northern
European settlers. Few wished the United States to become
embroiled in a conflict in Europe, from where they
themselves, or their ancestors, had fled. Casey ocasionally
made these visits flying in his own small aircraft and this
factor alone aroused levels of interest that initially had
been stirred by Casey’s demeanour. For many MidWesterners, he fitted the perception of an international
diplomat in manner, dress, speech and the particular
charm that both he and his wife, Maie, exuded. As Hudson
suggests, it is possible that the very qualities that created
something of a barrier in his political relations in the
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Australian context, perhaps summed up succinctly in the
phrase, ‘the Australian Anthony Eden’ worked in the very
opposite direction in the United States.
Casey’s thirst for useful information led him to engage in
what might be described as unconventional practices.
Information was Casey’s stock-in-trade. Early on, Casey
was very cautious about what information he divulged and
to whom. He was obviously receiving information from the
British Embassy, but was unsure about the limits of what
he could relay to Canberra. Reporting to McEwen on 23
April 1940 about the enthusiastic British response to an
American request that its ships might be refitted at
Singapore, Casey warned:
I need hardly say that the above is of absolute secrecy.
My source of information is completely reliable, but
both my informing you of this and the information itself
must never be mentioned – if I am to preserve my
position here.312
As if regretting that he shared the information, Casey
concluded by warning that ‘you do not read too much into
the above’ as the request may have reflected military
exigencies rather than having a political significance.
Casey became bolder over time. In a brief note in his diary,
written in early June 1940, Casey made the revelation that
he sent copies of his reports to Australia to Bruce in
312
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London. The off-hand manner in which Casey discloses this
practice suggests that he perceived nothing amiss in it:
It is necessary to put down the background of affairs of
the last week or so in order to knit together the cables
that I have sent to Australia and repeated to SMB
(Stanley Melbourne Bruce). For the first two or three
days of the invasion of Holland Belgium, I experienced a
feeling of depression and foreboding but this passed and
after that I spent a fair proportion of my time in putting
heart into people—Allied and neutral.313
It is conceivable that the practice was in accordance with
Australian diplomatic procedures existing at that time. It is
also conceivable that within the new Australian diplomatic
service, there were no policies or procedures laid down on
matters such as this. Casey’s reports, copies of which he
was ending to Bruce, were headed ‘Secret’, denoting a
clear indication of their status and the restricted circulation
applying to such documents. There is no indication on the
messages Casey was sending to the Prime Minister or the
Minister for External Affairs that a copy was being
simultaneously forwarded to Bruce in London.

A more

benign interpretation would be that both men regarded the
practice simply as an exchange of information. Both were
Australian public servants, serving their country abroad. It
was only natural that each saw the need to learn as much
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as possible about the momentous events that were
unfolding every day.
Moreover, the advising of Bruce by Casey was not a oneway transaction. Casey noted in his diary: ‘I see Lothian
almost every day and I see the cables that are passing
direct (or through Lothian, or through Kennedy ) between
Winston and the President’.314 If Casey can be criticised for
passing on information to a colleague, then it is possible for
the same criticism to be levelled at Lothian, the British
Ambassador for passing on this correspondence to Casey.
Indeed, Casey told Mcewen that he showed Lothian his
letters ‘to check my own impressions’.315Finally, it must be
remembered that the year was 1940, that France was in
the process of capitulation and that Britain and the
Commonwealth were totally alone. In such a time, an air of
desperation would not be impossible. For the players in
that conflict, knowing as much as possible would be a
paramount consideration.
Yet Casey’s knowledge was evidently far from perfect. After
Pearl Harbor, Casey was moved to note that one reason
why the situation was now so perilous was the poor flow of
information between London and the Dominions over issues
such as reinforcing Singapore. According to Casey:
314
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A fundamental factor in the war situation of today, and
the last year or so, is that we (the British peoples)
have failed rather badly in the business of keeping in
touch with each other – the old problem of bad liaison.
We in Australia have failed to establish and maintain
adequate appreciation of what had been going on in
the minds of the British War Cabinet…316
Casey himself could hardly be accused of failing to make
efforts to facilitate just such an exchange of information.
On

ocassions,

the

information

confirmed

Casey

and

Australia’s worst fears. Another matter of vital concern to
Casey was the state of American readiness for war, should
its leaders decide to intervene on the Allied side. Casey
well understood that the British navy was the point of
connection between the security of Britain, the United
States, and Australia. Casey’s networking skills in pre-War
Washington enabled him to receive briefings and to
participate in discussions that might otherwise have been
denied him. For instance, the Naval attaché at the British
Embassy, Captain Curzon-Howe explained to him that, in
early

1939,

‘practically

the

whole

American

fleet,

concentrated at Norfolk, Virginia had been sent to the
Pacific region’. Casey noted that the United States had
insufficient ships to maintain appropriate strength in both
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The transfer meant that
only

four

old

battleships

remained

in

the

Atlantic.

Approved by the President, the transfer reflected an
316
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American fear of Japan’s intentions.317 Casey also detected
a growing realisation in the United States that the Royal
Navy was primarily responsible for safe-guarding the
Atlantic and indeed, the continued existence of the British
Navy

was

isolationism

the

sine

possible.318

qua

non

While

that
the

made
secret

American
agreement

between the Admiralty and the United States Navy of May
1939 allowed American ships to take command of the
western and southern Atlantic, should war break out
between Germany and the United States, there was no
similar agreement for the Pacific where the United States
studiously avoided committing itself to defending Britain’s
empire.
There was much to be concerned about in the statistics of
the American armed forces, gathered by Embassy staff in
Washington and conveyed by Casey to Canberra in May
1940. This report was the first indication that Casey, since
arriving in the United States, was able to assess American
offensive capability. He undoubtedly considered that the
disposition of American aircraft carriers and war ships in
the Pacific vis-à-vis the Atlantic conveyed an appreciation
by Washington of the primacy of the Pacific. He reported
that of the entire American fleets of fifteen battleships, 37
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cruisers and six aircraft carriers, twelve battleships, 29
cruisers and four carriers were based either on the Pacific
coast or at Pearl Harbor.319 This disposition arose from a
strategic plan by the U.S. Army and Navy and was based
on the hypothesis that the United States would join the
European colonial powers in defending their common
interests in the western Pacific against attack by Japan.
While the naval strength quoted by Casey might appear to
be numerically satisfactory, at least in peacetime, it was
seriously inadequate to cope with any prolonged period of
hostilities. The strength of the Army, the Army Air Force
and the Naval Air Force was, in Casey’s estimation, ‘less
than satisfactory’.320 Casey’s judgments were much too
benign. The armed forces of the United States in 1940
were so inadequate that the security of the nation and
indeed the security of the western world were jeopardized.
The Official History of the United States Army states that,
from

1918,

the

armed

forces

of

the

United

States

underwent an almost continuous weakening for a decade
and a half.

In 1919, the total strength of the Army was

846,498. It dropped dramatically until, in 1939, it was
188,565. Twelve months later, as the deterioration of
international relations assumed such critical importance,
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the

number

emasculation

increased
of

the

to

armed

a

paltry
forces

267,767.321
extended

The

beyond

personnel. The equipment remaining at the end of the
Great War became increasingly obsolescent: there had
been some support for directing resources to a strong Navy
on the grounds that it was ‘the first line of defence, the
only really necessary line of defence for the time being’.322
As Casey put it to McEwen on 8 May 1940, not much could
be expected given ‘the strength (or lack of it) of the three
American fighting services. It is not a pleasant picture.
Clearly the help that America could give quickly if and
when she comes in would be largely moral’.323
Casey saw reason for real concern at a statement by the
Assistant Secretary of War that despite the efforts to build
up the Army’s resources, ‘some fifteen months would
elapse after Mobilization Day before even a million men
could be adequately supplied with the more critical items of
ordinance equipment…we could raise two or three million
men but we could not furnish their weapons and supplies in
less than two years’. There was here a dual problem in that
not only were the Americans not particularly interested in
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Australia, the country that so many hoped would prove the
salvation perhaps of Britain and certainly Australia, lacked
the capacity to do so.324
It is clear that Casey made good use of his first months in
Washington to push back against Washington’s blindness
when

it

came

to

Australia

and

Australian

interests.

Roosevelt was the target, but the strategy was to influence
American decision making by working on those individuals,
such as Berle, and key opinion makers in the media and
polling, to whom the President might listen. Here Casey
was not just hard-working, but clearly effective.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Summer 1940: Casey’s Battle for
Britain.
A criticism that has been made of Casey isthat he was
single-mindedly obsessed with saving Britain when he
should have pursued the narrower focus of pushing
Australian interests.The reality was more complex. Casey
did focus upon saving Britain during the summer of 1940
when

invasion

seemed

a

real

possibility.Yet

Casey

justifiably argued that Britain’s salvation was vital to both
American

and

Australian

interests.

Moreover,

it

was

because he was arguing for American aid to Britain that
Casey was able to establish himself in Washington as a
diplomatic force to be reckoned with.
Within three months of Casey arriving in Washington, it
seemed that Britain was on the verge of losing the war.In
summary, the situation Casey faced at the beginning of his
term, bleak as it may have been, grew immeasurably
worse during the following six months of 1940, his first six
months in Washington. In January, France and Britain
seemed strong enough to resist any German adventures,
the Low Countries and Scandinavia had not been attacked
by the Wehrmacht, Italy had not joined Germany in any
military sense either in Europe or North Africa and the
Soviet

Union’s

relations

with

Germany

remained

enigmatically neutral while it attempted to cope with
Finnish resistance to the Soviet invasion.
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By the end of June, however, France, the Low Countries,
Denmark and Norway had been overrun by German forces,
continental Europe was virtually being governed from
Berlin,

Italy had joined Germany to form the Axis, with

substantial forces in North Africa, while Finland had been
forced to capitulate to the Soviet Union, a defeat seen as
detrimental to the Allies.

The suddenness of the French

capitulation on 17 June is well illustrated by the assurances
given to Menzies by Lord Caldecote, the U.K. Dominions
Secretary, as late as 29 and 30 May that, ‘we should not
like it to be thought that we regard a French collapse as
imminent or as other than a possibility’ and that ‘there is
no reason to assume that anything is radically wrong with
the French Army’.325
The month of May 1940 was the crucial time when the full
enormity of Britain’s isolation as the sole combatant in the
conflict with Hitler, the only nation still standing, became
vividly real. Moreover, following the collapse of France, the
question of whether Britain would fight on against the
overwhelming superiority of Germany or succumb to a
negotiated peace was debated passionately and forensically
at the highest levels in London. Britain’s leaders were
deeply divided as they faced the helplessness of being the
325
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sole remaining obstacle to the creation of a Nazi Europe.326
The world awaited the launch of the German war machine
on a Britain that was clearly unready for a fight for
survival.
Churchill became Prime Minister on 10 May 1940; a
coalition government wasformed against the background of
German troops pouring into Belgium and The Netherlands.
Despite the inevitable Cabinet re-shuffle, there was not
complete confidence in Churchill as leader. Two days
earlier, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Under Secretary and
Permanent Head of the British Foreign Office, speculating
on who would take over if Chamberlain resigned, wrote in
his diary, ‘Winston useless’.327 One Parliamentarian wrote:
‘The Tories don’t trust Winston… There seems to be some
inclination in Whitehall to believe that Winston will be a
complete

failure

and

that

Neville

(Chamberlain)

will

return’.328

Nor was there complete unanimity in the new

leadership team. Lord Halifax, now Foreign Secretary, was
still entertaining the possibility of negotiating with Hitler.
Lukacs

has

documented

the

intense

debates

and

arguments that characterised those three, perhaps four
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days, of debates and arguments which were confined solely
to the War Cabinet. Elements in the cabinet, led by Halifax,
sought for several days in late May to devise some kind of
accommodation with Hitler, which, while saving Britain
from the destruction that had been inflicted upon other
parts of Europe, would turn Britain into a vassal state,
perhaps even retaining a puppet king (the name of the
previous king, now the Duke of Windsor was mentioned in
this context) but essentially governed from Berlin. As early
as December, 1939, Halifax had told the cabinet that if the
French dropped out, ‘we should not be able to carry on the
war by ourselves’.329
The motivation driving Halifax was not a willingness to
accede to the demands of Hitler as such, but rather an
ardent

desire

to

avoid

the

bloody

and

destructive

consequences of a German invasion and a fiercely fought
battle within the British Isles.

Churchill, in resisting the

very concept of negotiating with Hitler, either directly or
through an intermediary such as Mussolini, anticipated that
Hitler’s demands would be so great, including the handover
of Gibraltar, Malta, the British Fleet, the naval bases ‘and
much more’, that resistance leading to defeat could be no
worse: ‘We should become a slave state, through a British
government which would be Hitler’s puppet, would be set

329

Cited in Lukacs, Five Days, p. 126.

191

up’.330 The historian, Ian Kershaw, argues that Britain’s
decision, in May, 1940, to ‘stay in the war’, that is, to resist
the expected German invasion and to mount a repulse to
Hitler’s ambitions:
was far from being the obvious, even inevitable, decision
that some subsequent events (and some persuasive
historical writing) have made it seem. The War Cabinet
seriously deliberated the choices for three days, with a
new prime minister still tentatively feeling his way, the
British army seemingly lost at Dunkirk, no immediate
prospect of help from the United States and a German
invasion in the near future presumed to be very likely.331
Not only was this crucial debate not revealed publicly at the
time, Churchill, in writing his history of the Second World
War deliberately omitted all references to it and in fact,
reported the opposite: ‘Future generations may deem it
noteworthy that the supreme question of whether we
should fight on alone never found a place upon the War
Cabinet agenda. It was taken for granted and as a matter
of course by these men of all parties in the State, and we
were much too busy to waste time upon such unreal,
academic issues’.332 As Reynolds has pointed out, this
assertion is strictly correct but seriously misleading. There
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were no items on the Cabinet minutes headed ‘Surrender’
or ‘Negotiated Peace’, but while Churchill wrote that he and
his colleagues were much too busy to waste time on such
unreal, academic issues, Reynolds asserts that ‘those
issues had seemed all too real in May, 1940’ and that ‘the
way he concealed the debate is the most significant coverup in Their Finest Hour’.333
It is uncertain how much Casey, in Washington, was aware
of the day-by-day arguments during the crucial week of 24
to 28 May 1940 and what he knew was most likely to come
from Bruce, who was close to Chamberlain and Halifax, but
often at loggerheads with Churchill. Edwards makes the
point that Bruce and Casey frequently discussed proposals
before submitting them jointly to Canberra.334

In a ‘Most

Secret’ message to Menzies, on 16 May, less than a week
after Churchill’s ascendancy to the prime ministership,
Bruce wrote that the ‘Present War Cabinet showing more
initiative and vision than predecessors in preparing to meet
situation when it arises’.335
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The Australians had their reservations about political
developments in London. Just a few months earlier,
Menzies had savagely criticised Churchill. Obviously deeply
opposed to Churchill’s strong opposition to any kind of
negotiations with Hitler, Menzies told Bruce: ‘I cannot tell
you adequately how much I am convinced that Winston is a
menace. He is a publicity seeker; he stirs up hatreds in a
world already seething with them and he is lacking in
judgment…’336 Casey, though, came to see the positive side
of Churchill, telling his diary that the messages that came
from London to the President ‘are clearly dictated by
Winston himself as they are in his unmistakeable style--and are very good’.337 Casey was clearly impressed with
Churchill’s determination to fight and the pressure he was
attempting to pile on the Americans.
Lukacs, in attempting to describe the motivations of
Churchill in those crucial days, quotes some of the Prime
Minister’s

utterances

which

go

some

way

towards

delineating the choices that Casey would have perceived:
‘In these British Islands that look so small upon the map,
we stand, the faithful guardians of the right and dearest
hopes of a dozen states and nations now gripped and
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tormented in a base and cruel servitude’.338 Lukacs claims
that Churchill saw Hitler and his Reich as incarnating
something evil and dangerous and saw himself as saviour
not only of Britain but of much else besides—essentially, of
all Europe. Lukacs referred to Churchill’s address to
Parliament on 28 May, in which he spoke of ‘the world
cause to which we have vowed ourselves’, and his address
a few weeks later (14 July), when he declared that Britain
was fighting ‘by ourselves alone, but not for ourselves
alone’.339

The real import of this message might be

summed up in the conclusion that Lukas himself reached:
‘At the end of May 1940 and for some time thereafter, not
only the end of a European war but the end of Western
civilisation was near’.

340

This worsened situation invites the question, how did this
unexpected and rapid deterioration impinge upon Casey’s
perception of his role in Washington?

Did the frightening

prospect of a German invasion of Britain lead him to
conclude that his efforts should best be directed at
attempting to convince the Americans of the monumental
importance of doing everything possible to rescue the last
bastion of Western democracy in Europe from subjugation
338
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by the Nazis? Or did he adhere to his commission to make
Australia’s voice heard in the corridors of Washington and
to

make

the

United

States

aware

of

the

strategic

importance of the Pacific region?
In the summer of 1940, Casey clearly chose not to stick to
a narrow interpretation of his brief of representing an
Australia confronting nothing more than a possible threat
from Japan, but instead broadened his efforts to help
representa

United

Kingdom

facing

almost

immediate

invasion by a real and superior foe. Casey’s encounters in
Washington and his clearer understanding of the global
situation led him to reason that the immediate threat was
not to Australia but to Britain. The threat to Australia from
Japan was still just that, a threat and one which was not
universally perceived as grave. There was certainly a
common thread running through Churchill’s messages to
his Australian counterpart at this time, that a Japanese
attempt to threaten Australia was not likely.341 In the face
of this, Casey could hardly make his first priority the
gaining of American assurances to assist Australia in such
an unlikely eventuality. Moreover, a German victory over
Britain would have dire consequences for Australia because
of the probable loss of the Royal Navy. Although no one
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could predict the fate of the British fleets, there was feeling
that Britain would go to Australia’s aid if invasion occurred.
As France collapsed, Australian diplomacy attempted all
means of persuading Roosevelt to do more. According to
Edwards, it was Bruce in London, in consultation with
Casey in Washington, who suggested the appeals that
Menzies made to Roosevelt for assistance in May-June
1940.342 On 26 May Menzies cabled Casey asking him to
‘present’ to Roosevelt a heart-felt request for American
participation in the major disaster unfolding in Europe.
Much of Menzies’ reasoning had already been canvassed by
Churchill in his entreaties to the American president but
Menzies’ command of language was no less arresting than
his British counterpart and deserves quoting, at least in
part. Having asked for practical help for Britain in terms of
military equipment, Menzies tugged at American heartstrings over its relationship to Australia:
But quite plainly, and I know that you would wish me to
speak plainly, without the most prompt material
assistance from the United States there must be grave
danger of a state of affairs rapidly developing in which
the power of Great Britain to defend liberty and free
institutions is destroyed and in which, we, your Englishspeaking neighbours on the Pacific Basin, must find our
own independence immediately imperilled… There is in
342

P.G. Edwards, ‘R.G.Menzies Appeals to the United States. May-June, 1940’,
Australian Outlook, XXVII, 1974, pp. 64-70.

197

Australia a great belief in your friendliness and goodwill.
We feel that we are fighting for immortal things which
you value as we do. On behalf of my own people I beg
for your earnest consideration and swift action.343
Like Curtin’s ‘Look to America’ plea the following year,
Menzies emphasised Australia’s dire vulnerability. To be
fair, Menzies used his message to emphasise the selfinterest of the United States in not allowing Britain’s worldwide influence to be diluted. Menzies, a few days earlier,
had written to Churchill, strongly urging him to approach
the American president in similar terms.344 Churchill’s reply
was almost dismissive: ‘Every form of intimate personal
appeal and most cogent arguments have already been sent
to Roosevelt…If you and the other Prime Ministers feel able
to follow up our appeal by a personal appeal from
yourselves, this would be very welcome to us’.345
For all his attachments to Britain, Menzies was realistic
enough to read the signs and these told him that in the
event of Australia being threatened in the Pacific region,
Britain, fighting for survival, would be unable to offer
Australia anything in the way of military or naval support.
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Yet Menzies struggled in his efforts to find an argument as
to why the United States should offer to save Australia. His
subsequent appeal of 14 June 1940 to Roosevelt betrayed
an ever increasing note of desperation:346
The friendship of Australia as an integral part of the
British Empire is of importance to the United States. The
British and American people have too much in common
and may I add, too many precious ideas at risk and, of
importance to the United States in this turbulent world,
not to realise that, whatever their organic relations
might be, they are exercising similar functions and that
safety and development of each is of profound
importance to the other.347
It is a matter of conjecture whether Menzies actually
believed that arguments about the shared heritage of
Britons, Australians and Americans would carry any weight
in Washington.

He was acutely aware that Churchill had

made similar appeals to Roosevelt and yet, for the last six
months of 1940 Britain had faced the distinct possibility of
invasion, while the United States virtually looked on,
Roosevelt trapped from assisting because of the November
elections.
The relevance of the Churchill/Halifax debate to Casey’s
responsibilities lies in the reality that Washington, in fact,
was the focus of Britain’s only real hope of holding off
346
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Hitler. Casey saw his position as especially vital in the
business

of

networking

because,

while

the

average

American is ‘a free and spontaneous creature’, by contrast
‘the average member of the British Diplomatic service is a
rather shy creature, the product of the British Public School
system, and definitely not a good and quick mixer’.348 Casey
implied that he, by contrast, was a very ‘good and quick
mixer’. He was happy to serve alongside Lothian as, in
Lothian’s phrase,‘the second blade of the scissors’.349
Casey offered his advice freely and occasionally struck a
note of optimism as he looked for an effective strategy to
lever the United States into the war. Early in June, Lothian
suggested to him that they (Lothian and Casey) should
advocate a conference in London to discuss what action
should be taken if the worst happened, meaning the
capitulation of Britain. Casey expressed strong opposition.
He argued that in the absence of actual knowledge of what
the United States would do, such a conference would be of
no use. Further, if the United States did ‘come in’, there
would be a complete change and re-appraisal of strategy.350
Hull later revealed that Roosevelt’s decision to run for a
third term was an immediate consequence of Hitler’s
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conquest of France. He explains it thus: ‘Up to that time,
the President, in personal conversations with me and with
some

Democratic

Party

leaders

had

indicated

his

expectation and wish that I should be his successor’.
According to Hull, Roosevelt’s decision ‘was an immediate
consequence of Hitler’s conquest of France and the spectre
of Britain standing alone between the conqueror and
ourselves.

Our dangerous position induced President

Roosevelt to run for a third time’.351
A week after the invasion of France, Casey told Canberra
that events of the past few days had profoundly shaken
American complacency: ‘(The) whole country, particularly
Washington,

is

extremely

nervous

and

depressed

at

realisation of their own unpreparedness and the United
Sates may be menaced by trend of events in Europe’. Yet,
while Casey detected a growing belief that while the United
States should give Britain all possible assistance, there was
no groundswell of opinion for the United States to become
a participant in the war. Casey, shrewdly, warned that
Australia should avoid making any criticism in the press or
elsewhere of American ‘tardiness’. Nor should Australia
give any indication that the United States should offer
assistance to Australia. In the context of the American
elections, Casey reported that many candidates believed
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that to speak out what he (the candidate) believes is the
truth would cost him the Isolationist vote.352 His reading of
the mood of the American people detected a denial of the
awesome prospect of the United States remaining the only
democracy on the globe.353
Both Casey and Lothian shared the same combination of
anger and bewilderment when it came to understanding
the Administration’s refusal to mobilise the American
people. Lothian reported to London in May:
The United States is still dominated by fear of
involvement and incapable of positive action…the war is
steadily drifting nearer to them and they know it.. they
are not pacifists (but) are highly belligerent by
temperament…the President would like to take action
vigorously on the lines of his own principle ‘Everything
short of war’…all the other candidates, especially the
Republicans, none of whom are familiar with international
affairs, are paralysed by fear of being charged with a
desire to get the United States into war…they are
completely mesmerised by fear of the great god, ‘the
American Electorate’.354

Or as Casey put it: ‘‘Self-interest’ is the only lever’- and it
was not clear to me (or to Lothian) … how to arouse this
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motive’. The ‘motive’ to activate this American ‘selfinterest’ would have to be the preservation of the British
fleet.355The Roosevelt administration could only have been
alarmed by a message from the American Ambassador in
France, William Bullitt, that Britain’s reluctance to dispatch
more aircraft to France in the last weeks of the German
invasion of that country was explained by the possibility
that Britain would use the Royal Air Force and the Royal
Navy as bargaining points in future negotiations with
Germany.356 According to Charmley, Roosevelt believed that
no matter what happened to Britain, such as a negotiated
peace, the British Fleet must be kept from German hands,
and become part of the United States fleet.357 The prospect
of the largest navy in the world falling under control of
Germany would have catastrophic consequences for the
United States.
The view in Washington was that a negotiated settlement
between Britain and Germany was more likely than an
invasion. Roosevelt’s long-held opposition to colonialism
and, in particular, the British Empire, led him to believe
that to achieve that result, Britain would have to accept
some

form

of

governance

from

Berlin.

Under
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circumstance would Roosevelt consider American troops
undertaking any adventure that would have the effect of
propping up the British Empire.
A serious flaw in Roosevelt’s argument lay in defining ‘the
British Empire’. The United States’ longest border was with
an integral component of the Commonwealth, Canada,
which, in American eyes, stood for ‘British Empire’.
Roosevelt had already indicated that any attack on Canada
would

virtually

certainly

bring

an

armed

American

response. Moreover, the Bahamas and Jamaica, both
members of the Commonwealth, were close neighbours of
the United States and it is difficult to believe that any
European takeover of such close neighbours would be
viewed benignly in Washington. In any event, these islands
were within the ambit of the Monroe Doctrine.
For Casey, Roosevelt’s position was not clear and in some
ways, inconsistent. He believed that, privately, Roosevelt
was far more interventionist than he appeared and that
simply following public opinion was not the complete
explanation. Lowenthal has advanced an explanation of
Roosevelt’s position as a series of fits and starts, whose
interconnection the President himself denied at the time:
These policy decisions could be grouped into three broad
consecutive periods. Each of these periods was
dominated by a thematic unifying search for a type of
policy…which shaped what he wanted and what he hoped
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to avoid. Each of these periods was ill-defined at the
outset and was abandoned through the pressure of
events, requiring the beginning of yet another search.358
Casey suspected that the American failure to rearm may
have constituted a more practical reason for Roosevelt’s
inaction, telling his diary on 5 June 1940 that ‘It may be
that the President realises that, even if they intervened in
this war, they have virtually no fighting services to fight
with-outside the Navy that is virtually stuck in the Pacific’.
Even so Casey hoped that not only would American
prestige boost the Allied cause but that ‘they could send a
few divisions, a few dozen destroyers, a fair tonnage of
merchant shipping, a few squadrons of aircraft, and could
help with equipment far faster than they are doing as
neutrals’.359
Casey

admitted

to

himself

the

next

day

that

his

speculations amounted to no more than ‘wishful thinking’.360
Of course the question has to be posed of whatmight the
Americans have done? Immediately after the capitulation of
France, the sending of a substantial contingent of American
troops to Britain or the greater involvement of American
naval units in the Atlantic, specifically to protect merchant
358
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ships carrying food to Great Britain, would have been
achievable without the necessity of a formal American
declaration of war. There would have been political risks
involved however, especially in the stationing of American
troops in Britain. It certainly was not going to happen in
Roosevelt’s re-election year.
Casey’sire was accentuated by a letter from Roosevelt to
Menzies, sent through the Australian Legation and which
was a reply to a pleading letter that the Australian Prime
Minister had sent to the President a few days earlier.361
Roosevelt was effusive but resolute in re-affirming the
traditional

American

stance

of

non-participation

in

countering the spread of Nazism rapidly engulfing Europe.
The letter was dated 23 June, two days after French
representatives signed the formal surrender documents at
Compiegne, thus leaving Britain standing alone. Roosevelt
put things this way:
I have given your message my full and most careful
consideration…I do not fail to appreciate the dangers to
the United States and to the world implicit in an Allied
defeat…America’s
sympathies
lie
with
Allied
governments…to the Premier of France, I send my
assurances of my utmost sympathy…in like manner and
subject to the same limitations, I want to assure you that
so long as the peoples of the British Commonwealth of
Nations continue in the defence of their liberty so long
361
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may they be assured that material and supplies will be
sent them from the United States in ever increasing
quantities and kinds.362
Casey, in a reflective mood on 2 July 1940, asked himself if
nations ever went against their ‘material interests’. The two
examples of this occurring, he claimed, were the abolition
of slavery and the free ride that British naval power offered
to ‘North (and South) America and Australia, South Africa
and New Zealand’. According to Casey’s figures, the
Australian taxpayer spent less than one pound per head on
its defence compared to more than three pounds per head
for the British taxpayer.363 Whether, British altruism – as
Casey claimed - was the reason might be debated, but
Casey’s general point that the British navy carried the
burden of defence in the Atlantic was difficult to argue
against.
All the representatives of Britain and Australia, Casey
foremost among them, pressed the point that it was the
Royal

Navy

which

made

the

MonroeDoctrine

viable.

According to Casey, the American leadership knew the
truth of this proposition, even if they would not declare it.
As Casey put it in a letter to McEwen on 4 April 1940:
Lord Lothian maintains (and he believes that the
President and others in high places here agree) that for
362
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generations until quite lately that it was the British
Fleet and not the American Fleet that maintained the
Monroe Doctrine.364
The Doctrine was promulgated in 1823 and yet it was not
until ‘relatively lately’ that the United States possessed a
fleet of any great significance, a fleet capable of enforcing
some kind of American hegemony over the two American
continents. Even in1940, the United States was unable to
maintain significant fleets in both the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans.

In other words, according to Casey’s reasoning,

the United States was unable to defend the two American
continents both on the Atlantic and Pacific sides.365 The only
practicable arrangement therefore was for Britain to look
after the Atlantic and the United States, the Pacific.
The corollary raised the question, why does the United
States stand aloof from the grave threat facing Britain and
pretend that the European conflict is of no consequence to
American security? Casey became increasingly displeased
at the President’s almost obsessive interest in the future of
the British Fleet, denoting to Casey that while he was
unprepared

to

give

Britain

meaningful

support

and

assistance, he was most anxious to acquire the entire Royal
Navy should Britain capitulate. From Casey’s perspective,
the Americans appeared at times almost as vultures circling
364
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the carcass of the British Empire. In a diary entry, Casey
referred to a discussion with Roosevelt on 28 May, 1940: ‘I
did not, at the time, appreciate the significance of what he
had to say about the urgent importance of the preservation
of the British Navy at all costs’.

366

According to Casey, American concern about the British
fleet reflected a realisation that it was the same British
fleet that had been protecting the United States for years
and that if the British fleet were to disappear, the
Americans would have to set about defending themselves,
which Casey said was ‘unthinkable’. Casey quoted with
approval an observation by Mark Sullivan, a journalist and
friend of Roosevelt whom Casey cultivated: ‘We have a
national policy—the Monroe Doctrine. We think this policy
has been enforced by the United States Navy. But it was
never we who enforced it. It is the British Navy that kept
European nations from seizing lands in the Western
hemisphere. The British Navy prevented them. And more
- to do what the British Navy has done in enforcing the
Monroe Doctrine for us, you have to command the naval
bases and bastions from which the British Navy operates’.367
Casey noted that he had circulated a ‘draft’ hammering the
point

that

for

the

366
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responsibilities required by the Monroe Doctrine in the
Pacific, the United States would need to ensure the security
of naval bases in the North Atlantic. Up until now, the
Americans had relied upon the British to perform these
tasks.

Casey’s

drafting

of

these

‘talking

points’

for

columnists confirmed not only his growing confidence in his
powers of manipulation, but also his grasp of strategic
issues on both the Atlantic and the Pacific sides of the
world.
Casey was irritated above all bythe complacency of the
Americans. On 2 July 1940, Casey, in one of his bleakest
assessments, told his diary that:
There is no spirit in the American people today and
they’ll have to go through hell in the next ten years to
produce some spirit. Their only concern now is safety
and self preservation.368
Indeed, Casey’s diary entries are scathing of the United
States and Americans to the point where the reader would
likely conclude that he was as anti-American as Berle was
Anglophobic. A diary entry from July 1940 was typical of
his acute sense of American betrayal of a good cause:
The spectacle is a humiliating one of a great nation
twittering with indecision and inaction willing to wound
but yet afraid to strike even in its own defence—
tangled in the toils of domestic political manoeuvring at
a vital moment—realising that the British are fighting
368
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their fight—yet giving inconsequential assistance—
cursing Germany and yet yapping at Britain.369
Casey became increasingly forthright in July 1940 as he did
his best to agitate the policy makers. When Under
Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, speculated about the
fate of the Royal Navy in the event of a successful German
invasion of Great Britain, Casey retorted that the navy
would not surrender but probably immolate their ships in
attacking German ports, a view that Welles protested was
illogical. ‘People aren’t logical in such circumstances’, Casey
persisted, adding that they would change their minds only
if there was some eventual chance of the United States
entering the war.370 Casey knew that Welles, and Roosevelt
if they were relayed to him, would find these words
provocative.
Hull told Casey in June 1940, as the full extent of the
German mastery in Europe became evident, that he was
under no illusions ‘as to the seriousness of the situation or
of its implications for America’. He confessed to Casey that
he had persisted, to the point of boredom, in rubbing into
Congressmen and Senators what a German victory would
mean for the United States and that the United States
would be obliged to do all its negotiations with other
369
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countries through Berlin or Tokyo.371

Casey left this

interview with Hull by claiming that he could see no
satisfactory end to the present situation unless the United
States declared war and ‘came in with us’. If this were to
happen, however unpleasant the next few months would
be, he believed that the situation could be retrieved by the
throttling of Germany through the blockade. Casey records
that Hull made no direct reply to this other than he hoped
and prayed that Britain could ‘last out for the next four or
five months’.372
Hull recalled the desperate persistence of Casey in June
1940. Casey told Hull that he (Casey) and S. M. Bruce, the
Australian

High

Commissioner,

the

Australian

High

Commissioner in Britain, were ‘emphatically’ of the opinion
that Germany would conquer Britain and that he would be
extremely interested to see the United States declare war
on Germany.

Casey reasoned that as the United States

was doing everything possible to sell equipment and
supplies to the Allies, a declaration of war was an obvious
corollary and that the effect morally of such a declaration
would be very great.

Hull promptly replied that it was

‘unthinkable’ in the present situation’.373
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Yet, curiously, Casey’s challenging Hull over America’s
determination to remain out of the war does not sit with his
remarksin a letter to McEwen of 5 June: ‘It needs all the
self-command

one

possesses

not

to

be

bitter

and

recriminatory towards this country’.374 Certainly, this latter
comment fits the perception of his reluctance to express a
view that would not be kindly received by his listener, a
reluctance that, on the basis of the two instances quoted
above, he obviously sometimes foreswore.
In the dark summer of 1940, Casey reflected not just on
American inaction, but Australian mistakes. In retrospect,
he regretted that Australia had neglected participating in
what he termed, ‘international affairs’, leaving them to
Britain to handle, instead directing attention on domestic
affairs and domestic politics. When such matters were
discussed, ‘the ignorant prejudices of individuals had a field
day to the exclusion of calm deliberation. We grasped the
shadow and let the substance go’.

375

In his daily dealings with the Administration, Casey
maintained a formal, gracious demeanour.

Privately, his

diary discloses a deeply held anger and frustration at the
reality that Britain stood utterly alone and her survival was
very much in doubt. Unable to contain his exasperation
374
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with American foot-dragging, Casey committed to paper a
lengthy, considered statement, which he wrote for his own
personal satisfaction and kept in his diary without sending
it to anyone:
I have been at a loss to know what attitude to take. They
(the Roosevelt Administration) are apparently quite unmoved, or perhaps it is more correct to say that they
steadily (sic) refuse to take any action designed to
awaken the American people to the grim days ahead, at
the prospect of France and then Britain being over-run.
One can almost hear them say to themselves, ‘Well, well,
fancy Britain going down---too bad’.
The President is the only person who could set American
public opinion on fire and he apparently won’t do it. His
broadcast speech on Sunday evening (26 May) was flat,
full of domestic politics and given at a time, in fact, at
the exact moment, when he might have given a high lead
to the country.376
Casey speculated on the situation that would confront the
United States in the event of Britain’s capitulation or
defeat: ‘They might even have to stand up to the German
and Italian fleets…or what would be left of them.

They

might even be asked by the South American republics how
they proposed to see that the Monroe Doctrine was
maintained’. He also quoted with approval, an argument
mounted by the American journalist and commentator,
Walter Lippmann:
376
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This country chose deliberately not to support an
organised peace---and it chose deliberately not to take
measures to prevent the war---and it chose deliberately
not to take measures to support the resistance of the
Allies. We have now to pay for the consequences of our
deliberate choice. The price will be heavy. Let us pay it
like men.377
Casey also offered an analysis of the slogan that was
frequently heard, ‘Every help to the Allies, short of war’. ‘It
is curious’, he wrote, ‘that no one stops to think what this
expression actually means. It reflects a realisation that we
are fighting a war in which they are almost as interested as
we are—and yet we can be killed, we can bear the
grievous burden of cost—and they will sell us their
armaments

(Casey’s

emphases).’378

These

comments

mirrored remarks made privately by Lord Chatfield, British
Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, that Americans
would ‘fight the battle for freedom to the last Briton, but
save their own skins’.379Casey, reflecting upon a strike by
waterside workers in June 1940 noted that politics ‘brings
something not much better than scum to the surface…the
best and most able people avoid politics.380 While the United
States

377

378

379

380

strenuously

opposed

any

involvement
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European conflict, it was likely that if Britain concluded a
negotiated

peace

with

Germany,

leaving

Germany

undefeated and triumphant in Europe, Britain would be
vehemently accused in the United States of ‘selling
democracy down the ocean’, implicitly placing the United
States in greater danger.
In a discussion at the State Department, James Dunn, one
of Hull’s political advisers, told Casey on 16 June, that the
Pacific Fleet would be transferred from the Pacific to the
Atlantic. Roosevelt, George Marshall, Chief of US Army.
and R. Stark, Chief of US Navy, contemplated moving the
Pacific fleet from Pearl Harbor to the Atlantic after the fall
of France. Casey noted to his diary that he took up this
‘wild idea’ with Berle three weeks before and thought he
had won the argument. Of course, any strengthening of the
American Navy in the Atlantic would have provided some
limited measure of protection of the convoys taking
armaments and food to beleaguered Britain. On the other
hand,weakening the American Pacific Fleet would have
created alarm among those Pacific and Southeast Asian
nations, mainly colonial and totally unable to defend
themselves from Japanese attack.

Australia and Britain

favoured retention of the Fleet in the Pacific, arguing that
the Royal Navy would always be in superior numbers to the
German and Italian navies, thus freeing American ships to
concentrate on the threat from Japan. As Casey saw things,
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strenthening the American naval presence in the Atlantic at
the expense of the Pacific ‘would sacrifice vital interests in
the

Far

East

without

corresponding

advantages

elsewhere’.381
According to Casey, Dunn conceded that the President
could have done more in establishing American resolution
to participate in the defeat of Hitlerism.382 Casey inquired of
Dunn why the President had never informed the American
people that the Monroe Doctrine could be fully enforced
only with the participation of the Royal Navy: ‘Columnists
etc said it, but until the President said it, it would not be
believed by the mass of the people’.383

Dunn claimed

simply that the President could not say that. His reasoning
was that it would have the opposite effect on the American
people to what was intended, specifically, that there would
be greater clamour for more ships to be built. Of course,
this was precisely the effect that Casey sought. In any
event, Britain’s sinking of the French fleet at Oran on 3-4
July finally eased the pressure.384
It was the loss of France that caused Casey, temporarily at
least, to discard his mask and goad the likes of Hull,
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Welles, and Dunn to do more to put pressure on Roosevelt
to enter the war. Yet having often vented his personal and
undiplomatic anger, Casey recorded to his diary: ‘I impress
on everyone in sight that it is essential, in our own
interests, not to show any bitterness.

One’s mind has to

accept the fact that the reality that has to be faced is
American

public

opinion.

(Casey’s

emphasis.)’

He

recognised Hull’s view that American public opinion was
moving, but, to him, ‘most irritatingly slow’.385 Casey had to
overcome his sense of outrage and get down to work to
make the United States see where its self-interest lay.
Yet for all this effort to impress upon the Americans the
importance of saving Britain, it would be wrong to suggest
that Casey during the Battle of Britain lost sight of his
mission

of

trying

to

‘save’

Australia.

The

intense

discussions that occurred in May between those holding
Churchill’s view and those prepared to negotiate in some
way or another with Hitler were conducted against a
background of the United States remaining seemingly
indifferent to Britain’s fate. The American position was
doubly frustrating to the Australians in that American
sympathy for the Chinese nationalist cause meant that the
danger of the United States provoking some sort of
preciptious reaction on the part of Japan was ever present.
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The early months of 1940 saw a short-lived easing of
tensions between Britain and Japan, which enabled the
transfer of two bomber squadrons from Singapore to the
Middle

East,

arousing

Australian

alarm.

The

tranquil

atmosphere in Anglo-Japan relations evaporated with the
fall of France, when Japanese aggression re-asserted itself
with the demand for the withdrawal of British troops from
Shanghai, the closure of the Hong Kong frontier and the
termination

of

British

assistance

to

Chiang

Kai-shek

through the Burmese frontier.386 Japan, hitherto hesistant in
its dealings with Nazi Germany, now sensed that the
European empires and the United States itself were
vulnerable. Casey’s balancing of British and Australian
interests was made easier by the fact that, in the summer
of 1940, Britain’s goal was to encourage the United States
into ‘tougher diplomatic, naval and economic measures
that would deter Japan from war’.387
Casey never lost signt of the importance of finding out
what the Americans knew about Japan’s intentions and
preparations. He told McEwen on 8 May 1940 that:
I have tried to get information here as to what is going
on in the Japanese Mandate (Marshall and Caroline
Islands) but the State Department has very little
information. It is thought extremely probable that
386
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Japan has prepared landing fields and harbour facilities
for war purposes.388
As

Casey

told

Canberra

early

in

his

Washington

appointment, protocol demanded that he call upon the
sixty resident Ambassadors and Ministers, some relevant to
his country’s interests but most, not. He was mostly
unimpressed with what he found. Casey’s diary note for 15
June 1940 confirmed Casey’s awareness of how much the
British and Australian cause depended on him personally:
It is a curious thing, but I am the only Dominions
Minister who is playing any part in the war business in
Washington. Neither Christie (Canada) nor Close (South
Africa), nor of course, Brennan (Irish Free State) have
had, so I am told, any business or communication with
the State Department or anything in any important
connection related to the war. It rather confirms one’s
previous belief that the other Dominions’ Legations are
“prestige” posts and nothing more.389
Casey therefore had to be discerning if he were to make
useful

contacts

and

understand

better

the

strategic

situation facing Australia.
Among

those

Netherlands

with

whom

Ambassador,

Casey

connected

Alexandre

was

Louden,

the
who,

recognising the threat common to Australia and the
Netherlands East Indies initially approached Casey, seeking
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talks.390 The discussions between Casey and Louden initially
revolved around a statement issued by the Japanese
Foreign Minister, Hachiro Arita, on 15 April 1940 affirming
that Japan’s interests lay in a continuation of the trade
arrangements then existing between the Netherlands East
Indies and other nations of the region, especially Japan. It
said

that

‘the

Japanese

government

was

deeply

concerned…at any aggravation of the war in Europe that
might affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies’.
The State Department speculated that the statement was
either a warning to both sides, Germany and Britain, to
leave Japan alone, or on the other hand, creating a
justification for sending its own forces south.391 Hull warned
against any nation intervening because, as Hull put it:
‘Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands or
any alteration of their Status Quo by other than peaceful
processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability,
peace

and

security

not

only

in

the

region

of

the

Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area’.

He

reminded Japan of the notes exchanged as long ago as
November 1908, confirming their policy to maintain the
status quo in the Pacific region, reaffirmed by both nations
as well as Britain and France in the signing of the
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(Washington) Treaty in 1921, specifically respecting the
rights of the Netherlands and their ‘insular possessions’ in
the Pacific.392 Hull described the Netherlands East Indies as
‘very important to the international relationships of the
whole Pacific Ocean’ and that many countries, including the
United

States

depended

upon

the

NEI

for

essential

commodities.
Casey’s

view

of

Hull’s

statement

expressed

some

disappointment but it was ‘still most useful’. It at least
recognised an American interest in the southwest Pacific,
the region of primary relevance to the security of Australia.
It was an early introduction for Casey to the complexity of
the

American-British-Dutch

relationship.

The

British

preference was for a united front of the ‘ABD powers’
aimed at dissuading Japan from any further aggression in
South-East Asia. Britain needed oil from the Netherlands
East Indies and as much help as possible to support
Singapore. There would be no guarantees from the United
States, however, because an attack on Dutch or British
possessions would not in itself engender the American
public to support a war against Japan.393 The fate of the
Netherlands East Indies was a priority for Casey who put it
most starkly on 2 July 1940 when he noted that ‘the
392
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destiny of the Netherlands East Indies [was] inseparable
from the destiny of Australia’.394
Casey argued the case, long before it was widely accepted,
that

to

think

of

the

war

as

comprising

various

compartments that could be dealt with in isolation would be
a major error. The Pacific could not be left ‘to the wolves’.395
Australia was not remote from the unfolding conflict, but
vitally connected. In conversation with Casey in April 1940,
Under-Secretary Welles read out a long list of the naval
strengths of those nations that might be considered
‘potentially opposed’ to Japan… Britain, Australia, France,
the United States and the Netherlands.

Naval craft from

these nations, according to Welles, were in or close to
Singapore, the Philippines and Hong Kong. No doubt
impressed with the combined fire-power of these warships,
Casey assured Welles that the Australian government was
attempting to make Darwin into a fleet anchorage, some
sort of complementary naval station to Singapore. For
Casey any military use that the Americans might have in
mind

for

an

Australian

harbour

was

a

welcome

development.
More sobering was the belief expressed by Hornbeck that
Japan had no limitations on its ambitions to expand its
394
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sphere of influence and to fulfil its ‘mission on earth to
spread

Japanese

culture,

commerce

and

authority’.

Moreover, he believed that Australia and the Netherlands
East Indies fell within the ambit of Japan’s eventual aims,
even if Japan was presently ‘bogged’ in China. Hornbeck
was far from reassuring on the matter of Japan actually
invading Australia when he noted that he did not believe
that Japan would have the opportunity to launch ‘a big
southward jump’ in the direction of the Netherlands East
Indies during the present war. Casey reported to Canberra
Hornbeck’s view that ‘it is one matter to seize and another
to hold’.396 There could have been no comfort in these
words in Canberra.
One task Casey set himself was to attempt to discover if
isolationism was relative, that is, would the United States
enter the war more easily in the Far East Pacific region or
in Europe? This was a legitimate activity for a diplomat but,
given the sensitivity of the Administration to what it
defined

as

propaganda,

there

were

risks

of

Casey

jeopardising his close relationships with senior American
officials by examining and discussing such a highly political
issue. Casey pondered his options in a long letter to
McEwen on 8 May 1940. He concluded that Australia’s
desire ‘to curb Japanese ambitions’ was reflected in United
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States policy, but whether Japanese aggression would
bring the United States to a ‘force of arms’ was the great
unknown. Casey stated that ‘it was my own impression’
that the bulk of the United States Navy would remain in the
Pacific rather than the Atlantic. The latter would continue to
be the responsibility of the Royal Navy. This was proved
mostly true although one quarter of the American fleet
would find its way to the Atlantic. Casey also took solace in
the fact that ‘just as Australia was anxious about Japan, so
must Japan be anxious about the United States’.397 As for
practical steps that the Australians should take. ‘Britain and
Australia should do all they can to help America ‘express
herself’ in the Pacific’. This meant that in relation to ‘the
Pacific islands that the United States wants to use’, Britain
and Australia ‘should be very liberal in this matter and let
America use what Islands she wants’.398
The issue that proved virtually insoluble from the outset
was whether to adhere to the British line of appeasing
Japan or whether to join the Americans in displaying
sympathy for the Chinese cause.399 From Hornbeck, Casey
learned that American opinion strongly sympathised with
China in the war against Japan: there was no sympathy for
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appeasement

of

Japan,

yet

no

readiness

to

offer

guarantees to Britain or Australia in the event of further
Japanese aggression. Hornbeck in his conversation with
Casey on 25 June 1940 assured the Australian that Japan
was not ready ‘to do anything about Australia’. It infuriated
Casey that Hornbeck was full of praise for Chinese
resistance, but did not recognise that it was Britain and
Australia that were risking war by supplying China through
Burma while the Americans debated whether to abandon
the Pacific altogether by moving their fleet to the Atlantic.
Casey wanted the Americans to commit to negotiations
that would at the very least put at stake American
commercial relationships with Japan.400
This was a delicate balancing act even for someone as
nimble as Casey. Australia was in a difficult position given
that it had to do all in its power to avoid contronting Japan
without firm American guarantees. Gaining some reliable
commitment to Australia from the United States in the
event of war with Japan was the goal, albeit a very distant
goal in the first half of 1940.Confirming the tenebrous
prospects facing Australia, the Chief of the Australian Naval
Staff told the War Cabinet on 18 June, that in the event of
an Anglo-Japanese War, without American support, there
would be no point in attempting to hold Darwin. Further,
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that if British naval forces and bases in the Far East were
defeated and captured, Japan could bring Australia to
terms

by

sea

power

alone

without

the

need

for

invasion.401On 28 June 1940, Australia learned that the loss
of the French fleet meant that Britain, temporarily at least,
could not reinforce Singapore.402It was vital that the
American fleet remained in the Pacific. As Casey told his
diary on 26 June 1940:
I have been much concerned in recent days with trying
to hammer out proposals for what we should in the Far
East , in view of great change in situation arising out of
French fleet position and obviously uncertainty of US
government as to whether or not to move their fleet to
the Atlantic.

Casey’s campaign to interest the United States in the
strategic value of Australia was based upon the concept of
Australia

and

its

neighbours

as

offering

outstanding

strategic assets for American strategy. In other words, the
national interests of the United States would be served by
coming

to

Australia’s

aid.

Casey’s

emphasis

on

the

strategic considerations of the United States demonstrated
not only his differences with the thinking embodied in
Menzies’ appeal but his keen understanding of Roosevelt’s
thinking.As for the message itself, it was in part that Britain
401
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was in desperate need of support. The other part of the
message was that Australia was a valuable strategic asset
for the United States.

In his cable to the Department on 28 June, Casey set down
the arguments he was employing, ‘publicly and privately’
about Australia:

1. Significance immensely greater than our population
implies by reason of size, resources, location.
2. Outpost of Western civilisation in Pacific Ocean.
3. Purchases billion dollars worth of American goods last
twelve years against 300,000 (pounds) exports to
America.
4. Australia is not a liability to its friends as witness last
war and this war.
5. Australia, with increasing population and strength will
have increasing contribution to make towards
economic development of the Pacific area.
Glad to have other ideas in this connection.403
Four of the five points appealed to American self-interest.
Casey’s first point – Australia’s size, resources and location
– was the centrepiece of his gospel. Even the notion of
Australia as an outpost of Western civilisation implied that
403
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Australia could serve the United States as an outpost in a
military setting.Casey’s message too revolved around the
connection of the oceans and islands around Australia to
the area of principal American strategic concern. As Casey
put it to his diary in terms that he was using in his private
diplomacy and public speeches:
Australia is the bridge between the Pacific and Indian
Oceans. Some columnists speak glibly of the possibility
of letting the Netherlands East Indies go – without
realising that it isn’t the Netherlands East Indies alone
but the whole western Pacific that will go if the NEI
‘goes’.404
At this time, American thinking looked at the Philippines as
its base for war against Japan, but Casey was providing his
American listeners with a Plan B. Australia had many
advantages---English speaking, several good port facilities,
beyond the range of Japanese bombers, and the potential
for dozens if not hundreds of air strips.

Casey’s battle for Britain was then a challenge, but not a
case of choosing between Britain and Australia. From
Australia’s perspective, everything depended upon the
United

States

aiding

Britain,

while

strengthening

its

commitment to the Pacific. The question was how to press
this argument upon the Americans. Casey had quickly
realised the ineffectiveness of the argument that Australia
404
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was worthy of assistance as a white, European outpost in
Asia. He was only too aware that Roosevelt had remained
quite unmoved when Churchill had appealed for assistance
in mid 1940, citing the reason that if Britain, the last
outpost of democracy in Europe, fell to the Nazi tyranny,
the world would enter upon a dark period of oppression
that would even threaten the very existence of the United
States.

Menzies’ appeals of May and June 1940 were

similarly predicated on the nobility of a European nation in
a sea of Asian settlements. Roosevelt clearly took little
notice of this reasoning. Instead, Casey pressed the case
that the United States needed Britain to enforce the
Monroe Doctrine and needed Australia if it were forced into
a war against Japan.

It was a common interest for the Americans to rearm, for
the American fleet to base itself in the Pacific, and for the
United States to look upon Australia as a potential base in
the south-west Pacific. Moreover, Casey’s battle for Britain
had planted him firmly within the circle of influential
Americans

discussing

policy.

Casey

coped

with

his

frustration by working ever harder at networking the
Administration and other power brokers. He could not
change the American position but he had made the
necessary contacts and set down the basic message of his
gospelabout the importance of Australia for the next, and

230

ultimately more important phase of his mission.
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CHAPTER

SIX:

Autumn

and

Winter

1940-41.

Preparing for the Pacific War.

Casey

was

desperate

to

influence

events

once

the

November election gave Roosevelt his third term. Indeed a
change in Casey’s strategy was evident from the late
autumn of 1940 and reflected an appreciation of the
growing threat from Japan. This change in focus led him to
vary another segment of his strategy, that is, the targets,
the people and institutions who might, in some way,
influence the direction of American thinking. The focus of
his activities would no longer be directed at convincing the
Americans that the survival of Great Britain was essential
to the security of the United States.

Instead, Casey now

faced the task of explaining the vital role that Australia
must play in repulsing the common threat of a rampant
Japan in the Pacific.
For Britain, the military situation improved in Europe in the
autumn of 1940. Crucial for Britain was the dismantling of
the so-called ‘invasion fleet’ on the French coast. Various
intelligence reports from a wide range of sources signalling
a build-up of German military strength on the eastern
boundaries pointed to the possibility that Hitler was
deferring, if not abandoning the cross-channel invasion and
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was contemplating if not planning an attack on the Soviet
Union. Churchill’s somewhat prolonged refusal to concede
that the danger to Britain had passed by the late autumn of
1940 was still in evidence in 1941. Even in his broadcast of
23 June 1941, Churchill argued that the German invasion
of the Soviet Union was no more than a prelude to another
attempt to invade Britain. Documents captured by the
Allies at the end of the war fixed the date of Hitler’s
decision to postpone indefinitely the invasion of the British
Isles at 17 September.405 Publicly, in Britain, the conclusion
that the invasion had been deferred if not abandoned was
suppressed, the Cabinet believing that the War effort would
be lessened if the threat of invasion no longer existed.
On 9 August 1940, Churchill and Roosevelt met at
Newfoundland accompained by advisors – Welles, Hopkins
and Cadogan. The ‘Joint Declaration’ or ‘Atlantic Charter’
that resulted on 14 August 1940 looked forward to a world
freed from Nazi tyrrany. On the other hand, this first
meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt changed little on
the ground. There is a conflict between what might be
termed contemporary, private, and deep resentment of the
inaction of the United States on the part of individuals like
Churchill, Lothian, Cadogan and Casey and some of the
historical commentary, which is far more sympathetic to
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Roosevelt and his administration. Norman Davies, for
example, refers to Roosevelt ‘shoring up Britain’ in its
moment of need. Moreover, while ‘watching Britain’s ordeal
with sympathy, and aware of the fact that it was not in
America’s long-term interest for Britain to go under’,
American aid had to be ‘surreptitious’.406 Davies leaves us
wondering exactly what this ‘surreptitious’ aid actually was.
Frequently, the ‘Destroyers for Bases’ deal is quoted as the
example

of

Roosevelt’s

courageous

and

generous

assistance. In August 1940, the United States gradually
settled on a plan that would give Britain some fifty old
destroyers in return for 99 year use of certain British bases
in the Atlantic and Caribbean. This was only token aid.
Slow, obsolescent and clearly beyond their use-by date for
the major purpose for which they were built but still useful
for slow convoy duties, they would have been of little
practical value in the event of a German invasion. In any
event, Roosevelt offered them to Britain on 2 September,
1940 and they did not actually commence being handed
over for some weeks, by which time, the threat of invasion
had all but passed. Their chief effect was to establish which
side the United States was on.

Other accounts refer to Roosevelt’s authorising assistance
406
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to Britain, but the outcomes are questionable.407 Burns, for
example, cites Roosevelt’s granting Churchill’s request that
a British battleship, HMS Malaya, badly damaged by a
torpedo while escorting a convoy, be repaired in an
American shipyard. Whether this comprised significant aid
is open to debate. On the other hand, it must be
acknowledged that even token aid created a great many
political problems for Roosevelt. Within the United States,
the destroyers deal led to a lively argument. Professor
Herbert Briggs and Professor Edwin Borchard claimed that
Roosevelt had acted unconstitutionally, the ‘gift’ being a
violation of America’s neutral status.408

Yet, as Reynolds has put it, there was ‘from July to October
1940…

a

remarkable

Anglo-American

rapprochement’

characterised by the growing belief in the United States
that Britain would survive and ‘the increasingly pro-British
tone of American public statements on the war’.409 Casey’s
optimism that the United States might ‘come in’ with
Britain in the war against Nazi Germany had proved wide of
the mark. However, his tireless efforts to promote the
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British war effort clearly contributed to this growing
rapprochement and made the US much more open to this
new development.
Both Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, and
General George Marshall, the Army Chief were putting
pressure on the President to begin planning for the
inevitable entry of the United States into the European
conflict. Marshall’s arguments were based on first-hand
reports on the military situation in Britain, submitted by
Generals Emmons and Strong, who concluded that ‘sooner
or later, the United States will be drawn into this war’. This
conclusion was given greater weight by reason of the same
two officers finding that morale in Britain was high and that
Britain may well have had the ability to withstand, if not
repel invasion on its own.410 Marshall brought his report to
the

notice

of

the

Standing

Liaison

Committee,

the

coordinating group of the Departments of War, Army and
Navy on 23 September, 1940.411
In the United States, earlier suspicions of Japan had
hardened

into

an

article

of

faith

that

Japan

was

contemplating aggression. Hoyt fixed the date of Japan’s
articulation of its ambitions as October 1921 when a group
of young army officers made a secret agreement, effective
410
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when they reached senior staff level, to reorganize the
Japanese army and to define the area which Japan needed
to fulfil her needs and ambitions. These comprised Siberia,
China, India, South east Asia, Indonesia, Australia and New
Zealand.412
From an Asian perspective, the American invasion of the
Philippines with the defeat of Spain in 1898 added a new
ingredient into the already potent mix. The rulers of Japan
and China perceived the United States as a threat to their
own emerging nationalist ambitions.

Hunt and Levine

define the beginnings of Japan’s hostility as specifically
directed to the United States and as early as the nineteenth
century. The American occupation and subjugation of the
Philippines, Hawaii, Midway and Pearl Harbor and the
conflict with Germany over Samoa looked to China and
especially Japan to be naked American empire-building and
constituting a threat to other Asian and Pacific nation
states:
As Japanese and Chinese observers clearly saw, the
United States had become an imperial presence in
eastern Asia. The very fact of conquest dramatically
signalled the emergence of a powerful, confident
country on the shores of the western Pacific.413
412
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Japan was in a far stronger position to flex its muscles
against the new arrival than was China. Japan was
conscious of its own lack of colonies, in contrast to the
substantial colonial empires of the Western powers which
constituted a basic foundation for international status and
prestige. After World War One, Japan suffered indignities
that fed the sense of resentment at the failure of Western
Powers to recognise Japan’s true standing or what Japan
perceived

as

her

true

standing,

internationally.

The

Versailles conference rejected Japan’s request for a racial
equality clause in the League of Nations Charter. Japan
perceived the Washington Naval Agreement as unfair,
despite the fact that it had the effect of strengthening
Japan’s relative standing in the Pacific. The Japanese
Exclusion

Act

immigration

to

of

1924

the

severely

United

restricted

States

and

Japanese

matched

the

Australian White Australia Policy in its anti-Japanese
provisions.

It

was

unsurprising

therefore

that

these

obstacles were perceived in Tokyo as deliberate attempts
by Western Powers to keep Japan firmly in place. During
the years between the end of World War I and the
beginning of World War II, the Versailles Treaties granted
Japan trusteeship rights over strategic Pacific Islands.
Small groups of Japanese Army and Navy officers were
diverted

to

study

international

situations

that

could

translate into armed intervention by the United States. The
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United States’ disarmament and its withdrawal from its
‘temporarily close association with the European colonial
powers’, after 1920, also contributed to the balance of
power in the Pacific region swinging in favour of Japan.414
Yet the difficulty for Australia was that the Atlantic always
appeared to take priority over the Pacific in the minds of
American military planners. Casey continued to work on the
State Department, especially Hull, Berle, and Hornbeck
with a view to manoeuvring the United States into a
greater commitment to the Pacific. Berle certainly sought
out Casey for information. In September 1940 with the
Japanese taking over French Indochina, Berle noted to his
diary:
The Australian Minister came in, at my request; I asked
him whether they could supply any arms to Indo-China, if
we replaced them. He said he would try to find out but
they were steering pretty clear of it. In a sense this is
typical English; they want the Far East held down and
they need that very badly. But they resolve somebody
else shall do it and take the rap for it. This is permissible
in the Australian case, I suppose, since they might not be
able to resist.415
Following the ‘Destroyers for Bases Deal’, there were
rumours in Washington that the United States might take
over
414

415

more

British

bases.

Berle’s

diary

entry

Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, pp. 1-3
Adolf Berle Diary, 19 September 1940.
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September 1940 clearly indicates Berle’s recognition of
Casey’s growing influence at the highest level of the
Washington Administration and simultaneously a fear of
what that influence might mean:
The various conversations which Secretary (of State),
Hull is having with Lord Lothian (British Ambassador) and
Mr Casey, the Australian Minister, are exciting a great
deal of comment.
Everybody suspects that another
Anglo-American naval base deal may be in the making,
which will give us joint occupation of the bases running
all the way from Singapore around the Pacific.416
Berle argued that

‘I think that there probably is danger

that the British will try to do some such thing as that—
since this would in substance imply that we were to defend
the British Empire in the Far East—from some unnamed
point in the Indian Ocean’. Yet Berle noted that if the
matter of joint bases in the Far East were being discussed,
he hoped that it would involve ‘the southern Pacific route,
not accessible to the Japanese fleet’.417 At least there was
recognition here that the desirability of bases and lines of
communication safe from Japanese attack was paramount.
Casey attempted to increase his influence by offering Berle
opinions

that

differed

from

official

British

sources.In

October 1940, Berle committed to his diary his surprise at
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Casey’s criticism of the frequency with which Britain
supplied misleading figures of the resources she held in the
Far East. Casey claimed that the figures were understated
by about half. Berle’s long-held suspicion of Britain’s
motives and duplicity, no doubt, lay behind his observation
that in relation to the misleading figures: ‘This may be that
they are merely giving the first line plane resources, which
is not quite cricket, because the Japanese have only second
rate stuff. Or it may be that the British are piling on the
agony hoping to get more out of us, which I think is
probably the case’. Putting aside Berle’s poor opinion of
Japanese

aircraft,

an

erroneous

belief

common

to

American, British, and Casey’s thinking, it was significant
that he found Casey’s criticism of Britain, ‘interesting’ and
Britain’s subterfuge ‘not quite cricket’, a colloquialism,
unusual for an American to use, but quite appropriate in
that context.418 It is apparent that by this stage people like
Berle

and

Hornbeck

were

recognising

Casey

as

an

independent thinker, someone with worthwhile ideas to
offer in their discussions and a clear understanding of the
global aspects of the war.
Casey was privy to confidential sources. On the day before
the United States Elections of 5 November 1940, Casey
cabled Canberra that he had learnt, without revealing his
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source, that Japan believed that the United States might
well engage in a Far East conflict but that they would do
so,

‘hesitatingly

and

too

late’.

Casey

judged

that

intelligence to imply that if Japan acted with speed, both
the United States and Australia would ‘be faced with a fait
accompli’.419

The following week, Casey reported to

Canberra that he had finally told Berle of this intelligence.420
Given the frequency he met with Lothian, the closeness of
the relationship and that each shared confidential matters
with the other, it may be assumed that the intelligence had
emanated from British sources. Less than three weeks after
learning of that intelligence, on 22 November 1940, Casey
had a night visit from Hornbeck.421 Casey had called upon
both Hornbeck and Berle earlier that day and Hornbeck’s
unexpected visit was to inform Casey that he, Hornbeck,
believed that Japanese forces were concentrating at Hainan
and Southern Formosa so as to be ready to move by sea to
an unknown destination, possibly Saigon or Camranh Bay.
Hornbeck considered that Singapore should be reinforced
by British and/or Australian aircraft. He was not in favour
of American ships visiting Australia or Singapore, which he
believed would be too provocative. In reporting this new
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intelligence to Canberra, Casey emphasised Hornbeck’s
sensitivity about being quoted.422
Hornbeck’s after-hours visit to Casey may be explained by
his reluctance to be seen by his colleague, Berle, as
supplying confidential information to Casey. In any case,
important inferences may be drawn from these two
incidents. Firstly, Casey’s informing Berle of intelligence of
which Berle was unaware indicates the extent to which
Casey had established valuable contacts and enjoyed sound
relations with sources of such intelligence. Secondly,
Hornbeck’s night visit to Casey suggests that Casey clearly
had

positioned

himself

as

an

important

broker

of

information and was perceived that way on all sides in
Washington.
The passing of the Selective Training and Service Act in
late October 1940 at least signalled American recognition of
the fact that it might soon need more substantial armed
forces. By November 1940, senior officers of British,
American and Dutch forces had formed a committee to
discuss

what

Casey

termed,

‘matters

of

high

strategy’.423Hull wrote in his memoirs: ‘I held several
conversations with Lothian and Casey at the beginning of
October to lay the basis for exchanges of information
422
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among the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand
and the Dutch East Indies concerning the forces available
in the Far East to resist a Japanese attack’.424 There is no
substantive proof that Casey was a key figure in these
discussions, but in the light of Hull’s reluctance to do
anything provocative and given that Lothian was unwell
and not proactive in expressing Britain’s concern over
developments in the Pacific, Hull’s

notations may be

regarded as a further example of Casey’s leadership and
influence.The involvement of senior naval figures in the
discussions clearly indicated that while the President might
disown

such

claims,

the

Navy

was

considering

and

implicitly devising strategy for a future conflict. The
presence of British and Dutch representatives, moreover,
hinted that the Pacific was the region under discussion.
Clearly, the chief interest surrounded the devising of a
strategy for the expected conflict with Japan.
Casey certainly had ample opportunity to develop his
knowledge of strategy and military technology in the
autumn of 1940. On 16 October 1940, Casey spoke with
the President, Hull and Knox. Casey learned about new
developments in air-engine manufacturing from Knox.
From the President, Casey learned about American interest
in a ‘more southerly air route between USA and Australia’
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and establishing bases at various Pacific locations and
Christmas Island.425 This was thinking that Casey could only
encourage given that a great deal of American thinking and
resources was directed at shoring up the Philippines. Casey
summed up his message in a note to his diary on 22
November 1940: ‘Guam no fleet facilities. Little at Manilla.
Southern route to Australia and New Zealand all the more
important’.426
It was in the aftermath of the November election that
Admiral Harold Stark in a celebrated Memorandum penned
on 12 November 1940, outlined what became known as the
‘Beat Hitler First’ strategy. Stark recommended that in a
two-front war the United States would give priority to
defeating German over Japan. Stark, who had access to
deciphered Japanese codes, took the view that Australia
and New Zealand were not part of Japan’s imperial
ambition at that point. Much more likely was that Japan
would attempt to conquer Hong Kong, Singapore and the
resource-rich Malaya peninsula. Here too, his Memorandum
was well informed.
Neither Stark nor Marshall opposed the granting of further
aid to Britain. Stark went so far as to argue that an
American goal should be the prevention of the ‘disruption
425
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of the British Empire, with all that such a consummation
implies’.427 Stark was so confident of the strength of the
arguments that he and Marshall had advanced that he told
Admiral J.O. Richardson, Commander in chief, United
States Fleet, that the President would ‘give some definite
pronouncement on it in order that I may send you
something more authoritative than I otherwise could do’.428
Roosevelt did nothing of the sort. Nonetheless, Stark had
now made it clear that the Navy expected American
involvement in a world war.
Casey’s diary made no mention of the Memorandum, but
his subsequent activity could be viewed as representing an
attempt to water down the ‘Beat Hitler First’ strategy and
to emphasise the threat from Japan in the Pacific.At one
level, Casey was clearly in sympathy with a strategy that
prioritised American and British cooperation in the Atlantic.
‘Beat Hitler First’ would become a cornerstone of the
military alliance between Britain and the United States.429In
a private letter to Menzies in November 1940, Casey
confessed that he still saw the greatest menace to Australia
as the possibility of Britain being beaten in Europe. Casey
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viewed Britain’s commitment to the Pacific as the most that
could be hoped for under the circumstances: ‘…I think the
British government’s statements regarding ensuring the
safety of Australia and of Singapore are satisfactory…’
The hope at that time remained for Australia somehow to

430

avoid war with Japan. Casey realised at the same time how
important it was to get the balance right in judging the
German and Japanese threats: Japan would become
Casey’s priority.
Casey certainly had ample opportunity to make his ideas
known to American military planners. He was in frequent
contact with officers of the War Plans Division of the Army
and the War Plans Division of the Navy. When Commander
Henry Burrell, the Royal Australian Navy’s Director of
Operations and Plans arrived clandestinely in Washington
on 17 November 1940 to take part in high-level naval
discussions, it was Casey who introduced Burrell to Berle,
Hornbeck, Welles, Knox, and Stark.431It was not just high
level policy-makers that Casey met in this period but those
who a year later would be called upon to join the fight
against Japan. On 25 November 1940, Casey took Burrell
to see Sherman Miles, Chief of Army Intelligence and later
that day had Burrell dine with Admiral Walter Anderson,
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American Chief of Naval Intelligence, Commander Heard,
also American Naval Intelligence, Stanley Goble who was
the Australian liaeson with the Air Training Scheme, and
Admiral Herbert Pott formerly of the Royal Navy now the
Air Attache for the British Embassy in Washington.This last
week in November 1940 was a busy time in terms of
information gathering and cross fertilising the American,
British and Australian information channels. Casey’s diary
entry for 24 November 1940 did not mention Burrell, but
noted simply ‘Lunched with General Marshall Chief of
General Staff’. The same day as he lunched with Marshall,
Casey had his first talks with Lothian after the latter’s
return from London.432
Because of his predilection for meeting as many senior
political, media and government leaders as he could, Casey
would have become aware of the shades of differences of
views held in Washington. In his report to Canberra on 17
November, 1940, he referred to the views of Knox in
favour of ‘preventive strategy’ involving the deployment of
American, British, Dutch and Australian warships to deter
Japan from embarking on hostile actions. He also quoted
Knox as favouring a substantial American naval force to
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visit

Singapore,

a

tactic

constantly

opposed

by

the

President and Hull as too provocative.433
Casey’s interview with Hull on 12 November 1940 revolved
around Hull’s interest in the ‘British naval and commercial
shipping situation’, which Casey put into the context of
Hull’s anxiety about the Far East. This was a few days after
Roosevelt’s

re-election,

a

time

when

the

Roosevelt

Administration could have been expected to be more open
and more enthusiastic about closer relations with Britain.
Yet, American interest in the British Fleet clearly suggested
a continuing fear that Britain might conduct negotiations
with Germany in order to avoid the bloodshed and
destruction of an invasion, but where the Fleet became one
of Hitler’s prizes. In this interview, Casey, not one to miss
an opportunity, asked Hull if American warships would visit
Australia and/or Singapore in the near future. Casey was
being mischievously cute with this question. He had no
reason to suppose that the Administration had changed its
position. Avoiding a direct reply, the Secretary reasoned
that placing American ships at Manila and sending British
ships and Australian aircraft to Singapore would be a
greater deterrent to Japan. Hull suggested that it might be
possible for the United States to provide the aircraft,
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presumably involving payment.434 Hull’s avoidance of giving
a direct reply to Casey’s request, in contrast to Knox’s firm
belief that U.S. Navy ships should, in fact, visit Singapore,
was another example of the differing views coming out of
Washington. In his discussion with Hull, Casey argued that
Britain’s having to reinforce Singapore’s defences, ipso
facto, meant lesser resources being made available to
‘other important areas’ that were actual theatres of war.435
In a long session with Hull on 3 December 1940, it became
evident to Casey that the Secretary of State had adopted a
far more sympathetic stance concerning Britain’s plight.
Although the danger of invasion had passed and, with it,
any possibility of negotiations between Germany and
Britain, the loss of so many merchant ships in the Atlantic
created a new and dangerous phase. That, anyway, was
one of the explanations Hull offered for the new American
attitude. Hull claimed to have spent much time impressing
the gravity of the situation upon members of the Cabinet,
the Defence Advisory Commission and leaders in the
Congress. In reporting the conversation to Canberra, Casey
said that he had emphasised to Hull the anxiety of the
Australian government about Japan’s next move. In the
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context of Australia placing a ban on the export of scrap
iron, Hull did not offer any concrete support.
This lack of tangible aid continued to irritate the British and
the Australians.The President delivered, on 27 December
1940,

his

‘Arsenal

of

Democracy’

speech,

which

emphasised again that the United States was not about to
fight in foreign wars, but rather to supply the ‘implements
of war’. Roosevelt claimed that the United States would
provide ‘real resistance’ by strengthening those peoples
attempting to resist the Axis invaders.Picking up a phrase
uttered by Jean Monnet, the French resistance leader,
Roosevelt ended his speech with a call to the American
nation: ‘We must be the great arsenal of democracy’. This
phrase was meant to give heart to Britain. The British
leader saw it differently: as one historian has put it, ‘In
London, Churchill fumed and fretted’.436 The Prime Minister
was uncertain exactly what the President planned in the
way

of

neighbourly

assistance.

As

Churchill

put

it,

‘Remember, Mr President, we do not know what you have
in mind, exactly what the United States is going to do and
we are fighting for our lives’.
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part, an attitude that must have surprised Roosevelt.
Churchill’s mind was exercised by the American insistence
that so much of this aid had to be paid for and that the
costs were rapidly running down British gold reserves.
Casey, on a ‘show the flag’ visit to Florida, remained
unmoved by the ‘Arsenal of Democracy’ speech. It may
have represented an advance on Roosevelt’s part towards a
more helpful attitude towards Britain, but, realistically, it
was a very small advance.438
The

scepticism

is

unsurprising

because

Roosevelt’s

intentions are difficult to read, even with the benefit of
hindsight. Two factors lend themselves to a questioning of
the timing of this harder American attitude.

Firstly, the

Presidential elections were out of the way giving Roosevelt
the opportunity to adopt a more belligerent attitude to the
Axis powers at a lower political cost.

Secondly, the

postponement, if not the abandonment of a German
invasion of Britain, certainly known by both London and
Washington enabled Washington to adopt a more pro-Allied
attitude knowing that the United States would not have to
deliver on its fine words.
Roosevelt’s State of the Union message delivered in
January, 1941, spoke of the post-war world and of the
need
438

for

‘four

essential

Casey Diaries, 29, 30 December 1940.

human

freedoms’.

The
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historiography of the message, its title fixed as ‘The Four
Freedoms Declaration’ often has Roosevelt signalling a
gradual but determined march to take the United States
into what was expected to become another World War. Yet,
a careful reading of the message does not necessarily lead
to that conclusion. Roosevelt spoke of the four freedoms,
speech, worship, freedom from want and from fear as
attainable within his lifetime and not as some distant
vision. It was the immediacy of this grand idea that led to
the conclusion that the United States would have to take
up arms in order to achieve the adoption, world-wide, of
these freedoms.

Inspiring as the sentiments may have

been, they fell far short of providing any real expectation of
a change in America’s neutral position. The timing of the
Four Freedoms Declaration, so soon after the crucial
Presidential elections was a quintessential Roosevelt ploy, a
lofty statement that would satisfy the Interventionists and
hold them off for a further period and at the same time,
reassure the Isolationists that military intervention was not
on the Administration’s agenda.
On the other hand, the promised material support for the
Allies appeared more likely after the Lend Lease Bill was
introduced into Congress on 10 January 1941. Lend Lease
would become law despite an intense opposition campaign,
mainly from Republicans, spurred on by a grass roots
group known as America First, claiming a membership of
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over 800,000.439Casey, infuriated by what he regarded as
empty gestures and posturing on the part of the United
States, at least saw signs of hope of more useful
assistance. Casey noted in his diary entry of 9 March 1941
that ‘Lend Lease Bill passed Senate last night 60-31. Great
sense of relief.’440 Casey was quick to make apparent
Australia’s readiness to participate in the scheme. The
following day, he hosted a dinner at the Legation where the
dinner guests comprised Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Morgenthau, Head of U.S. Steel and later of Lend Lease,
Edward Stettinius, Berle and two naval officers, Admiral
Pott and Admiral Turner.441

Clearly, Casey was intent on

getting some key players together.
The task for the Americans now was to devise ways in
which Lend Lease would fit into an ultimate victory
programme and on 10 April 1941 the Secretary of War
outlined the procedure to be followed under the Lend Lease
Act.442
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Lend Lease was not the only important event from Casey’s
perspective. The Plan Dog memo written by Chief of Naval
Operations, Harold Rainsford Stark, in 1940, recognised the
possibility of the US being involved in war in both Europe
and the Pacific. He formulated ideas on coping with the
possibility, although recognising the need to ‘Beat Germany
First’. Stark’s recommendation urged the President to
approve US service chiefs holding talks with their British
counter-parts, something the British had desired for some
time.443
Roosevelt

approved

Stark’s

recommendation

and

the

‘American British Conversation’ or ABC 1, ran from January
to March 1941 and involved high level military delegations
from both sides of the Atlantic. As Bridge has noted, Casey
successfully had Burrell attached as an observer with the
British military delegation.444 This no doubt is part of the
explantion as to why Casey was able to report to Canberra
accurately on the two main developments of relevance to
Australia. Firstly, as the Stark Memorandum (Plan Dog)
prefigured, the strategy was to ‘Beat Hitler First’ and to
conduct a ‘holding war’ in the Pacific. Secondly, the
Americans, against strong opposition from the British, had
decided that Singapore was important but not vital in any
443
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conflict. This was the message conveyed by Casey to
Canberra on 23 February 1941. While the United States
was prepared, if necessary, to move ships from the Pacific
to what it perceived to be the more important Atlantic
theatre of the war, the expectation was that British capital
ships would use this opportunity to reinforce the Far East.445
The sweetener for Australia was, as Bridge put it, for the
first time there was recognition that holding Australia was
crucial to any war against Japan.446
Casey did his best to make his case for Singapore, which
the British delegation at ABC 1 considered vital for both
India’s and Australia’s security. Casey was ill during the
early days of the ABC1 talks.

He was in hospital with

influenza from 22nd January to 1st February, followed by a
week’s convalescence.

It is difficult at this stage to

contemplate if this affected Australia’s arguments at the
talks, whether his voice added to that of the British would
have made a difference regarding Singapore.

It must be

remembered that Burrell was present during this period so
Australia’s opinions were represented.

Casey met with

Halifax on 4th February when he advised caution in issuing
invitations to the Embassy at this time because of the
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atmosphere surrounding the Lend Lease Bill.447 It is obvious
that he had the ability to ‘bounce back’ from ill health as he
visited both Halifax and Hornbeck on 14th February and
Cordell Hull the next day.448

Among the many American

contacts Casey made were two psychologists, Dr. Hadley
Cantril and Dr. Lloyd Free, researching what Casey termed,
‘the whole poll idea’. Clearly fascinated by the potential for
political adaptation, Casey was interested to learn that,
under the auspices of the Office of Public Opinion Research
at

Princeton

University,

the

two

were

seeking

to

understand why vast numbers of Americans responded
positively to simple prompts such as ‘Constitution’ and
‘Panama’. Casey reported their interest in finding out the
American reaction to prompts connected to the ‘South West
Pacific’ such as ‘Australia’ and ‘Singapore’.449
Casey continued to garner poll results from Cantril and on
17 February 1941 excitedly reported a ‘most interesting
public opinion poll… in respect of the Far East’, copies of
which he sent to Halifax, Hull, Hornbeck, and Frankfurter.
The reason for Casey’s elation was that Americans had ‘a
much greater appreciation of the value of Singapore than I
had thought possible’.450 More than half those polled
447
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favoured American support for Singapore. For Casey,
polling was an opportunity to exploit the public mood. He
optimistically, as it turned out, proposed that Willkie, the
defeated

presidential

candidate

in

November,

include

Singapore on his itinerary for the latter’s proposed trip to
Australia. On 19 February, 1941, he wrote the following in
his diary:
I have been spreading the Gospel far and wide lately---of
the great importance of Singapore. There is a tendency
in some quarters here to regard the various theatres of
war in watertight compartments and not from a global
standing. The connection between Singapore and the
main theatres in Europe and the Mediterranean has to be
emphasized.451
To emphasise Singapore and the mistaken notion that
Europe and Asia were utterly distinct theatres of war was
to argue for moderation in the application of the ‘Beat
Hitler First’ strategy favoured by the Americans at ABC 1.
For now this was a battle that Casey could not win. The
conclusions of ABC1 were the nucleus of the ultimate total
strategy for the war. Yet Singapore was for Casey worth
pursuing in the worrying context, as Horner has put it, that
Australia’s

451

‘security

was

Casey Diaries, 19 February 1941.

in

the

hands

of

American
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strategists who were more interested in the Atlantic than
the Pacific’.452
There were other battles that Casey did win. Casey became
an even more crucial intermediary during the northern
winter because of the sudden death of Lothian on 12
December 1940. Like Casey, Lothian was highly suitable for
the task of winning friends in Washington. Churchill once
described him thus: ‘In all the years I had known him, he
gave me the impression of high intellectual and aristocratic
detachment

from

vulgar

affairs.

Airy,

viewy,

aloof,

dignified, censorious, yet in a light and gay manner, he had
always been good company’. Yet, by late 1940, Lothian,
visiting Britain, had become, according to Churchill, a
changed

man,

deeply

conscious

of

the

peril

facing

Britain.453Cadogan noted in his diaries that in Washington,
Lothian had become subject to drowsiness.

Clearly

suffering from an undiagnosed illness, he refused medical
attention because of his Christian Science beliefs and died
shortly after.454 Lothian’s death led to the American officials
using Casey as a liaison with Britain.455 Indeed, there was
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speculation in the American press that Casey would be
Lothian’s replacement as British ambassador.456
Instead Casey played a dominant role in ensuring the
rejection of tentative soundings from London as to whether
David Lloyd George, the elderly, former Prime Minister, and
an advocate of appeasement, would be acceptable to the
American

Administration.

In

a

Memorandum

of

Conversation, Berle described Casey’s position on the
proposed

appointment

as

‘violently

opposed’.

Berle

discerned that Casey believed his objections conveyed to
London had had considerable influence in causing Lloyd
George’s name to be withdrawn; at the very least Casey
made it clear to Churchill that there was no support for
Lloyd George among the Americans or Dominions.457
Lothian’s eventual replacement was the taciturn Lord
Halifax. A former Viceroy of India and with an imposing
aristocratic background, he yet lacked the easy affability
that Casey was able to call upon when the occasion
demanded. His interests were said to be hunting and the
Anglican Church, resulting in his nickname of the Holy Fox.
Halifax reported to Churchill that he found the Americans
and the American form of government difficult to deal with.
456
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In a personal letter to the Prime Minister dated 13 March,
1941, Halifax complained about ‘how terribly disjointed is
the whole machinery of government.

I don’t think the

President ties up awfully well; I am quite certain Harry
Hopkins doesn’t and as for government departments, they
might almost as well be the administration of different
countries…’458
Nor did Halifax hit it off with Hull. Between February and
May

1941,

Ambassador,

Hull

was

Admiral

secretly
Nomura,

meeting
for

the

Japanese

wide-ranging

talks

without even telling the British, a situation that infuriated
Halifax when he found out.459 It was not within Halifax’s
capacity to engage in the kind of politicking or the new art
of public relations employed by Casey. One of Casey’s
goals in spring 1941 was to bring Halifax into discussions
with the Americans about practical issues such as the
location of fleets and new deals over bases. Hull was, it
seems, referred to by his Assistant Secretary, Dean
Acheson, as ‘the old man from Tennessee’; he was
extremely shy and felt quite intimidated by Halifax.
Acheson described the situation thus: ‘[Hull] regarded
Halifax as a combination of the holder of an ancient British
peerage, Viceroy of India and a British Foreign Secretary,
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all rolled into one and he was scared to death of him’.
Casey was asked if he could do anything about it. He
initially raised it with Halifax, whose immediate reaction
was: ‘I hope he’s not as scared of me as I am of him’.
Casey arranged a small dinner party for Hull, Halifax and
himself with an additional guest, Norman Davis, known to
both. Food and drink were carefully chosen and Casey and
Davis met beforehand ‘and acted as honest brokers who
made the running until the other two warmed up’.
Apparently, the diffidence between the British Lord and the
Tennessean Secretary of State evaporated thereafter.460
Casey was pleased with his efforts, describing it as ‘a most
useful evening indeed’. According to Casey, Halifax ‘tried
my ‘bases’ proposal’ and received a favourable response
from Hull. Casey was also pleased that he found himself on
the same side as Hull in opposing any transfer of American
naval vessels from the Pacific to the Atlantic.461The fact that
the

Australian

Minister

was

routinely

engaged

in

conversation with influential policy makers about military
strategy helped to ensure that Australia remained part of
the

strategic

conversation

even

after

the

Stark

Memorandum. For a small nation that had had no previous
diplomatic representation in the United States, Casey was
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clearly taken seriously by those responsible for the highest
levels of American strategic planning.
When Casey arrived in the United States, it was made clear
to him that Australia was not part of any American
strategy. A year later, the situation had clearly changed.
The secret British and American Staff talks (ABC-1) that
took place in Washington in the first three months of 1941
made clear the American expectation of entering the war
on the Allied side. While both sides agreed that the first
task would be to win the war in Europe, defending the
British Commonwealth’s interests in the Pacific became a
priority nonetheless. It was at this point, according to
Burrell’s report of 7 February 1941, that the Americans
acknowledged that Australia and New Zealand had to be
held by the allies. The implication, perhaps, was that if
Britain could not ‘save’ Australia, then the United States
might.462 In any case, it is clear that, once the danger of an
invasion of the British Isles had passed, Casey’s priority
was focusing American attention on the Pacific and the
importance of Australia in defending American interests
there.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: From the Menzies visit to the Pearl
Harbor Attack.

Throughout 1941, Japan’s war-like intentions were obvious
to more astute observers, but there was no agreement
among the Allies about what to do. After prolonged secret
talks with three senior Japanese representatives, Hornbeck
concluded that Japan wished to reduce her forces in China
so as to have these forces available ‘for possible activities
in some other direction’, which might be against British,
Dutch, Soviet or even American interests.463 Japan’s nonaggression treaty with the Soviet Union,signed in April
1941, suggested that Japan was securing its northern
frontier for the purposes of a southward invasion. On the
other hand, the rapid progress of the Wehrmacht into the
Soviet Union after the invasion on 22 June, 1941 invited
the conclusion that Japan would use the opportunity to
attack the Soviet Union on its eastern flank at a time when
the latter was fighting on its western front for its very
existence. The alternative view held that the treasures of
oil and rubber, freely available in the south-east Asia
region were vastly more vital to Japan’s future.
This uncertainty over Japan was the shadow that hung over
the visit of Menzies to Washington in May 1941. A measure
463
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of the greater sympathy for the Allied cause was reflected
in confidential Briefing Notes prepared by the State
Department for use by the President for the Menzies visit.
These Briefing Notes are not often cited in the literature,
but are important because they confirm that a change in
American

thinking

about

Australia

had

occurred.

Significantly, the notes were prepared in the Department’s
Division of European Affairs, but were studied by Berle
before they reached the President. In fact, the Briefing
Notes’ reflection of the frosty nature of American-Australian
relations might be seen as Berle’s contribution. The notes
give insights into the relationship between the two nations,
Australia and the United States, including frank judgments
that relations had been highly unsatisfactory, at times,
‘even acrimonious’, that a ‘trade war’ existed between the
two countries, and that the United States had ‘black listed’
Australia.
However, the State Department now saw other issues as
relevant in the event of hostilities erupting in the Pacific
region.

Washington obviously believed that the long-

standing issues that had inhibited closer relations between
the United States and Australia for many years were no
longer relevant. What was crucial was dealing with the
growing aggressive nature of Japan.464From Washington’s
464
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perspective, the two long-standing problems besetting the
relationship were Australia’s refusal both to allow American
air services to land in Australia and to permit direct radio
telegraph communications between the two countries. The
notes described the long delays in telegraph services
between the United States and Australia:
Telegrams either go by radio via Canada or by cable via
Canada or Great Britain…the average delay on telegrams
transmitted by radio originating in Australia and destined
to (sic) the United States is five and one half hours. The
American company, RCA had had a traffic agreement
with Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) Ltd. since
October, 1931 for the establishment of a direct radiotelegraph circuit but the Australian government had not
issued the necessary licence.465

Equally as inimical to the relationship were the poor trading
arrangements, born of the excessive tariffs maintained by
both countries: ‘It would be difficult to say which country
has

been more

at fault in this regard’. The

State

Department notes clearly admit that the United States bore
the major responsibility for the ‘trade war’ by its Tariff Acts
of 1922 and 1930, which imposed excessive duties on
Australia’s principal exports to the United States, notably
wool.
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The Australian refusal to grant landing rights to Pan
American Airlines arose solely from Australia’s insistence
that Britain be granted reciprocal rights to land in Hawaii.
The American objection was based on the reality that the
only landing field in Hawaii was in the American Naval
Station at Pearl Harbor, thus presenting grave security
risks. The State Department noted that opening Hawaii to a
British airline would enable that airline to operate a roundthe-world service, a distinct commercial advantage and one
that the United States would strenuously resist. A year
earlier, Casey complained to Berle that the British side had
given away ‘landing rights at Fiji and Auckland – and had
nothing in return’.466The ‘Briefing Notes’ revealed that while
the lack of a direct service between the two countries had
been difficult from a ‘purely commercial point of view, in
the present emergency, a direct service becomes doubly
important, not only for the United States and Australia but
for the whole British Empire’.
This statement is important for two reasons. Firstly, the
reference to the ‘present emergency’ at a time (8 May,
1941) when the United States was neutral and the Pacific
War was seven months away. Secondly, the notes referred
to the British Empire in a manner that could be interpreted
as showing concern, a departure from the conventional
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understanding that Roosevelt believed that the Empire
should be broken up. It is only by a careful reading of the
notes that the American position is fully understood.
Clearly, the Roosevelt Administration was aware of the
distinct possibility of Japanese-inspired conflict in the South
Pacific

and

was

attempting

to

create

some sort of

understanding with Australia that would facilitate American
participation, if not intervention.

Equally clearly, the

United States was envisaging greater communication with
and an improved relationship with Australia.
aircraft

was

an

obvious

means

of

Access by

establishing

and

maintaining that understanding. Important too was the
need for rapid communication between the two nations.
The identification of the need for direct radio telegraph
facilities between the two nations signalled the growing
American awareness of the approaching conflict in the
Pacific.
The new importance of Australia is on display in the
language of the notes: ‘Should the United States become
involved in war, particularly in the Far East, instantaneous
telegraph communication with Australia would be of the
utmost importance’. The same sentiment is expressed
again: ‘It is obviously desirable and helpful in cultivating
closer ties between the United States and Australia, quite
aside

from

mutual

defence

needs,

to

improve

the

communication facilities between the two countries’. The
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import and the motivation of the briefing notes thus
becomes apparent. The United States was forecasting the
role that Australia would be required to play in the events
expected to unfold within the very near future.
The significance of the ‘Briefing Notes’ lay in it confirming
Burrell’s reports from ABC 1 that Australia had become part
of the American strategy for the expected war in the
Pacific. Equally significant was the fact that this document
was

driven

not

by

the

American

military

or

naval

authorities but by the State Department. It is possible to
speculate that the new-found American recognition of
improving relations with Australia and the importance of
Australia in Pacific defence strategy owed something to
Casey’s energetic wooing of the State Department andits
senior officers.
The Briefing Notes criticised what it perceived as Australia’s
attempt to ‘establish its independent position vis-à-vis the
United States and at the same time, expect us to accept
her playing the Empire game in such a manner’. However,
they concluded by emphasizing that ‘the current general
situation

offered

an

unusual,

probable

(sic)

unique

opportunity for attempting to solve, by moderate liberality,
a deep-rooted conflict which puts a severe strain on United
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States-Australian relations in general—political as well as
economic’.467
Casey left nothing to chance in terms of cementing
relationships upon the arrival of Menzies in Washington. His
gathering of Washington’s important people reveals the
effectiveness of his networking. For example, in a letter to
the Assistant Secretary of State that began ‘My dear Adolf’,
he gave Berle a list of those who would be attending ‘an
informal men’s dinner (black tie)’ at the Australian Legation
to meet the visiting Prime Minister, Menzies, on 9 May,
1941, signing the letter, ‘Dick Casey’. The list included
Vice-President Henry Wallace, Secretary of War, Henry
Stimson, Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Acheson and
Special Adviser the President, Harry Hopkins, along with
other members of the Diplomatic Corps.468
The Menzies visit proceeded smoothly. Casey did his best
to bring his intelligence up to date, noting to his diary the
day before Menzies arrived: ‘Lunched alone with Mr
Stimson (Secretary of War). He wanted to explain his point
of view rearding United States fleet proposals. We also
discussed

Philippines’.469No

less

an

importantmeeting

occurred on 12 May 1941 when General Marshall and
467
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Admiral Stark came to the Australian Legation to talk with
Casey and Prime Minister Menzies. Casey would not have
passed up this opportunity to spread his gospel that it was
Australia that offered great benefits to American power in
the Pacific. While Marshall and American strategy were still
focused

on

somehow

defending

the

Philippines

and

confining any Asian war to the ocean north of the equator,
they

would

reminders

certainly
about

not

what

have
a

been

strategic

spared
asset

Casey’s
Australia

represented in the event of war with Japan. There were
follow-up visits to Casey from American miltiary leaders.
On 9 June 1941, Admiral

H.E. Kimmel, Commander-in-

Chief of the US Pacific Fleet, and one of his planning
officers Captain MacMorrow, called at the Legation to see
Casey for a ‘useful confidential discussion on Pacific’.470
Impressing upon the Americans the importance of the
Pacific, despite the ‘Beat Hitler First’ strategy, was one of
Casey’s priorites. Another was seeking to encourage the
Americans to look beyond the Philippines in the context of
the looming Pacific War. Having made so many important
contacts in Washington, Casey would have learnt of the
existence of various colour-coded war plans created by a
Joint Committee of the United States Army and the United
States Navy. War Plan Orange was a strategy designed to
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deal with hostilities that were expected to break out in the
Western

Pacific

involving

a

Japanese

attack

on

the

Philippines and Guam, both American protectorates. As
early as 1905, Japan was perceived as the likely adversary
in the Pacific, a belief that persisted, with varying degrees
of conviction, until proven correct by the outbreak of the
Pacific War in 1941. The Army and the Navy were required
to develop their own tactical programs in accordance with
the overall strategic concepts and objectives. Theoretically,
the existence of clearly defined War Plans would have
made it impossible for an outsider, such as Casey, to
attempt to influence the political will of the United States in
the specific area of military strategy. In reality, the color
plans never achievedwhat was hoped for and expected.
Moreover, they were drawn up by serving and retired
members of the Army and Navy, albeit of senior rank such
as

General

Pershing

and

Admiral

Dewey,

but

with

insufficient political input.
In fairness, there exist many different opinions on the
value of the War Plans. Miller has claimed that ‘War Plan
Orange, the secret program of the United States to defeat
Japan, was, in my opinion, history’s most successful war
plan’.471 On the other hand, the Army’s official history
described these plans as far from realistic and hence little
471
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more than staff studies.472 No War Plan was ever enacted
by Congress or signed by the President. From the very
beginning, American planning was based upon two major
factors, firstly that the hostilities with Japan would be
essentially a naval war and secondly, arising from that, a
world class naval station and harbour was needed in the
Western Pacific. Subic Bay or Manila Bay in the Philippines
were invariably nominated for that role.Both propositions
were problematic. The development of aircraft and aircraft
carriers demolished the belief that hostilities with Japan
would be entirely naval. Secondly, the declared need for a
major naval base in the Western Pacific and the conclusion
that the Philippines were the only possible place reflected
poorly on the thinking that went into the creation of War
Plan Orange. There was never a realistic chance that the
Philippines were defensible.

The agreements reached at

the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-1922 allowing
Japan the smallest ratio of

5:5:3 in capital ships

eventuated in Britain and the United States conceding
Japan the right to strengthen her Pacific possessions while
denying the two Western countries the right to fortify their
Pacific bases.
authority:

In the words of a United States naval

‘Thus

went

all

chance

of

defending

the

Philippines and providing a military sanction for American
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policy’.473At the first meeting of the Joint Board in 1919,
after one of the many reviews, a Naval member, Captain
Yarnell, questioned how could war plans be developed
without a national policy being defined? What were
America’s interests in the Far East? If there were to be
hostilities, would they be restricted to a limited war or was
it the intention to decisively defeat the enemy? Could the
Philippines be held and at what cost? By 1922, Yarnell had
concluded, ‘it seems certain that in the course of time the
Philippines and whatever else we may have there will be
captured’, thus anticipating precisely the events of 19411942.474

A senior Army officer, Brigadier (later General)

Embrick argued that the Philippines ‘had become a military
liability of a constantly increasing gravity… [that] the early
dispatch of our fleet to Philippine waters would be literally
an act of madness’.475
Between 1924 and 1938, Plan Orange was revised many
times but the essential features remained unchanged. In
April 1935, American strategic planners concluded that not
only was Japan hell-bent on expansion of its empire, but
that she could be defeated by the United States only in a
473
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long, costly war, in which the Philippines would early be
lost. The American response would take the form of ‘a
progressive movement’ through the mandated islands,
beginning with the Marshalls and Carolines, to establish ‘a
secure line of communications to the Western Pacific’.
Australia, despite its harbours and resources, was evidently
too distant and too far south from where the Americans
expected a Japanese attack, that is, the Philippines and the
island of Guam. The vast expanses of the thinly-populated
Pacific raised the question of whether the makers of
American national policy were prepared to incur the
obligation of engaging in such a war.476
The revision of January 1938 recognised that the Royal
Navy had responsibilities in the Pacific through Britain’s
access to the valuable resources in Australia, Malaya,
Borneo and elsewhere. The 1938 Plan raised the possibility
of greater co-operation between the navies of the United
States and Britain in the event of war in the Pacific.
Nonetheless, the Philippines always took priority over
Singapore as the anti-Japan base in the Pacific, a situation
that Casey was still complaining about bitterly in the weeks
that followed Pearl Harbor.477
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If the majority of the Naval hierararcy sought to prioritise
holding the Philippines, the Army leadership was much
more sceptical.478As the World War broke out, War Plan
Orange was succeeded by a series of Rainbow Plans,
predicated on the belief that the next war would involve
multiple countries and not just the United States and
Japan. Rainbow Plan 1 aimed at preventing violation of the
Monroe Doctrine, Rainbow Plan 2 the defeat of ‘enemy
forces’ in the Pacific, while remaining ‘in concert’ with Great
Britain and France. Rainbow Plan No. 3 provided for the
‘protection of United States’ vital interests in the Western
Pacific by securing control in the Western Pacific as rapidly
as possible’.479 Whatever the plan, the belief that the
Philippines could serve as the American base in the west
Pacific

in

the

events

of

war

with

Japan

was

held

simultaneously with the fear that the Philippines could not
be held in the face of a sustained Japanese attack.
In February and March 1941, as the ABC 1 talks took place,
Marshall and Stimson now expressed some confidence that
the Philippines could be held once reinforced with the new
B-17 Flying Fortress bombers. These long-range bombers
could target Japan and help to deter an attack on
Singapore.The effective takeover by Japanese forces of
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French Indochina in July 1941 was the background for
Roosevelt strengthening American resolve to hold the
Philippines.480 On 31 July 1941 General Marshall made the
statement that defending the Philippines was American
policy.481

The

command

of

American

forces

in

the

Philippines was given to General Douglas Macarthur.
Ensuring that the United States did not restrict itself to
prioritizing the Philippines therefore became the key
element of Casey’s mission in the months leading up to
Pearl Harbor. It was a welcome development for Casey
when, on 2 August 1941, he called on General Spaatz
(Chief of U.S. Army Air Corps) and General Scanlon (U.S.
Army Intelligence) regarding ‘their desire for information re
airfields in North Australia and the islands’.482 Casey was
someone that the Americans clearly found necessary to
bring into the discussion on this issue. Casey’s diary for 11
October 1941 records, ‘Called on President and had hour’s
talk, mainly on the part the Philippines may play in Far East
and on economic aims in the future.’483 Casey advised
Canberra that the President held out no hope of a
permanent peace with Japan. Casey noted that the
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previous belief that the Philippines could not survive had
been reviewed and it was now considered that the
garrisons there could hold out for a longer period enabling
Philippines-based aircraft to deter Japanese movement
southward

towards

Singapore.484Casey’s

report

of

the

meeting, sent to Canberra that night, indicated that the
President spoke, at length, on ‘the changeable attitude by
the U.S. Army and Navy’ towards the Philippines.485The
President, obviously aware of the doubts over whether the
Philippines could be held, asked if Australia, in the event of
war with Japan, might consider the practicability of
Australian air squadrons operating from North Borneo, in
order to co-operate with the United States air forces based
in the Philippines. This was in itself a significant victory. It
was recognition that the United States could not base its
strategy solely on its holding the Philippines.
Menzies’ hold on the Prime Ministership was always on a
knife edge and he resigned on 27 August 1941. Arthur
Fadden became Prime Minister for 40 days and when
Wilson

and

Coles,

two

disaffected

pro-Menzies

backbenchers, crossed the floor, Labor came to power in a
minority government. It would be wrong to see the
removal of the United Australia Party from office as a
484
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decisive turning point in Australia’s relationship with the
United

States.

There

were

important

elements

of

continuity, foremost among which was Casey himself who
remained in Washington. In fact, Casey had initiated in a
cable of 5 October, 1941, the possibility of ‘returning home
for consultation’, motivated in part, claims Bridge, by the
prospect of assessing his chances of becoming UAP
leader.486 When this was denied Casey continued the
diplomacy and the public relations campaign aimed at
elicting greater commitment from the United States to the
security of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and therefore to
Australia.
The new Australian Prime Minister John Curtin and his
Minister of External Affairs, Evatt, became involved in
strategic discussions almost immediately. Long before he
released

‘Australia Looks to America’ in December 1941,

Curtin was well aware of how far the Australia-United
States

military

relationship

had

advanced

under

the

previous government. On 13 October, 1941, Curtin, as
both

Prime

Minister

and

Minister

for

Defence

Co-

ordination,Curtin presented to the Australian Advisory War
Cabinet a United States’ request for Australia’s assistance
in various military matters. Curtin used the report to
emphasise the increasing interest the United States was
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exhibiting in Pacific defence. Curtin was clearly aware of
American plans. He cited various proposals:

supplying

equipment and technical assistance to make Rabaul a welldefended anchorage for possible use as a base for
American fleet operations against the Caroline Islands and
Japanese lines of communication passing eastward of the
Philippines; American interest lay in establishing a chain of
landing grounds suitable for heavy bombers between
Honolulu and New Zealand, Australia, Malaya and the
Philippines; advising the United States about conditions in
New Caledonia,

New Hebrides and the Solomons; and of

increasing numbers of American planes arriving in Australia
on their way to the Philippines.
The American requests were agreed to, some in principle
subject to further investigation, but all were regarded
favourably.487 Although American service personnel were to
staff the airfields for American aircraft, the request sought
supplies and equipment including oil and gasoline, bombs,
and ammunition. The motive for the American involvement
was to facilitate the strengthening of the Philippines, but
Australia’s growing stature in American thinking was plain
to see. In a message to Churchill in late October, Curtin put
the view that were the Commonwealth nations forced into
a conflict with Japan, ‘we will certainly have done all we
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can to deter her (Japan) and our defensive position in the
Eastern Hemisphere will be all the stronger for the
measures that have been taken’.488
Three days after this request, the Advisory War Cabinet
received advice from Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the British
Commander-in-Chief, Far East when he attended their
meeting on 16 October 1941. He told them that the whole
region of south-east Asia, comprising Burma, Malaya, the
Netherlands East Indies, Australia, New Zealand and the
Philippines comprised one strategic area. The defence of
one affected the others. It was a perspective that reflected
Casey’s message to the Americans for much of the
previous year. Yet, on other matters, Brooke-Popham
proved to be wide of the mark. He assured the War Cabinet
of the increasing strength of British forces in the Far East,
with Malaya growing from strength to strength. The most
welcome and the most inaccurate news of this message
was that Japan probably was about to attack the Soviet
Union rather than move south. As Brooke-Popham put it,
‘Russia’s

preoccupation

with

the

war

with

Germany

presents an opportunity for Japan to rid itself of the
Russian threat’.489
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This optimistic view was abroad in Washington as well.
Casey reported to Canberra that senior American service
quarters believed that Japan was about to attack the Soviet
Union and that the United States would remain neutral, so
long as British and American interests were not also
attacked.490As

late

as

25

October

1941,

Casey

was

recordingWelles as having ‘a fairly hopeful attitude about
the Far East, particularly about the probability (he thinks
improbabililty) of their going south’.491Yet, talks between
Hull and the Japanese representatives, Admiral Nomura
and Special Envoy Kurusu, aimed at reducing the tensions
between Japan and the United States, were achieving
nothing.492 Contrary to the views held by some senior
American
November

service

chiefs,Casey told Canberra in

1941that

Japanese-Anglo-American

mid-

relations

were ‘heading fairly rapidly for a break’.493
Japan’s refusal to withdraw her troops from Indo-China and
the American refusal to lift or reduce the restrictions and
allow Japanese access to raw materials constituted major
obstacles to a lessening of tensions. On 21 November, in a
long
490

491

message

to

Curtin,

Casey

trawled

over

the
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circumstances in which war in the Pacific might break out.494
If Curtin and Evatt had entertained the hope that war with
Japan would likely be avoided, Casey’s latest message
would have demolished that hope.
Casey, meanwhile, was furiously pursuing all avenues to
speed

up

Australia’s

rearmament.

Australia

was

an

important beneficiary of Lend-Lease and Casey was not
afraid to make his views about delays in the supply of
equipment. He told Edward Stettinius, who was in charge
of Lend-Lease, on 17 September 1941 that ‘it was in his
hands whether or not there was an Australian mechanised
division in the field in mid-1942’.495 In October 1941, he
involved Welles, Hopkins and the President in a discussion
of how well the Australians were using American-made
machine tools.496 In November 1941 Casey congratulated
himself on the fact that ‘we have been getting our
requisitions approved and orders placed at 2 to 3 times as
great a rate, relatively, than any other beneficiaries,
including the British’.497
Casey hoped for an ‘incident’ that brought the United
States into the war but feared above all a situation where
494
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an embittered Japan struck out at British and Dutch
interests

with

no

guarantee

of

American

assistance.

Negotiations between Japan and the United States reached
an impasse in November, and the United States knew from
its MAGIC (US ability to collect and interpret Japanese
secret codes – hugely helpful in US devising strategy)
intercepts that a date had been set in Tokyo for talks to
come to an end. The United States had imposed ever
tougher sanctions upon Japan. This was not a welcome
development for the Australians who still hoped to buy
time, avoid war with Japan altogether, or make sure that
the United States, Australia and Britain entered a new war
together.
Evatt, previously unimpressed by the Japanese threat, now
as Minister and armed with Casey’s intelligence, warned
Parliament of the threat of war. Yet the Australians were
still unclear as to how soon the collision with Japan might
come. Casey on 29 November reported that a southward
advance

of

a

significant

Japanese

taskforce

was

expected.498At the same time, Evatt was greatly cheered in
the last week in November 1941 by Casey’s revelation that
a draft proposal from Hull to the Japanese offered a modus
vivendi that exchanged a retreat of Japan from its recent
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conquests in exchange for a resumption of trade.499 The
modus vivendi required that neither side would advance
further in Asia or the Pacific. To Casey’s chagrin, the modus
vivendi was not ultimately part of the proposals that went
to Japan. Casey blamed not only Japanese militarism but
an intransigent Chinese nationalist movement for the
removal of the modus vivendi, viewed in China as making
too many concessions.500 From that moment it was simply a
matter of where and when Japan would strike.
At the end of November, Casey reported on a long
interview he had had with the Secretary of State. Casey
told Curtin and Evatt that Hull now believed that relations
with Japan had gone beyond the diplomatic stage and that
so far as the United States was concerned, the matter was
now up to the Army and Navy. Casey also noted that Hull
had taken to using the word ‘we’ in the sense of the United
States

and

British

Commonwealth

countries,

a

very

encouraging signal.501
Although he was careful to keep Canberra closely informed
of his activities and, just as importantly, of what he learnt,
it was obvious that Casey was on a fairly long leash. Casey
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sought Canberra’s approval for variouscourses of action but
the initiative was usually his own. An example was his
private meeting with Special Japanese Envoy, Saburo
Kurusu, and the Japanese Ambassador to the United
States, Admiral Kichisaburo,on 30 November 1941. In this
case,

Casey

and

Evatt

had

the

same

objective

of

miraculously postponing the looming war.502 Bridge notes
that Casey was the last diplomat to negotiate with Kurusu
on the eve of Pearl Harbor. This was, as Bridge points out,
not naivety on Casey’s part, but a shrewd manoeuvre to
remind the United States that Australia was in the front line
of any Japanese attack and that the Americans had given
no guarantee to Britain or Australia in relation to a
Japanese attack on Malaya. Just such a guarantee did
emerge on 1 December 1941.503 If nothing else, this lastgasp

conversation

highlighted

Casey’s

stature

in

Washington and his capacity to achieve results that worked
in Australia’s favour.
Casey’s focus in 1941 was the looming Pacific War. He
could not, by his own efforts, reverse the ‘Beat Hitler First’
strategy or American reliance upon the Philippines, let
alone prevent a war with Japan. Yet the time spent by
Casey and the energy employed - interviews, writing,
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dining, talking – propounding the interest of Australia and
the role it could play in the war effort kept Australia’s
stratetic value in plain sight of the military planners. The
aftermath of Pearl Harbor would make all those Casey
ideas suddenly relevant. Decision makers – both political
and military - who had been hearing Casey’s reasoned
arguments and discussions in a wide range of meetings and
gatherings found that ideas that were ‘filed’, but not
actually dismissed, were now worth serious consideration,
politically and strategically.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Curtin and Casey.
Bridge has made the point repeatedly that Casey was
‘looking to America’ long before Curtin put his name over
these words in his statement of 27 December 1941.
YetCurtin is the measuring stick by which most Australians
still think about Australia’s alliance with the United States.
In traversing the path of the Australia-United States
relationship in the crucial years of 1942 to 1945, Curtin
looms large. If in fact, Casey did contribute to that
formulation, the question arises, how do Casey’s efforts
compare with Curtin’s?

This might be seen as a fair

question because Curtin has been afforded the accolades.
A key sentence in Curtin’s‘Australia Looks to America’
statement put Australia’s international relatioships in stark
perspective: ‘Without any inhibitions, I make it quite clear
that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our
traditional links of kinship with the United Kingdom’. This
sentence has become the symbol both of Curtin’s foreign
policy and indeed, of Curtin himself. The phrase is
continually linked to Curtin and has entered the Australian
political lexicon. The conventional wisdom is clearly based
on the fact that within days of ‘Australia Looks to America’,
thousands of American servicemen, growing to hundreds of
thousands, plus ships, equipment and aircraft began
arriving in Australia.
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Thus, the phrase ‘Australia Looks to America’, which
summed up neatly Australia’s position in the crucial days
following 7 December, constitutes one of the foundations
upon which Curtin’s status rests. The belief about Curtin
ultimately led to his being perceived as the saviour of
Australia.504 Yet, the appellation is not justified. When
Curtin issued that statement on 27 December, the Pacific
War had been raging for almost three weeks. On this
reasoning, nearly three weeks elapsed before Curtin
expressed these fears and sought American assistance.
This is clearly absurd.
The Japanese attacks on 7 December, plus the German
declaration of war upon the United States four days later,
virtually destroyed the isolationist cause and forced the
hitherto neutral United States to become a combatant. As
Casey put it on 8 December 1941: ‘The Japanese attack
has welded this country into one as nothing else could
possibly have done’.In the days following Pearl Harbor,
General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States
Army, took charge of the response to the Japanese attack.
Lyon claims that it was Marshall himself who decided that
the major American base to counter the Japanese attack
would be in Australia.505
504
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obvious that it could hardly have been anyone else. While
Roosevelt and Churchill may have been the political
strategists for the United States and Britain, it was Marshall
who was the chief military strategist for the Allied counter
attack, certainly at that early stage of the war.
Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Marshall pensioned off his
old guard in order to promote some of the bright young
officers he had met during his career, includingDwight
Eisenhower. Eisenhower won much favourable comment
over his brilliant conduct of war games in Louisiana in mid
1940, which led to his immediate promotion to brigadier
general.506 Marshall brought Eisenhower to Washington
urgently. Arriving at Washington’s Union Station on Sunday
morning, 14 December, one week after Pearl Harbor,
Eisenwhower found the War Department almost empty
except for Marshall, who told Eisenhower to put down on
paper a plan. Eisehower submitted a plan to Marshall the
same day. Marshall rejected it, and told Eisenhower to
make corrections. The new plan, completed by Eisenhower
on 17 December, was sent to Marshall who approved it for
transmission to Roosevelt the same day.
It was Marshall who described in broad detail, the size,
composition

506

and

time

requirements

of

the

American
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response and told Eisenhower, to commit the proposals to
paper, filling in some numerical blanks in the ordinance
requirements, what might be termed ‘the nuts and bolts’.
He even included in his briefing the proposal that was then
being floated around Washington to persuade the Soviet
Union to take a belligerent stand against Japan and provide
aid to those nations and areas under Japanese attack.507
Eisenhower’s recommendation was to ‘use Australia as a
base’, which would entail making ‘certain of the safety of
Australia itself’.
As

Gelber

has

pointed

out,

Marshall’s

response

to

Eisenhower’s recommendations about the Philippines – ‘do
your best to save them’ – on the surface, at least,
suggested no great urgency.508 Yet the plan itself suggested
an overwhelming reliance upon the Australian land mass.
In his briefing, Marshall ignored the much-vaunted Rainbow
Plan created for precisely this purpose. What he did include
was a model of clear, concise directions that became the
basis for the United States’ conduct of the war in the Pacific
and had the consequence of converting Australia into a
vast arsenal that would, in effect, remove any possibility of
Japanese forces invading the country. It is worthwhile to
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quote the Marshall/Eisenhower Plan, called ‘Steps To Be
Taken’, in full:
SECRET
Assistance to the Far East.
Steps to be taken..
Build up in Australia a base of operations from which
critical supplies (planes and ammunition) and personnel
can be moved into the Philippines—probably entirely by
air. Speed is essential.
Influence Russia to enter the war, at least give us secret
use of certain Siberian air fields.
Pursuit planes.
Move

carrier

with

Army

Pursuit

planes,

pilots,

ammunition and bombs from San Diego to Brisbane,
Australia.
Send fastest commercial vessel immediately available
on West Coast, with pursuit planes, pilots, ammunition
and bombs to Australia.
Ferry planes from Australia into Philippines.
Heavy Bombers
Move heavy bombers (B-24)—via Africa to Australia to
set up a combined fighting-transport service from
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Darwin to Philippines. Also send B-17 heavy bombers in
small groups across Pacific via the southern ferrying
route from West Coast to Australia, if Christmas Island
and Fiji fields can be used.
Transport Planes.
Establish in Australia, a transport plane ferrying service
to move ammunition and supplies from Brisbane to
Darwin, and possibly into Borneo or Manila.
Bombs and Ammunition.
Initially, utilize the bombs and ammunition now in
Australia, others to be carried on carriers and fast
merchant vessels with planes. Establish fast merchant
ship

supply

maintenance.

service
Ferry

from
by

U.S.
plane

to
from

Australia
Australia

for
to

Philippines.509
Clearly this was the moment at which Australia was
‘saved’. Australia, not even on the radar as a base for the
United States when Casey arrived in Washington in March
1940, was now central to American thinking. Of course, it
was the ‘incident’ of Pearl Harbor that had brought about
the transformation. Yet the situation had arrived at the
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point anticipated by Casey, who had worked so hard at
disseminating his gospel of Australia being viewed as vital
to American strategy in the looming war. Of course, there
is no direct evidence

that Casey inspired Marshall’s

thinking. Yet Marshall had met Casey before Pearl Harbor
and was involved in many discussions with senior military
figures

who

negotiations

had
with

also

been

Casey.

in

communication

Casey’s

entreaties

and
and

suggestions about an American base in Australia were now
relevant to detailed American planning at the highest level.
On

the

very

day

that

he

approved

of

the

Marshall/Eisenhower plan, 17 December, Roosevelt called
Casey to the Oval Office to tell him that he had read
Curtin’s offer to ‘co-operate with the United States forces in
the provision of a naval base at Rabaul and aerodrome
facilities

in

territories

under

the

control

of

the

Commonwealth and at New Caledonia’, which Casey had
delivered to the President on 13 December.510 Roosevelt
explained that the United States regarded the whole southwest Pacific as one area. As the President acknowledged,
this notion that ‘the South-West Pacific is one unit’ was
Casey’s theme over a long period.511 The war had to be
regarded from ‘a geographical rather than a national point
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of view…and that the defence of Australia and its outlying
islands were just as important as the defence of the
Philippines’,
Philippines

although
were

Roosevelt

more

believed

immediately

that

the

threatened.

The

President told Casey that they hoped to use Ausralia as the
place to establish a bridgehead and a base.512

Roosevelt

told Casey to ‘please tell your government that we have
already started’ on the matters raised in Curtin’s message
of 13 December.
As of 17 December 1941, there was presidential approval
for Australia to become a major base for the American
response to Japan. If Stimson is to be believed, Australia
as a base had been locked into American thinking for some
time.513 This was the goal to which Casey had clearly been
working, essentially since he arrived in Washington, but
which he had especially pushed in 1941. The Plan was as
much Marshall’s as it was Eisenhower’s. The plan was also
Casey’s. Casey had for the past two years, spoken to as
many service people as he possibly could, always with the
same message, the relevance of Australia in any plan for
Pacific security. Given Casey’s indefatiguable energy, this
message became well known to the various service people
and became relevevant when the full import of the
512
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Japanese attack began to sink in. Like Marshall, most of
the important military leaders in the United States had
heard first hand the Casey ‘Gospel’.
If there is at the very least a plausible case that Casey had
influenced events positively from the perspective of the
‘saving’ of Australia, the same cannot be said of Curtin’s
‘Look

to

America’.

That

Don

Rogers,

Curtin’s

Press

Secretary, wrote this statement is now well established.
Rogers wrote it for Curtin, it was published over Curtin’s
name

and,

as

Rogers

explained

to

this

author,

it

represented Curtin’s thinking at the time.514 At that time,
Curtin had enough to occupy his time without drafting
press

messages.

It

is

unlikely

that

he

would

have

anticipated that it would become the historically significant
document it has.
‘Australia Looks to America’ fulfils none of the criteria for
being regarded as a definitive or significant document of
national importance.

Firstly, it was not drafted by any

senior member of government, but by the Prime Minister’s
Press Secretary: the press release was merely scanned by
the Prime Minister before being sent to the newspaper.515
Secondly, it was written by Rogerssimply in response to a
514
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request by the Editor of the Melbourne Herald for a New
Year message and was published on 27 December.

Cyril

Pearl, the editor of the new (Sydney) Sunday Telegraph,
saw what he considered was a new slant on the war effort,
a switch in Australia’s allegiances, and ran it the next day.
Pearl made a decision to concentrate on Australia seeking
aid from the United States rather than the real message,
that is, of Australia seeking aid from both the United States
and the Soviet Union and encouraging an ‘all in’ effort on
the home front.
Thirdly, it was never sent to the President, or indeed,
anybody. It was essentially a Press Release written for one
newspaper. Fourthly, while it conveyed to the people of
Australia a clear message that the war situation was rapidly
deteriorating and that American and Soviet help was
needed, Curtin knew at the time that it was issued that the
United States was about to establish a major base in
Australia.

Essentially

the

American

President

had

personally told both Casey and the Australian government
of American strategy involving Australia. In the two weeks
between Roosevelt’s decision to approve the Marshall plan
and the issuing of ‘Australia Looks to America’, Curtin was
informed of the dimensions of the American aid in some
detail. Initially, the information had come to him in a
cablegram from Casey, within hours of Casey’s being
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informed by the President himself, that he regarded
Australia as a bridge-head and a base.516
There are at least two puzzling aspects of Curtin’s appeal.
The first is what Curtin hoped to achieve with his American
audience? Curtin may have intended ‘Australia Looks to
America’ as an attempt to keep the United States focused
upon the Pacific and Australia. Evatt would later claim that
the Labor government was shocked when it found out
about Roosevelt’s agreement to the ‘Beat Hitler First’
strategy. On the other hand, Bridge has shown that the
Australian government did, in fact, know of the ‘Beat Hitler
First’ policy within days of its formulation. While there has
always been a degree of conjecture over the precise timing
of Australia’s learning of the policy, Bridge notes that Casey
notified the then acting Prime Minister, Arthur Fadden, in
February 1941 that Roosevelt had made it quite clear that
in the event of the United States becoming involved in a
war with Japan, it would have to be ‘a holding war’.To fight
a war with Japan would be a dangerous diversion of forces
and material from the main centre of operations, which in
his (Roosevelt’s) view was ‘the Atlantic and Great Britain’.517
It would be inconceivable for Curtin and the Labor
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members of the Advisory War Cabinet, although still in
Opposition, to be ignorant of this.
It could be argued, with validity, that Curtin’s issuing of the
statement on 27 December was nothing more than a
declaration of the Prime Minister informing the people of
Australia where their future lay. The difficulty with that
argument, however, is that, from the very beginning, the
statement was regarded as an open appeal for the United
States and the Soviet Union to come to the aid of Australia.
Curtin made no attempt to place the statement in its
correct context. In other words, the statement was
misinterpreted and was, in fact, believed to be something it
was not. The blame for this lies not so much with the way
the statement was treated by the press but more by the
way it was written.
No matter how it is read, Curtin’s ‘Australia Looks to
America’ statement remains an appeal, a public appeal to
the American and the Soviet governments. Nowhere does it
acknowledge that Australia was about to become a huge
American base. It remains a matter for conjecture why, in
drafting the statement, Rogers clearly constructed it that
way. More importantly, it remains a matter for conjecture
why Curtin, in approving of its release, chose to not even
hint that massive American help was on the way. It is
impossible to avoid the conclusion that in the matter of
establishing

a

sound

relationship

with

the

American
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President, Curtin made a serious error of judgment in
publicly calling for American aid when he already knew the
details

of

the

American

strategy

involving

Australia.

Indeed, as already stated, American forces had arrived in
Australia on 22nd December 1941.518
Roosevelt read it for the first time at the end of December,
when it was repeated in sections of the American press.
The statement was published there on 28 December,
1941.519 The most frequently quoted sentence, ‘I make it
clear that Australia looks to America, free from any pangs
about

our

traditional

links

or

friendship

to

Britain’,

appeared in the second paragraph of both The New York
Times and Washington Post reports. Yet, Casey’s diary for
that week makes no reference to it perhaps because he
soon learned that Roosevelt was extremely displeased.
Maie Casey recounted how President Roosevelt had called
Casey to the White House and told him that if he thought
that this statement would ingratiate Australia with the
United States, he (Roosevelt) assured him that it would
have the opposite effect.

Maie Casey claims that the

President insisted that his words were to be regarded as
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personal and not part of the official record.520 Undoubtedly,
this is the reason Casey neither made a note in his diary
nor informed the Prime Minister. His silence on the matter
for the rest of his life accorded with what he regarded as
the honourable thing to do. The President had told him in
confidence. Casey kept that confidence, despite the fact
that Roosevelt’s thoughts were of profound political and
historical significance.
Hudson deals only briefly with Casey’s reaction to it. Casey
committed to paper (but not his diary) his belief after
talking to Roosevelt about it, and after the President put
him under ‘a seal of secrecy’ that not only was the
statement counter-productive, but was seen in Washington
as almost treason against the major ally, Britain. Hudson
found this (undated) ‘scrap of paper’ in a safe in Casey’s
house eight years after his death while researching the
biography.521
Maie Casey recollected that ‘Look to America’ did not just
offend Roosevelt, but also caused Casey anger and
embarrassment.522 It might be profitable to dwell on that
sentence for a moment. Curtin’s strongly worded plea for
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American assistance does not differ greatly from the
message that Casey had been expressing from the time
that he arrived in the United States. Curtin, however, used
language that was far more assertive and demanding, far
more aggressive even, reflecting the changed context. In
Curtin’s defence, Japan had commenced hostilities and the
threat to Australian survival was real and growing daily.
It must be recognised that Casey too often needed to be
assertive and insistent. This invites the interpretation
therefore, that if Casey was embarrassed and angered it
may well have been at the reactions to Curtin’s statement
within the United States and Britain, and not to the
statement itself. In other words, given Casey’s passionate
dedication to an American involvement in the conflict with
the Axis powers, first Germany and subsequently Japan,
the more probable grounds for his embarrassment or anger
could have been the blunt, direct language used in the
statement, language far removed from the felicitous
periphrasis of his world of diplomacy.
The second puzzling aspect of ‘Australia Looks to America’
is that it was directed as much to Stalin as to Roosevelt.
Curtin’s ‘Australia Looks to America’ is in two parts. The
first deals with Australia’s foreign relations, the second part
deals with the need for Australia, internally, to go on a war
footing. The whole tenor of the statement reveals Curtin’s
belief that the war in the Pacific would be fought by a
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combination of the Soviet Union, the United States, the
British Commonwealth, Dutch and Chinese forces. As
Humphrey McQueen has pointed out, the strength of the
appeal to the Soviet Union is no less than that of the
appeal to the United States.523 Of the thirty paragraphs of
prose and the stanza of four lines that make up the Curtin
statement, four deal with the justification of Australia
seeking Soviet assistance, while three deal with the
justification of Australia seeking American assistance. Two
paragraphs refer to both nations. The summary within the
statement reads: ‘Summed up, Australian external policy
will be shaped towards obtaining Russian aid and working
out, with the United States as the major factor, a plan of
Pacific strategy, along with Britain, Chinese and Dutch
forces’.
Curtin’s emphasis in his appeal on the seeking of Soviet aid
at a time when the Soviet Union was fighting for survival is,
at first glance, mystifying. Curtin’s statement explained it
this way: ‘As the Australian government enters 1942, it has
behind it a record of realism in foreign affairs’. Specifically,
Curtin pointed to what he called ‘a forthright declaration in
respect of Finland, Hungary and Romania’ and which he
said was followed by a declaration of war against those

523

Humphrey McQueen, Japan to the Rescue. Australia’s Security Around the
Indonesian Archipelago during the American Century, (Melbourne: Heinemann,
1991), p. 1.

304

countries by the Democracies. Curtin was clearly putting
forward the proposition that Australia could reasonably
expect Soviet assistance because Australia had responded
positively to the Soviet request for a declaration of war
against Finland, Hungary and Romania. This is how Curtin
put it: ‘We felt that there should be no half-measures in
our dealings with the Soviets when that nation was being
assailed by the three countries mentioned’. Then came the
argument for a negotiated pay-off:

‘Similarly we put

forward that a reciprocal agreement between Russia and
Britain

should

be

negotiated

to

meet

an

event

of

aggression by Japan. Our suggestion was then regarded,
wrongly as time has proved, as premature. Now, with equal
realism…we should be able to look forward with reason to
aid from Russia against Japan’.
The historian Peter Lyon described the urge to secure
Soviet intervention

in

the

war

against

Japan

as

‘a

preposterous notion’.524 It was, after all, only eight months
since Stalin had signed a five-year neutrality pact with
Japan. This was truly a pact that worked admirably for both
countries.

The

Soviet

Union,

already

suspicious

of

Germany and unsure of German intentions, specifically the
possibility of a massive German invasion from the west,
desperately wanted its eastern boundaries secure. Japan,
524
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for its part, needed just as desperately to keep her
northern flank secure to facilitate a drive south. The pact
therefore, was in the national interests of both the Soviet
Union and Japan. The subsequent German invasion of the
Soviet Union did not violate the Soviet-Japan Neutrality
Pact.

Strained it no doubt but its preservation became

even more vital to Soviet interests as the Wehrmacht
stormed to the very gates of Moscow. Nothing could have
been more inimical to Stalin’s interests than a belligerent
Japan on her eastern borders.

Yet Curtin described as

realistic an expectation of Soviet aid in the fight against
Japan.
To be fair, Soviet intervention against Japan was a matter
that was being discussed in Washington, London and
Canberra throughout 1941. In a letter to Curtin in late
October, 1941, a day after he had called on Hornbeck and
Loy

Henderson

of

the

Russian

desk

at

the

State

Department, Casey reported to Canberra that there was
information that Japan might shortly attack the Soviet
Union.525

Rather than extend southward, Japan would

exploit the opportunity offered by Russia’s precarious hold
on its Eastern borders. From Australia’s point of view, this
could not be regarded as anything but favourable. A Japan
engaged in fighting with the Soviet Union would be hardly
525
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likely

to

launch

further

aggressive

moves

involving

Australia. In a submission to the Australian War Cabinet,
Evatt proposed taking steps to seek the appointment of ‘a
Russian Consul-General’, citing the following reasons: (a)
The necessity for giving the fullest material and moral
support

to

Russia

and

continued

Russian

resistance

(against the Wehrmacht), (b) Common political interests,
in particular the consideration that Soviet policy in respect
to Japan in the (Near) East is important to Australia and (c)
the potential importance of Australian-Russian trade.526
In Australia especially, the possibility of conflict between
the Soviet Union and Japan was such an attractive one that
a variation emerged. Rather than await Japan to strike the
first blow, the Soviet Union might launch a massive attack
on the islands of Japan, in other words, beat Japan to the
first and possibly killer blow. Curtin raised the matter of
Soviet-Japan relations at a meeting of the Australian War
Cabinet on 10 November. He proposed that Japan be
warned that any attack by her on the Soviet Union would
be resisted by the British Commonwealth, irrespective of
the attitude of the United States.

All members present

were in agreement, although noting the New Zealand
government’s preference for caution and adopting a wait
and see policy. Unable to speak for the whole of the
526
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Commonwealth or indeed to communicate directly with
Japan, the War Cabinet simply conveyed to London the
recommendation that such a warning be issued to Tokyo.527
This would have been no surprise to London. Curtin had
sent a similar message on 4 November.528
As the expectation of a Japanese attack on Australia
heightened, Casey’s interest in pressuring the Soviet Union
to rattle the sabres at Japan also grew. Four days after the
Pearl Harbor attack, when Britain, the United States and
Australia were emerging from a state of shock, Curtin
cabled London: ‘We think time has now arrived to make
earnest attempt to obtain Russia’s intervention’.529

Casey

cabled Curtin three days later (14 December) that the
‘great importance of active Russian co-operation against
Japan’ was fully realized in Washington but that an
American approach had met with a negative reply by
Stalin. Casey reported however, that in conveying Stalin’s
rejection, the Soviet Ambassador suggested to Hull that if
the United States and Britain were able to make some kind
of ‘offers’, Russian co-operation against Japan might be
forthcoming.530 It seems that this faint offer by the Soviet
527
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leadership to join the Allies against Japan in return for
some kind of ‘offer’ or deal was seized upon by the Curtin
government with enthusiastic alacrity.
Whatever hopes that Casey had of the Soviet Union
launching a preemptive strike against Japan received no
support when he called upon the new Soviet ambassador,
Maxim Litvinov, on 16 December 1941. Litvinov had served
as foreign minister for a decade and knew the Japanese
situation well. He told Casey that ‘a declaration of war on
Japan would necessitate moving probably 20 divisions to
Siberia’.531 Litvinov noted that he could not see how
attacking Siberia would be in Japan’s interests either. Yet it
must be acknowledged that hopes of Soviet military action
against Japan remained very much alive in Allied thinking
in 1942. After a meeting with Litvinov on 14 February
1942, Casey noted that ‘of set purpose I did not make any
reference of Russia attacking Japan or Japan attacking
Russia’ for the State Department advised against provoking
the

Russians

in

this

way’.532

Yet

clearly,

Russian

intervention in the war was something that the Allies in
general hoped to see as they scanned the international
horizon. Equally clear is the fact that Curtin’s appeal had as
little effect on Stalin as it did on Roosevelt.
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No man is without flaws and Curtin had his. His failure to
anticipate Roosevelt’s vexation at the issuing of ‘Australia
Looks

to

America’

insensitivity

that

recklessness

justified

demonstrated

jeopardised

either

a

level

of

the

relationship

or

a

by the dire

situation in

which

Australia found itself. Casey could have responded in a way
that was less than complimentary to Curtin but it was not
in his nature to go down that path. Of course it is often
pointedout in Curtin’s defence that ‘Look to America’ was
designed to remind the United States of Australia’s own
challenges and simultaneously to challenge the ‘Beat Hitler
First’ decision, taken by Churchill and Roosevelt earlier in
the year. Curtin strongly believed that Australia must have
the fullest say in Pacific strategy.533 Even so, it is surely a
myth that ‘Australia Looks to America’ was the catalyst that
loosened Australia’s ties with Great Britain and created,
that is, gave birth to, the American Alliance. As a corollary,
Curtin’s identification with the creation of the American
alliance is undeserved.
This

conclusion

needs

to

be

acknowledgedif

Casey’s

contribution is to be fairly judged. In dealing with Curtin,
much of the literature has been of an unquestioning
character.

Few writers have referred to Roosevelt’s

annoyance at the publication of ‘Australia Looks to America’
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at a time when Curtin was aware of the American decision
to convert Australia into the jump-off base for the
American offensive.

Roosevelt could have concluded that

Curtin, by issuing a virtual public appeal while knowing that
the crucial decision had already been made and that, within
a very short time, huge numbers of American servicemen
and impressive quantities of American materiel would
appear in Australia, was guilty of self-promotion and
creating the belief that he exercised a powerful influence
over the American President.
The kindest interpretation of Curtin’s knowledge of the
precise details of the American strategy at this time makes
‘Australia Looks to America’ seem less sincere and less
convincing.

A

stricter

interpretation

would

invite

speculation about his attitude to and his relations with the
Australian people. In wartime, it is not common for matters
of strategy to be conveyed to the civilian populace. The
Australian people at this time, late 1941, early 1942,
however, were seriously concerned about the future of the
nation and indeed, their own safety. The rapidity at which
Japanese forces were moving southwards, approaching the
Australian continent, created a state of anxiety. Colonel
Gerald Wilkinson, who had been appointed British Liaison
Officer with General MacArthur, in 1941, wrote in his diary
that when he arrived in Australia from the Philippines,
MacArthur had informed him that in 1942, Curtin had ‘more
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or less offered him the country on a platter’. Wilkinson’s
own view was that Curtin was ‘badly panicked and most
un-statesman-like at the time’.534 It might be reasonable to
suppose

that

the

nation’s

leader,

who

obviously

appreciated the dire situation more than the civilian
population, would assure the people that help was on its
way, rather than keep them in the dark.
An interpretation of the sequence of events leads to the
conclusion that Curtin had no significant role in the final
American decision. This is not to deny the major role he
took in the subsequent Pacific War. His battles with
Churchill, his standing up to Roosevelt, the leadership he
displayed as leader of the Australian people in their gravest
hour have ensured his place as an outstanding and
courageous figure in the history of Australia.

Yet it is

difficult not to agree with the minority of commentators
who look past Curtin when seeking an explanation of the
alliance between Australia and the United States.Yet, as
World War Two fades into history, Curtin’s name and
reputation continue to be invoked as much for the
establishment of the alliance as they do for his wartime
leadership role. As a consequence, the reputation of Casey
and his role in establishing the alliance between the United
States and Australia has been seriously underestimated.In
534
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effect, both Curtin and Casey were giving the same
message. Yet, it is a matter of record that Curtin’s
message, in contrast to Casey’s, failed to have any effect in
the United States.
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CHAPTER NINE: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath

It needs to be noted that some, mostly American, writers
have chosen to overestestimate Casey’s influence with the
President. The surprise Japanese attack on American
warships and defence installations at Pearl Harbor on 7
December 1941 traumatised the United States and has
generated a vast body of literature.535 As well, there have
been

reports

by

the

nine

official

investigations

and

enquiries into the attack, with the enquiry conducted by
Senator AlbenBarkely regarded as the most comprehenisve
and

authoritative.536

Central

to

the

interest

is

the

incredulity that a nation as powerful as the United States
could be taken by surprise so easily. It could be expected,
therefore, that much of the literature attempts to seek out
a culprit or culprits upon whom the blame might be placed
for this ‘day that will live in infamy’.537
Within eight weeks of the attack the local Army and Navy
Commanders, General Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel,
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had

been

relieved,

their

careers

and

reputations

permanently destroyed. Far from settling the issues raised,
however, their removal only heightened the interest and
stimulated the search for explanations. Senator Barkley, in
introducing the resolution into the Senate for the final
investigation, which began in November, 1945, said that
the first purpose of the Congressional investigation was
that of ‘fixing responsibility’ for the Pearl Harbor disaster
‘upon an individual, or a group of individuals, or upon a
system under which they operated or co-operated, or failed
to do either’.538
The final days of a neutral United States proved to be a
period of infinite interest to American historians and
writers.

For Casey in Washington, it was a period of

intense activity, a time in which he employed his diplomatic
skills and his networking habits to the utmost and a period
he seemed to enjoy. However, the historiography of that
momentous period contains references to Casey that to this
day have remained a mystery.

The suggestion has often

been made that on the afternoon of 6 December 1941, less
than 24 hours before the Japanese attack, Casey called at
the White House with British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, and
conferred with President Roosevelt for an undisclosed
period. What creates the mystery is that there is no record
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of such a meeting ever having taken place. It is unlikely
that Casey would have conferred with the American
President and not reported the meeting to Canberra. Yet,
there is no mention of it in Casey’s reports, diary, nor in
the files held in the National Australian Archives. White
House records contain no mention of it and the State
Department searched twice through all relevant documents
and found nothing.
An unrecorded visit to the American President by a
relatively junior diplomat would not normally be of great
interest to historians.

Casey’s supposed visit, however,

became important for several reasons. Casey had access
to the President and to the highest levels of the Roosevelt
Administration to a degree greater than might be expected
of a representative of a small nation member of the British
Commonwealth.

Australia’s

foreign

policy

sometimes

echoed Britain’s, yet Feis has noted that Americans were
not as habituated to regard the aims of the Dominion of
Australia with the same respectful suspicion as those of
Britain and that Casey, accordingly, sometimes ‘found the
path smoother that his British colleagues (did)’.539
Moreover,
undertaken

Casey,
talks

just
with

a

few
the

days

previously,

Japanese

had

Ambassador,

Kichisaburo Nomura and the Special Envoy, Saburo Kurusu,
539

Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 135.

316

in an effort to break the deadlock that had arisen in the
United States-Japan talks.

Although Casey had the

approval of the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Dr.
H. V. Evatt to undertake the talks, the initiative was
entirely his own.540
From the viewpoint of many critics, Roosevelt was overly
influenced by Churchill and privately, at least, anxious to
lead the United States into war.

From that position,

several theories may be developed, ranging from the belief
that despite ample knowledge that Pearl Harbor was about
to be attacked, the Administration purposefully left it
exposed and allowed the attack to happen, to another
belief that the Administration manipulated and maneuvered
Japan into attacking by deliberately placing the bulk of the
Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor as an inviting and tempting
target. This latter ‘conspiracy theory’ is described by
Kenneth S. Davis.541
A visit by an Australian diplomat who was close to the
British Ambassador and who shared Britain’s desire to see
the United States enter the war became significant when
no record of their conversation was kept and indeed, when
all evidence of the visit was missing. The visit, moreover,
was supposedly made less that twenty-four hours before
540
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the Japanese planes roared over the Hawaiian Islands. One
American study, in bemoaning the absence of any record of
the conversation, concludes: ‘This phase of the pre-Pearl
Harbor crisis is so poorly documented that it has invited
very

compromising

interpretations’.542

The

American

historian, Ladislas Farago, put it higher, calling the visit a
‘mission’: ‘The Casey mission to FDR continues to remain
one of the mysteries of the pre-Pearl Harbor diplomacy’.543
The works referring to the Casey ‘visit’ multiplied over time
and featured prominently in at least nine substantial
books.544
The initial reference at the PHA Hearings to the RooseveltCasey meeting emerged when S. W. Richardson, the
General Counsel assisting the Congressional Committee,
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learnt of a cablegram that Casey had dispatched to Curtin
and Evatt on the evening of 6 December at 9.30 pm.
Richardson claimed that the cablegram discussed the
procedures to be followed by Roosevelt in relation to a
message he was proposing to send to Emperor Hirohito.545
In

May 1946,

Richardson,

acting

through the

State

Department, asked the Australian Legation in Washington
for information about Casey’s cablegram of 6 December.
He did not ask for an actual copy.

The Legation’s reply,

dated 22 May and signed by L. R. McIntyre, stated, inter
alia, ‘the message was dispatched from Washington at 9.30
pm on 6 December 1941.

The information contained

therein regarding the procedure to be followed by the
President had come orally from the President late in the
afternoon of 6 December’.546
The reply then went on to convey Roosevelt’s concurrence
to a joint warning that Britain and the Commonwealth
nations proposed sending to Japan. It added that Roosevelt
had decided to send a message to Emperor Hirohito and
that if no reply was received from the Emperor by Monday
evening, the President would issue a warning on Tuesday
afternoon or evening. Roosevelt had asked that the British
545
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Commonwealth warning be held over until Wednesday
morning, that is, after his own warning had been delivered
to

Tokyo.547

What

made

the

Australian

message

so

interesting to the congressional Committee was that
Roosevelt’s reported proposals were contrary to the advice
he was receiving from the State Department.
The wording of the reply from the Australian Legation in
Washington seems to support the view that Casey had
spoken

to

the

President

on

that

fateful

afternoon.

Furthermore, it is the Australian Legation report and
nothing else, which was the basis for the speculation and
conjecture in the above-mentioned histories of the period.
It is now clear that the Casey visit did not take place. The
advice contained in the letter of 22 May 1946 from the
Australian Legation was correct but ambiguous and was
seriously and consistently misinterpreted.
The key to establishing if Casey visited the White House on
6 December 1941, and, if he did, what was discussed, lies
in his cables to Curtin and Evatt on the same date. Casey
dispatched three cablegrams to Australia that day, 6
December, all addressed to Prime Minister Curtin and
External Affairs Minister Evatt.

The times of dispatch

indicate that nothing more than the actual time each was
logged out of Washington. The first was sent from
547
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Washington at 3.00 am, the second at 3.57 pm and the last
at 9.30 pm. This latter cablegram is the one paraphrased
by the Australian Legation.

The complete text of that

cablegram, Casey to Curtin, is as follows:
Washington, 6 December 1941. (9.30 pm)
President sent for British ambassador late this afternoon
to say that he was telegraphing Japanese Emperor (text
follows in my immediate following telegram). President
said that if he received no answer from Japanese
Emperor by Monday evening he would give ‘warning’ to
Japanese government on Tuesday afternoon or evening
and suggests that in these circumstances British and
others give their warnings on equivalent of Wednesday
morning Washington time.
The above time table is likely to be speeded up if the
Japanese move more quickly. The President said that he
was sending a confidential message to the Thai Prime
Minister saying that the United States Government would
regard it as a ‘hostile act’ if Japan attacked Thailand,
Netherlands East Indies, Malaya or Burma.
News is being published tonight here of two large heavily
escorted convoys (totaling 35 ships escorted by 8
cruisers and numerous destroyers) having been seen this
morning to S.E. of Point Camau (the southern point of
Indo-China) steaming westward towards Gulf of Siam.
American estimates of numbers of Japanese troops in
Southern Indo-China are also being given to press
tonight, British Ambassador tells me that the President
does not believe that the Japanese will make an
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aggressive move as soon as the Secretary of State
does.548
That cablegram from Casey, with its clear indications in the
first sentence of the first paragraph and in the last
sentence of the final paragraph, that it was Halifax, the
British Ambassador who had spoken to the President was
subsequently paraphrased by the Australian Legation, inter
alia, as follows:

‘The information contained therein

regarding the procedure to be followed came orally from
the President late in the afternoon of December 6’.549
The information had

certainly come

orally from

the

President, but not to Casey. If the Australian Legation in
1946

had

been

precise,

it

would

have

told

the

Congressional Committee that the information had been
reported by Casey what had been told to him by the British
Ambassador.

It was this simple lack of precision in

language paraphrasing that created the belief by the Pearl
Harbor Attack Congressional Committee that Casey had
visited the White House ‘late in the afternoon of December
6.’ and had received certain information ‘orally from the
President’.
It is well nigh unbelievable that for so many authors the
history of the events leading up to the outbreak of the War
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in the Pacific could have been so distorted by a poorly
written paraphrase.

Equally as astounding is the widely

held view (certainly by the nine writers listed above) that
Casey, a representative of a relatively small nation, could
have played such a vital role at such a crucial time.
Conspiracy theories aside, there is however ample evidence
of Casey’s influence in the winter of 1941-42. The attack on
Pearl Harbor by no means heralded Casey’s exit from the
Washington scene. His major task, working towards an
American participation in ensuring Pacific security had
obviously been completed beyond the best he could have
possibly hoped for. It was to Casey that senior American
service chiefs turned as they sought to bring order from the
chaos and morale shattering events of 7 December. Casey
came to fulfil the responsibilities of a major participant in
the overall military planning as the American service chiefs
battled to evolve a coherent and viable counterforce
against the might of the Japanese Empire. It was Casey
who

knew

intimately

the

resources

and

territorial

characteristics of the Southwest Pacific. In the days and
weeks following Pearl Harbor, Casey became involved in
the implementation of the American counterattack, a
recognition of the status he had achieved in Washington.
The frenetic rounds of meetings between Casey and
American military leaders after Pearl Harbor were proof of
his ever increasing importance. Although the Australian
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Legation, by this time, was staffed by military, air and
naval attaches, their roles revolved around implementing
decisions taken at a joint United States/Australia political
level. It was Casey who had to pull the political strings as
best he could.
Gelber has pointed out that after Pearl Harbor, doors in
Washington were opened to Casey to the degree that the
Australian representative found himself in the regular
company of the likes of Roosevelt, Churchill, and the senior
miltiary figures now running the war.550 In fairness to
Casey, it should be pointed out that he already had a great
deal of access and that many of those whom Casey spoke
to after Pearl Harbor were the same individuals whom
Casey had cultivated in the months leading up to this long
anticipated ‘incident’. On the other hand, the doors now
opened wider and with greater frequency.
Casey stayed in Washington until 1 April 1942. It must be
said that this was the gloomiest period of the Pacific War
for the Allied cause. The Philippines came under attack
almost immediately after Pearl Harbor. Malaya was clearly
vulnerable

and

its

defenders

Americans

and British

at the

badly

panicked.

The

Arcadia discussions in

Washington agreed that there would be an ABDA (AmericaBritish-Dutch-Australia) command stretching from Burma
550
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to the Philippines and, as a last-minute inclusion, south to
the western part of northern Australia, including Darwin.
The north east of Australia was included in the ANZAC
area. The Japanese capture of Singapore on 15 February
1942 brought a premature end to ABDA and the ANZAC
area, which would be transformed into the South West
Pacific Area under General MacArthur who was to move
from the Philippines to Australia. By mid February, the
Japanese had taken the Philippines and Singapore, a
guerilla war was under way in Timor, New Guinea was
under threat and the Japanese had provided shattering
evidence of their newfound strategic reach and their
capacity to harm Australia by capturing the 8th Division of
the AIF at Singapore and bombing Darwin four days later.
The turning of the tide in the Pacific would not arrive until
the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in May and June
1942.
Casey’s private thoughts in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor
suggest an abiding incomprehension and disdain of the
superficiality of American preparedness and the American
response to Pearl Harbor, especially when compared with
the manner in which Britain had reacted to being pitched
into war in 1939. As Casey put it on 9 December 1941:
The President spoke on the radio to the nation this
evening. His speech did not carry the fire and
conviction that the occasion demanded...several
minutes recounting of the individual countries that had
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been attacked without warning, which to me pointed
the lesson that USA should have been more prepared,
at Hawaii and elsewhere, to be attacked also without
warning. The lesson of a dozen countries seems
to have been wasted on them (My emphasis.)
Everyone I’ve met yesterday and today amongst senior
American officials, Chief Justice Stone, Sumner Welles
and several others have shown mortification and anger
at the Hawaiian disaster. Not the least among them
said that if the world can be saved, Britain would save
it. Her bearing and steadfastness, without chatter, after
the fall of France, 18 months ago, was a model for all
people.
While Casey noted that the Japanese attack had galvanised
the Americans into action, he seemed to doubt that the
Americans had the necessary spirit to recover. As he told
his diary:
11 December, 1941. I called on Harry Hopkins at the
White House. He looked very sick. I saw him in his
combined bedroom-office…my main object in seeing him
was to seek to impress him with the idea that it would
be wise to see that the President’s mind was not
bombarded with pessimism and depression by the U.S.
Army and Navy, who are mighty likely to be very
down.551
Casey continued to wear his mask, however, balancing his
obvious disgust at the failure of the United States to
anticipate Japan’s break-out in the Pacific with pep talks
about the readiness of Australia and Britain to help. Casey
noted in his diary notation of 29 December 1941 that, since
551
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7 December, his work had completely changed and that he
was now nearly 100% engaged with Army, Navy and Air
people

and

not

diplomats

or

the

State

Department.552American resources were far from limitless.
There were now manpower shortages, shipping shortages
and all manner of equipment shortages. There were
endless meetings with military people about all manner of
military supplies that Australia desperately needed –
shipping, aviation fuel, Kittyhawks and tank production
occupied much of the discussion. After Pearl Harbor, Casey
had to help supply Australia with much-needed materials of
war while pursuing ever more vigorously his campaign to
ensure that Americans did not lose sight of how much they
needed Australia. His diary hints at the difficulties that
Casey faced given that Australia was one priority among
many and not the most immediately threatened.
In December 1941, the United States and Britain were
concerned mainly about the Philippines and Singapore
respectively. Both great powers were convinced – rightly as
it turned out – that Australia was not part of Japan’s war
plans at that stage. Japan’s purpose was to prevent the
Americans using Australia as their base and bridgehead by
threatening ports, airfields and sea lanes. This was not how
matters were viewed in Australia or by Casey, for whom a
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Japanese invasion seemed a very real and growing threat.
Often Casey had to work Australia into the conversation
when his interlocutor had other priorities in mind. On 16
December 1941, for example, Casey had what he described
as ‘useful talks to McCloy (Under Secretary of War) about
plans to reinforce the Philippines. Casey recorded that he
‘renewed my suggestion to him about supply ships to
Australia with relevant ammunition and spares for all
American ships that might be using Australia as a base. He
said he’d get on with it…’553 The next day, Casey records
seeing ‘General Arnold (Head of US Army Air Corps) about
the United States aircraft that may be using or passing
through Australia’. Typically Casey would deal with the
person in charge, in this case Arnold, and then his
subordinates;
‘subsequently

after
saw

seeing

Col.

John

Arnold,
J.

Casey

York…

and

notes
got

full

particulars’.554
At his meeting with the President on 17 December 1941,
Casey was

thanked

for

his tireless

pressing of the

messsage that ‘the South West Pacific is one unit’. Less
reassuringly, Roosevelt told Casey that ‘Australia was just
as important as the Philippines’ but that ‘the Philippines
had a strategic position that might well save the whole SW
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Pacific’.555 On 18 December, Casey saw Admiral Stark who
was most keen for an ‘agreed strategic plan for us all in the
Pacific and Far East. Very well disposed…’556 Casey was less
pleased with his meeting with Stimson on 19 December
1940, complaining afterwards that: ‘it is noticeable that
Singapore is always put a bad second in comparison with
the Philippines.557 Yet, as Bridge points out, Stimson’s own
diary suggests that a much more positive message
emerged from this meeting. Stimson told Casey that should
the Philippines and Singapore be lost, the United States
would be ‘making Australia our base, and fight it out
there’.558 Casey set himself the task of constantly reminding
the Americans how important was Australia to their plans.
Events moved so swiftly that it was impossible to record all
his activities in his diaries.559 Yet no day went past without
Casey

dealing

with

an

influential

service

chief

or

functionary. Casey met with Marshall at least four times
after Pearl Harbor: 29 December, 1941, 6 January, 1942,
25 January, 1942 and 5 March, 1942. These meetings with
Marshall appear to have proceeded smoothly. Marshall was
not an easy man to impress. He was a cold, aloof person,
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‘remote and austere’, according to Eisenhower, a ‘man who
forced everyone to keep his distance’. President Roosevelt
had tried at their first meeting to slap him on the back and
call him ‘George’. Marshall drew back and let the President
know that the name was ‘General Marshall’ and ‘General
Marshall’ it remained. He had few intimate friends. When
he relaxed, he did it alone.560Casey experienced no such
difficulties dealing with Marshall if his diary entry of 25
January 1942 can be believed:
I saw General Marshall (Chief of U.S. General Staff) on
(the) same matters on which I saw the President
yesterday---the situation in S.W. Pacific, and American
reinforcements. I had nearly an hour with him on this
and related subjects. He is a very approachable and I
should think, a balanced sane individual.561
It was just as well that the relationship began well. After
the fall of Singapore, Casey on 20 February had ‘not an
easy interview’ with Marshall and Arnold in the light of
Curtin’s decision to recall the 6th and 7th Divisions of the
AIF from the Middle East.

Churchill’s decision to ignore

Curtin’s entreaty and to send both Divisions to Burma,
provoked a furious response from Curtin which had the
desired effect of Churchill reversing the decision.

In a

cable from Churchill, dated 23rd February and sent by
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Deputy Prime Minister clement Attlee, the Prim562e Minister
wrote, “My decision to move it northward during the few
hours required to receive your final answer was necessary
because otherwise your help, if given, might not have
arrived in time.”563

This message infuriated Bruce, wh9

considered it arrogant and appalling.564 Casey handled this
thorny issue as best he could and immediately went to
Hopkins to help break the news to Roosevelt. Perhaps
Casey’s personal touch helped to ensure that the American
reaction to the Australian decision to bring its troops home
was much more muted than Churchill’s.

The conversations with key military and political leaders
became even more intense as the war progressed. Casey
needed to be ready for discussions about the entirety of
the war effort. On 26 January 1941, Casey noted that he
talked to Admiral Ernest King about US naval forces
designated to hold the ‘Anzac area’. Then, on 27 January,
he talked to Arnold about ‘air requirements of New Guinea
area’. Arnold agreed that the ABDA area needed to be
extended to New Guinea as far as New Caledonia.
According to Casey, it should also include the northern part
of Australia. Casey’s diary entry of 2 February 1941 tells
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how Hopkins had sought him out:

Long talk to Harry Hopkins, at his request, late in the
afternoon. He was obviously seeking to get a picture of
the whole war against Japan, on which I aired the facts
and my views on the facts for some time. He appeared
to want to hear the ABDA area discussed – the Anzac
area… also what Australia is seeking in the way of
fighter aircraft. He phoned General Arnold while I was
there in an endeavour to help this along.565
This connection to Hopkins and the capacity to get Arnold
on the phone immediately was unlikely to have been
something that the average diplomat in Washington could
achieve. Casey complained that not only were resources
stretched to breaking point, but there was no centralised
body towhich Casey could petition about Australia’s needs.
Casey up until the end of his appointment had to make his
‘daily peregrinations round dozens of offices –seeing a
series of highly placed individuals about our problems’.566
These talks sometimes ended, as Casey would put it,
‘unsatisfactorily’. For the most part, Hokpkins’ influence
and networks were the best support that Casey could rely
upon.
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There were many failures, although Casey was always
quick to seize upon possible alternatives. Almost from the
announcement of Lend Lease, Casey had hoped for the
construction of tanks in Australia with a mechanised corps
emerging some time in 1942. It became obvious that this
would

not

happen,

Casey

on

this

occasion

blaming

decisions made in Australia rather than American priorities.
On 6 March 1942, Casey noted that he urged the British
Tank Mission representative ‘to use any means of getting
some medium tanks early. He made useful suggestion that
we offer to take some without 75mm guns’.567

While the

Australian Army was anxious for a tank capable of
matching the Germans, Casey was desperate to have any
tanks at all that were at least capable of matching it with
the Japanese.568 Casey needed to be pragmatic and
facilitate solutions and compromises in conditions where
resources were in short supply.
Casey as ever was deeply concerned about his position in
the trading of information in Washington. He learned in
February that information from Australian sources had
found its way into Tokyo radio broadcasts. Casey was
sufficiently worried to press Welles to ‘speak to Marshall,
King and Arnold in the sense that they could continue to
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talk to me with safety’.569 Here, Casey believed that the
situation was retrieved. On 13 March 1942, Casey noted
that he had ‘a confidential talk with General Marshall.
Appears to have no reservations as to what he tells me’.
On 26 March, Casey noted that he ‘Saw General Marshall,
talked about world problems’.570

Historians have recognised that Casey was often on the
right side of these strategic debates. As Bridge points out,
during the Arcadia talks involving both Roosevelt and
Churchill after Pearl Harbor, Casey successfully pressed the
case for a unified command in the new South West Pacific
theatre.571 Horner notes that reacting to plans for the new
theatre, Evatt objected that Casey was off on a ‘frolic of his
own’ only to find that the naval chiefs backed Casey.572 On
2 February 1942 Casey expressed satisfaction that the
Americans were now planning to use ‘the Indian Ocean
Route (Seychelles, Diego Garcia Cocos)’, the route that
Casey insisted that the Australian Air Department survey in
1939. According to Casey, he had painted a ‘picture of the
possibility of the Imperial Air Route being cut – at which
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everyone laughed’.573 On 16 February 1942 following the
fall of Singapore, Casey described talking to General Arnold
about ‘the Australian situation generally’. Casey summed
up the position regarding Australia succinctly enough:
‘Where else can the situation be retrieved?’574 This had been
Casey’s message for a very long time and now in the
desperate

situation

of

the

late

winter

of

1942,

its

importance was becoming increasingly obvious. Here Casey
struck a tone of vindication, as well as desperation.
Australia still needed to make its voice heard given the
competing demands upon American decision makers. On 3
March 1942, Casey described his two principal troubles to
Stimson, the lack of a body – as distinct from a series of
individuals

- where South-West Pacific matters

were

discussed and the fact that Australia was in danger - yet
the necessary war materials were not being shipped to
Australia.575 On 12 March 1942, he had talks with Roosevelt
about ‘the message for Mr. Curtin about the co-ordination
of all the air strength in Australia under one leader’.576 While
his last months in Washington were fraught in terms of the
storm surrounding his move to the Middle East, Casey
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continued to keep the key American strategists informed
about Australia. Immediately before his departure,Casey
described how he handedmilitary appraisals coming from
Australia directly to the key American military decision
makers:
I saw Dill and Marshall and King – and handed each of
them a copy of the Australian Chiefs of Staff
appreciation of the situation in and near Australiareceived from Australia by telegram this morning. I
gave Marshall an extra copy for Arnold. It is a
document of the highest importance and it is essential
for all these four men to have it.577

As he left Washington, Casey noted in his diary that: ‘There
is no more diplomacyto be done. The job here in future will
be a military liaison job far below the top level…Marshall
and King are going to run the war’.578

Casey was perhaps offering a self-justification for leaving
Washington before the war was won. On the other hand,
Casey’s

multiple

gifts

of

strategic

vision,

superior

networking skills,and mastery of technical military detail
made him a crucial asset to Australia after Pearl Harbor.If
his task were to save Australia, he could be well satisfied
with his efforts.Casey came from and spoke of a country
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and a region that hitherto had not been in the American
field of vision, in contemporary jargon, ‘not on the radar’.
He opened up a field of vision of great strategic potential.
Significantly, of the discussions Casey had with President
Roosevelt, more than half occurred in the days and weeks
immediately after America had entered the war. These
talks indicate how important Australia had become in
American strategic planning and that Casey was the
individual to whom the Americans turned for advice and
support.
It would be a mistake to argue that the obvious usefulness
of Australia to the Americans after Pearl Harbor meant that
Australia would be able to significantly influence the
running of the war. Curtin and Evatt would find it very
difficult to make an Australian voice heard in the crucial
strategic debates.579 Yet Casey’s activity in the months that
followed Pearl Harbor provided further evidence of his
infuence and capacities as a diplomatic all-rounder. His
understanding of and contribution to Allied strategy, his
mastery of military detail, and his successful networking
enhanced Australia’s visibility at a time when American
strategists were scrambling to find a way to bring about
victory in the Pacific War.
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CHAPTER TEN: Conclusion

Casey was a remarkable diplomatic all-rounder whose
experiences were drawn from the military, business,
academic and political worlds. There is clear evidence that
he was capable of thinking strategically in both political and
military terms. The two years he spent in Washington were
years in which he sought to ‘save’ Australia. Just how
difficult a task that this was found expression in the
message that Casey received upon arriving in Washington
that Australia was not part of the American strategic
picture. Perhaps sensing that Manila and Singapore would
be lost in the first months of a Pacific war, Casey’s
message was that Australia was not distant from the
conflict that might well break out in the Pacific.
Although Casey was arguing with civilians and politicians
such as Hull, Berle, Hornbeck, Acheson, and Roosevelt, he
was arguing a case that was essentially strategic. His aim
was to impose a strategic mind-set or vision on his
American interlocutors who seemed beguiled by public
opinion and dismissive of the existential danger to the
United States. In 1941, Casey was beginning to move from
this political Washington elite so as to work directly on
Marshall, Arnold, Stark and King who would lead the fight
on fields of battle that were crucial to Australia’s survival.
Casey understood better than most that the oceans around
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Australia and the large landmass of Australia itself might
well be those fields of battle. Casey needed all the
imagination, intelligence, and persistence he could muster.
Casey’s endeavors on Australia’s behalf while leading the
legation in the United States required of him a careful
reading and understanding of the American position in the
fraught world situation, as well as qualities that could be
summed up as sound judgment.

Also necessary was the

energy to implement all that he believed necessary.

Casey’s

activities

at

the

top

levels

of

the

British

government introduced him to the world of international
relations,

diplomacy

and

the

personal

attributes

to

effectively negotiate in the context of competing interests.
All that experience was employed in full measure during his
two years in the United States. Casey approached the
United States with three different lines of attack. Firstly,
through diplomacy, then almost simultaneously, through
public opinion, that is moving the American people to see
the need for greater American involvement in the conflict
and finally, after diplomacy and public relations had
achieved

results,

enumerating
President,

the

the

engaging

the

military.

interviews

he

conducted

Secretary

of

State

and

the

The
with

data
the

Assistant

Secretaries, other senior members of the Administration,
newspaper

publishers,

radio

network

proprietors

and
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perhaps most important of all, the heads of the military
and the navy reveal the extraordinary range and scope of
his activities, undertaken for one purpose, to influence
events.
In the summer of 1940, Casey directed his efforts at
appraising America of the mortal dangers confronting
Britain and the dire effects such a loss would have on the
rest of the word, especially the United States. Once the
threat to Britain had passed, Casey sought to involve the
United States in the affairs of the Pacific-Asia region with a
view to ensuring American involvement in the longexpected conflict with the Empire of Japan.The evidence
suggests that Casey was a rare example of a Dominion
representative in the United States who stirred up the
decision-makers of Washington, who attempted to make
some impact upon American strategic thinking.

Even

before Pearl Harbor, Casey’s endeavours brought him in
contact

with

every

influential

figure

and

relevant

organisation in the United States at that time. That he was
accepted and recognised as a person of importance in the
Oval Office, the State Department, the British Embassy,
and senior American naval and militarydiscussions; that his
opinions were sought and listened to by the major
American newspaper and radio executives; and that he
spoke frequently to major and local organizations all point
to the fact, that, in contemporary parlance, he fought way

340

above his weight. His diplomatic skills and the fact that so
many Americans, in a range of levels, listened to him,
enhance his achievements.
The question needs to be asked as to whether all those he
spoke to would have been prepared to include him in their
reference groups if his views were of no relevance?There
can be no doubt that Casey was hugely active in
propagating greater American involvement in Pacific affairs.
The results of those activities may be impossible to gauge.
The essence of diplomacy is that things are done quietly,
secretly,

without

public

disclosure.

Yet

the

evidence

appears overwhelming that the barn-storming did in fact,
influence American thinking at the highest levels.
A constant theme of Casey’s public speeches and private
urgings during 1940 and 1941 was the establishment of an
American

interest

and

presence

in

the

Pacific.

The

conversion of Australia from an under-populated outpost of
Empire into a vibrant American base virtually ensuring
protection

from

Japanese

invasion

was

undoubtedly

Casey’s underlying motive, but was not something that
could be openly discussed in those terms. In all his
discussions with American officials or at least those
concerned with overall strategy, Casey was at pains to
emphasise that the various theatres of war were vitally
connected, a point that Roosevelt recognised as central to
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Casey’s message. The American wartime reliance upon
Australia as a base confirmed Casey’s foresight.
Coinciding with Casey’s years in the United States, there
was a seismic shift in the thinking of the military and
political powers of the United States in the two-year period
leading up to Pearl Harbor. As Casey predicted, it was the
pressure of events that drove the process and an ‘incident’
that got the United States into the war. Yet it was Casey
who patiently explained the strategic dimension of the
Pacific War to his listeners in a way that prioritised
Australia. The Marshall/Eisenhower plan might have been
drawn up by Casey himself were he given the opportunity
to do so.
The competing claims about the relative roles of Curtin and
Casey as instigators of the Australia-America Alliance may
each be contested.

Moreover, they invite the valid

question; need there be any ‘father’ or progenitor of the
Alliance? Yet it has to be recognised that the decisions by
the United States, after the shock of 7 December, owe a
significant debt to the foresight and persistence of one
man, Richard GardinerCasey.
Casey’s

nimble

developed

and

networking

effective
skills

strategy

and

enabledhimto

his

well

become

a

dynamic and effective force representing Australia in the
corridors of American power at a time unique in Australian
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history when the future of the nation was uncertain. Casey
would often be accused of lacking political acumen. Yet his
approach to American politics was shrewd and exemplary.
He eschewed the flowery language of civilisational bonds.
Instead, he was tireless in his efforts to sell Australia as a
base for American power in the Pacific. In his efforts to
court public opinion and persuade American leaders, Casey
was interventionist, he was assertive, too persistent to be
ignored. He employed tactics and adopted an overall
strategy that had clear and explicit aims. Significantly, he
did all this without stirring up resentment, without earning
a reputation as an interfering pest.
The aim of this thesis was to identify what Casey did, if
anything, to involve Australia in the American strategy for
winning the Pacific War.

The lack of recognition lies in

Curtin’s rather than Casey’s name being attached to what
really mattered in terms of the United States-Australia
alliance, the transformation of Australia into an American
base. As the good news from Hopkins recorded in Casey’s
diary on 22 December shows, Casey did in fact receive
plaudits at the time even if his reports to Canberra failed to
emphasise their significance.

His reports frequently have

the characteristics of British understatement. What is clear
and beyond argument is that the final decisions of the
Americans,
ambitions.

the

end

result,

even

exceeded

Casey’s
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From an historical point of view, it is unfortunate that there
is no official, weighty Proclamation conveying a Presidential
or

Congressional

Declaration

guaranteeing

massive

American support for Australia. Instead, we have Hopkins’
verbal assurance, pledging virtually the same thing.

It is

clear that the American decision to make Australia the
jumping-off base may have been formalised in the days
immediately following Pearl Harbor but it was a decision
that followed years of discussion and examination, in which
Casey played a crucial role. The corollary of all that is that
Casey is due some recognition that hitherto accrued to
Curtin.
In summation, Casey’s endeavours and his influence were
a real, tangible fact of life in pre-war America.

It is

impossible to measure quantitively the extent of that
influence.

All that can be said is that is existed, proof

enough to conclude that Casey’s reputation deserves
greater recognition of the contribution he made to the joint
Australia/America effrort in the Pacific War, an effort which
justifies revision of that reputation.Casey was not an
insignificant player in the diplomatic game that led to the
wartime alliance between the United States and Australia,
but rather an influential participant whose contribution,
albeit difficult to determine quantitively, was real. The
position of Casey in the framework of Australian history
therefore assumes a new relevance, one that recognises
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his vital role in the fact that the United States looked to
Australia in December 1941.
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APPENDIX A
The Task Ahead by John Curtin. The Herald (Melbourne)
27 December 1941
That reddish veil which o’er the face
Of night-hag East is drawn…
Flames new disaster fro the race?
Or can it be the Dawn?
So wrote Bernard O’Dowd. I see 1942 as a year in which
we shall know the answer.
I would, however, that we provide the answer. We can and
we will.

Therefore, I see 1942 as a year of immense

change in Australian life.
The Australian Government’s policy has been grounded on
two facts. One is that the war with Japan is not a phase of
the struggle with the Axis powers, but is a new war.
The second is that Australia must go on in a war footing.
Those two facts involve two lines of action – one in the
direction of external policy as to our dealings with Britain,
the United States, Russia, the Netherlands, East Indies and
China in the higher direction of the war in the Pacific.

346

The second is the reshaping, in fact, the revolutionising, of
the Australian way of life until a war footing is attained
quickly, efficiently and without question.
As the Australian Government enters 1942, it has behind it
a record of realism in respect of foreign affairs. I point to
the forthright declaration in respect of Finland, Hungary
and Rumania, which was followed with little delay by a
declaration

of

war

against

those

countries

by

the

Democracies.
We felt that there could be no half-measures in our
dealings with the Soviet when that nation was being
assailed by the three countries mentioned
Similarly, as we put forward that a reciprocal agreement
should be negotiated to meet an event of aggression by
Japan. Our suggestion was then regarded, wrongly as time
as proved, as premature.
Now, with equal realism, we take the view that while the
determination of military policy is the Soviet’s business, we
should be able to look forward with reason to aid from
Russia against Japan.
We look for a solid and impregnable barrier of the
democracies against the three Axis powers, and we refuse
to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be
treated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict.
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By that it is not meant that any one of the other theatres of
war is of less importance than the Pacific, but that Australia
asks for a concerted plan evoking the greatest strength at
the Democracies’ disposal, determined upon hurling Japan
back.
*

The Australian Government therefore regards the Pacific
struggle as primarily one in which the United States and
Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the
Democracies’ fighting plan.
Without any inhibitions of any kind I make it quite clear
that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our
traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.
We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We
know the ;constant threat of invasion.
dangers of dispersal of strength.

We know the

But we know too that

Australia can go, and Britain can still hold on.
We are therefore determined that Australia shall not go,
and we shall exert all our energies toward the shaping of a
plan, with the United States as it s keystone, which will
give to our country some confidence of being able to hold
out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy.
Summed up, Australia external policy will be shaped
toward obtaining Russian aid, and working out, with the
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United States as the major factor, a plan of Pacific
strategy, along with British, Chinese and Dutch forces.
*

Australian internal policy has undergone striking changes in
the past few weeks. These, and those that will inevitabnly
come before 1942 is far advanced, have been prompted by
several reasons.
In the first place, the Commonwealth Government found it
exceedingly difficult to bring the Australian people to a
realization of what, after two years of war, our position had
become. Even the entry of Japan, bringing a direct threat
in our own waters, was met with a subconscious view that
the Americans would deal with the short-sighted, under-fed
and fanatical Japanese.
The announcement that no further appeals would be made
to the Australian people, and the decisions that followed,
were motivated by psychological factors.
arresting

effect.

lackadaisical

They

Australian

awakened
mind

the

in

They had an
the

attitude

somewhat
that

was

imperative if we were to save ourselves, to enter an all-in
effort in the only possible manner.
That

experiment

in

psychology

was

eminently

successful, and we commenced 1942 with a better
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realization, by a greater number of Australians, of
what the war means than in the whole preceding two
years.
The decisions were prompted by other reasons, all related
to the necessity of getting on to a war footing, and the
results so far achieved have been most heartening,
especially in respect of production and conservation of
stocks.
I make it clear the experiment undertaken was never
intended as one to awaken Australian patriotism or sense
of duty. Those qualities have been ever-present; but the
response to leadership and direction had ;never been
requested

of

the

people,

and

desirable

talents

and

untapped resources had lain dormant.
Our task for 1942 is stern.

The Government is under no

illusions as to “ something cropping up” in the future.
The nadir of our fortunes in this struggle, as compared with
1914-1918, has yet to be reached.
Let there be no mistake about that. The position Australia
faces internally far exceeds in potential and sweeping
dangers anything that confronted us in 1914-1918.
The year 1942 will impose supreme tests.

These

range from resistance to invasion to deprivation or
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more and more amenities, not only the amenities of
peacetime but those enjoyed in time of war.
*
Australians must realise that to place the nation on a war
footing every citizen must place himself, his private and
business affairs, his entire mode of living, on a war footing.
The civilian way of life cannot be any less rigorous, can
contribute no less than thaqt which the fighting men have
to follow.
I demand that Australians everywhere realise that Australia
is now inside the fighting lines.
Ausralian governmental policy will be directed strictly on
those lines.

We have to regard our country and its

7,000,000 people as though we were a nation and a people
with the enemy hammering at our frontier.

Australians must be perpetually on guard;

on guard

against the possibility, at any hour without warning, of raid
or invasion;

on guard against spending money, or doing

anything that cannot be justified;

on guard against

hampering by disputation or idle, irresponsible chatter, the
decisions of the Government taken for the welfare of all.
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All Australian is the stake in this war.

All Australia must

stand together to hold that stake. We face a powerful, ably
led and unbelievable courageous foe.
We must watch the enemy accordingly.
him accordingly.

We shall watch
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